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Meade Risks Personal Ruin

Maj Gen G.G. Meade | Image Credit: CivilWarDailyGazette.com

Major-General George G. Meade’s Federal Army of the Potomac and General Robert E. Lee’s Confederate Army of Northern Virginia remained within striking distance of each other on either side of Mine Run in Virginia. Meade had aborted an assault on Lee’s right flank after receiving word that it was too strong to break. Finding no other weak points in the line, Meade ended his brief campaign. The Federals would withdraw back across the Rapidan River.

Meanwhile, Lee’s Confederates continued waiting for an attack that would not come. Lee reported on December 1, “Preferring to receive an attack rather than assume the offensive, our army remained in its position all day.” Major-General Jubal Early, temporarily commanding the Confederate Second Corps on the left, sent word that the Federals were withdrawing their guns in his front. Lee guessed that they were being moved to support an attack on Lieutenant-General A.P. Hill’s Third Corps holding the right. However, it was part of the general Federal withdrawal.

The Federals began pulling out in the early, freezing twilight of the 1st without a fight. When Lee realized the Federals would not attack that day, he resolved to launch an attack of his own the next morning. According to Early:

“Having waited in vain for the enemy to attack us, the commanding general determined to take the initiative, and for that purpose directed me on the afternoon of the 1st to extend my line during the night to the right as far as the plank road, so as to enable two divisions to be withdrawn from General Hill’s part of the line, for the purpose of attacking the enemy’s left next morning.”

Lee directed Hill’s divisions under Major-Generals Richard H. Anderson and Cadmus M. Wilcox to advance against Meade’s left. But when they marched forward on the morning of the 2nd, they saw that the Federals had retreated. Regretting the missed opportunity to give battle, Lee said, “I am too old to command this army; we should never have permitted those people to get away.” The Confederates did not pursue.

Maj-Gen G.G. Meade | Image Credit: Wikipedia

The Mine Run campaign cost the Federals 1,653 total casualties, while the Confederates lost 629. Meade acknowledged that he faced “certain personal ruin” for withdrawing without giving battle, bitterly remarking that those critical of his conduct thought it “would be better to strew the road to Richmond with the dead bodies of our soldiers than that there should be nothing done.” But by not attacking such strong fortifications, Meade probably saved thousands of lives and avoided another demoralizing failure.

Meade reported to his superiors at Washington, “I am free to admit that the movement across the Rapidan was a failure, but I respectfully submit that the causes of this failure… were beyond my control.” The Lincoln administration had refused to allow him to establish a base of operations at Fredericksburg to the east, thus forcing him to try to confront Lee to the west. Also, several corps commanders did not adhere to Meade’s orders that the campaign be carried out with speed and stealth. Meade was furious with his subordinates, as Provost-Marshal Marsena Patrick noted that he was “so much exasperated at the failure of his plans, or of his Corps Commanders, that he was like a Bear with a sore head & no one was willing to approach him.”

Anticipating an administration rebuke for not personally reconnoitering the enemy positions beforehand, Meade asserted, “It is impossible (that) a commanding general can reconnoiter in person a line over seven miles in extent, and act on his own judgment as to the expediency of attack or not.” In a letter to his wife, Meade concluded that this “fiasco” sealed his fate as army commander. But he added, “I would rather be ignominiously dismissed, and suffer anything, than knowingly and willfully have thousands of brave men slaughtered for nothing. It was my deliberate judgment that I ought not to attack; I acted on that judgment, and I am willing to stand or fall by it at all hazards. As it is, my conscience is clear. I did the best I could.”


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