Lieutenant-General Jubal Early’s Confederate Army of the Valley fell back northward after failing to capture Fort Stevens on the northern outskirts of Washington, D.C. Early’s men moved through Rockville and then turned west toward Poolesville and the Potomac River beyond. They reached the Potomac almost exactly 30 days after being detached from the Army of Northern Virginia.
Early’s forces completed their river crossing on July 14 and gathered at Leesburg, Virginia. They had a long supply train filled with captured goods from Maryland, along with about 1,000 prisoners, horses, cattle, and $220,000 taken from Hagerstown and Frederick as reparations for Federal destruction in the Shenandoah Valley.
Early’s raid had been a success in that it caused great panic in Washington, and it diverted Federal attention and resources from other theaters. It also boosted Confederate morale and temporarily brightened the dimming hope that European powers might recognize Confederate independence. But it had not caused the Federal armies at Petersburg to weaken themselves enough for General Robert E. Lee’s army to break out.
Federal General-in-Chief Ulysses S. Grant reported that Confederate deserters had confirmed the Washington raiders consisted only of Early’s command. This meant that 1) Lee’s army had not been substantially weakened, and 2) the Federal forces in the area between Washington and West Virginia could track down and destroy Early’s smaller force.
But President Abraham Lincoln noted with frustration that none of the six Federal generals around the capital were stepping up to lead a pursuit of Early’s army. Grant finally assigned Major-General Horatio G. Wright to lead the operation. Wright’s force consisted of his own Sixth Corps, elements of the Nineteenth Corps, and several units that had been assigned to defend Washington. The pursuit began a full day after Early withdrew, with the Federals not arriving at Poolesville until the 15th. Confederate cavalry guarded the river fords to delay a Federal crossing even further.
By that time, Hunter’s Army of West Virginia had finally arrived at Harpers Ferry, burning and plundering homes on their march through their army’s namesake. Hunter received orders to join forces with Wright to pursue and destroy Early, with Wright in overall command. When Hunter protested that he outranked Wright, Grant placed Hunter’s army under command of Brigadier-General George Crook while Hunter handled the army’s administrative duties from department headquarters.
Wright hoped to trap Early’s Confederates between his force and Crook’s, but he had trouble communicating with Crook due to Confederates cutting telegraph wires in the area. Crook’s 7,000 Federals crossed the Potomac near Harpers Ferry on the 15th and advanced to Hillsboro.
Back at Washington, Lincoln held a cabinet meeting where there was speculation as to the size of the force that had attacked Fort Stevens. As Navy Secretary Gideon Welles recalled:
“The President wants to believe there was a large force, and yet evidently his private convictions are otherwise. But the military leaders, the War Office, have insisted there was a large force. We have done nothing, and it is more gratifying to our self-pride to believe there were many of them, especially as we are likely to let them off with considerable plunder scot-free.”
Welles added, “The National Intelligencer comments with a good deal of truth and ability on our national humiliation, as exemplified in this late affair. There is no getting away from the statements and facts presented.”
Meanwhile, Grant sent Lieutenant-Colonel Cyrus Comstock of his staff to Washington with a message for Chief of Staff Henry W. Halleck. Grant wanted Hunter (Crook) to pursue and destroy Early’s army while Wright brought the Sixth and Nineteenth corps back to Petersburg before Early could rejoin Lee’s army. Comstock stated that Halleck laughed at this message and complained that Grant should have never moved his Federals south of the James River because it left Washington vulnerable to exactly the kind of attack that Early’s Confederates had made. Comstock wrote that Halleck said–
“–it was useless to talk about elements of strategy–that Lee was in a central position in reference to A. of P. (Army of the Potomac) and troops at Washn and could act on either at pleasure. That if Wright & 19 Corps were withdrawn Early would at once come back & play the same game over. Asked him what he supposed we could do with a siege of Richmond on North side (of the James)–he said that was not for him to say–that he might return by asking what we could do by a siege on S. side.”
After Comstock delivered Halleck’s response, Grant sent the chief of staff a new message:
“I want if possible to get the 6th & 19th corps here to use them before the enemy can get Early back. With Hunter in the Shenandoah Valley and always between the enemy and Washington force enough can always be had to check an invasion until reinforcements can go from here. This does not prevent Hunter from following the enemy even to Gordonsville and Charlottesville if he can do it with his own force and such other improvised troops as he can get. But he should be cautious.”
Without offering any advice as to what should be done next, Halleck reiterated his objection to Grant moving south of the James in a letter to Major-General William T. Sherman:
“Entre nous, I fear Grant has made a fatal mistake in putting himself south of James river. He cannot now reach Richmond without taking Petersburg, which is strongly fortified, crossing the Appomattox and recrossing the James. Moreover, by placing his army south of Richmond he opens the capital and the whole North to Rebel raids. Lee can at any time detach 30,000 or 40,000 men without our knowing it till we are actually threatened. I hope we may yet have full success, but I find that many of Grant’s general officers think the campaign already a failure.”
Both the Federal pursuit and the complaints about leaving the capital vulnerable would continue.
Bibliography
- Catton, Bruce, Grant Takes Command. Open Road Media, Kindle Edition, 2015.
- Davis, Jefferson, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government: All Volumes. Heraklion Press, Kindle Edition 2013, 1889.
- Donald, David Herbert, Lincoln. New York: Simon & Schuster, (Kindle Edition), 2011.
- Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative: Red River to Appomattox. New York: Vintage Civil War Library, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group (Kindle Edition), 2011.
- Lewis, Thomas A., The Shenandoah in Flames: The Valley Campaign of 1864. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983.
- Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day. New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971.
- McFeely, William S., Grant. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1981.
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