General-in-Chief Ulysses S. Grant, the overall Federal commander, resolved that the Federal armies in front of Petersburg, Virginia, needed to “do something in the way of offensive movement” toward the Confederate capital of Richmond, 22 miles to the north. This would divert Confederate attention and resources from both the siege of Petersburg and the tunneling expedition outside that city.
Grant met with Major-General George G. Meade, commanding the Army of the Potomac, on the morning of July 25 to share his plan. A joint infantry-cavalry force would move north of the James River, “having for its real object the destruction of the railroad on that side.” The infantry would threaten the Richmond defenses while the cavalry would ride north and west of Richmond to wreck track on the Virginia Central Railroad, which linked the capital to the fertile Shenandoah Valley. The Confederates of General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, defending Petersburg and Richmond, depended on the Valley and that railroad for sustenance.
Grant added, “It is barely possible that by a bold move this expedition may surprise the little garrison of citizen soldiery now in Richmond and get in.” If so, “Concentrate all the force possible at the point in the enemy’s line we expect to penetrate.”
Meade assigned Major-General Winfield Scott Hancock’s Second Corps and two divisions of Major-General Philip Sheridan’s Cavalry Corps to the mission. They were to cross the James River at Deep Bottom, 10 miles southeast of Richmond, where troops of Major-General Benjamin F. Butler’s Army of the James had built two pontoon bridges. Grant preferred that the Confederates see this movement because it would compel Lee to send some of his troops north to meet the threat and thereby weaken his defense line at Petersburg.
Sheridan would ride ahead while Hancock confronted the Confederates at Chaffin’s Bluff and prevented them from opposing Sheridan. “I do not want Hancock to attack intrenched lines,” Grant said, since Sheridan’s cavalry was to play the main part in the operation. The Federals moved out on the night and early morning of July 26-27. They crossed the James and occupied a bridgehead held by the Tenth Corps of Butler’s army. A correspondent observed the Federals for two hours crossing the river and noted “that flow of men, like a river, passing, still passing, but never passed.”
Lee was already aware of Grant’s plan. He believed this would be just a diversion from the main action outside Petersburg, but as a precaution he quietly sent Major-General Joseph B. Kershaw’s division north of the James on the 23rd, before Grant had even finalized his plan. Hancock’s Federals came up and met unexpected resistance near where the New Market Road intersected Bailey’s Creek. Nevertheless, the Federals overwhelmed the Confederates and captured four 20-pound Parrott guns.
Hancock took positions east of Bailey’s Creek, between the New Market Road to the southwest and Fussell’s Mill to the northeast. The Federals were suddenly pinned down by Confederate fire from the divisions of Kershaw and Major-General Cadmus M. Wilcox. The fighting diminished while Lieutenant-Generals Richard H. Anderson and Richard Ewell argued over which of them was the ranking Confederate commander.
Upon reconnoitering the enemy positions west of Bailey’s Creek, Hancock reported, “The works appeared to be filled with men, and a number of pieces of artillery were in position. After a careful examination of the position it was decided that the chances of successful assault were unfavorable, and it was determined to maneuver to the right, with the view of turning the position.”
Sheridan’s troopers moved beyond Hancock’s right and began probing up the Darbytown Road, which ran northwest to Richmond. Troopers of Brigadier-General Alfred T.A. Torbert’s division seized the high ground around Fussell’s Mill, but a Confederate counterattack drove the troopers off.
Despite these repulses, the Federals were achieving their overall goal by forcing Lee to send more troops north of the James until he was left with just three divisions to cover the entire Petersburg line. These reinforcements included Major-General Henry Heth’s division and a cavalry division under Lee’s son, Major-General W.H.F. “Rooney” Lee. The Confederates on the Petersburg line were now sufficiently weakened for the impending mine explosion.
Meanwhile, Grant rode north and arrived on the scene on the late afternoon of the 27th. He was surprised to see such strong Confederate resistance, as troops from the Richmond garrison had hurried to strengthen the defenses in front of Hancock and Sheridan. Grant reinforced Hancock’s infantry with a brigade from the Nineteenth Corps and issued orders for the Federals to turn the enemy’s left (north) flank the next day. This would enable Sheridan to ride northwest and raid the railroad as planned.
On the 28th, Sheridan’s Federals moved to assault the enemy left near Riddle’s Shop, but the Confederates preemptively attacked their right with three brigades under Kershaw. The dismounted Federals took refuge just below a ridgeline and repelled a Confederate charge with their repeating carbines. The Federals took 300 prisoners and two battle flags while losing a cannon.
Despite the Federal success, Lee’s swift decision to bolster the Confederate defenses prevented Sheridan from moving toward Richmond or the Virginia Central Railroad as planned. Hancock positioned his forces so they could withdraw back across the James, and the Federals began returning to the Petersburg line that night.
The Federals sustained 334 casualties in this operation. Grant reported to Washington, “We have failed in what I hoped to accomplish–that is, to surprise the enemy and get on to their roads with the cavalry near to Richmond and destroy them out to the South Anna. I am yet in hopes of turning this diversion to account, so as to yield greater results than if the first object had been accomplished.”
Despite failing to raid the railroad, Grant had drawn nearly half of Lee’s army north of the James, leaving only 18,000 men to defend five miles of lines at Petersburg. Thus, it was a successful diversion from those tunneling under the Confederate lines. Grant and his Federals now turned to that operation to bring them ultimate success.
Bibliography
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