After the Federal defeat at Cold Harbor, the marching and fighting that had taken place for nearly 30 straight days briefly stopped. A division commander whose unit was taken out of the front line on June 8 noted that it was the first day in more than a month in which none of his men had been killed or wounded. Another officer stated that he was so exhausted that he could not write a coherent letter home to his family; “I can only tell my wife I am alive and well. I am too stupid for any use.”
The Federal Army of the Potomac had sustained over 50,000 casualties in the past month, and criticism of General-in-Chief Ulysses S. Grant’s strategy was getting louder among the rank and file. However, President Abraham Lincoln remained supportive, telling a group of New Yorkers on the day after the Cold Harbor repulse, “My previous high estimate of Gen. Grant has been maintained and heightened by what has occurred in the remarkable campaign he is now conducting…”
The Federals were now closer to Richmond than they had been since June 1862. They had also inflicted losses on General Robert E. Lee’s Confederate Army of Northern Virginia that could not be replaced. But they had not destroyed Lee’s army, and they had not captured Richmond. And they had run out of room to maneuver north of the James River. Previous Federal commanders had fallen back to regroup and come up with a new strategy, but Grant would not. He wrote to Chief of Staff Henry W. Halleck on June 5:
“A full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north-east of Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg Railroad to enable us to use that road for supplying the army… My idea from the start has been to beat Lee’s army if possible north of Richmond; then after destroying his lines of communication on the north side of the James River to transfer the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat.
“I now find, after over 30 days of trial, that the enemy deems it of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now have. They act purely on the defensive, behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where in case of repulse they can instantly retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to make all cannot be accomplished that I had designed outside of the city. I have therefore resolved upon the following plan.
“I will continue to hold substantially to the ground now occupied by the Army of the Potomac, taking advantage of any favorable circumstance that may present itself until the cavalry can be sent west to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad from about Beaver Dam for some 25 or 30 miles west. When this is effected I will move the army to the south side of James River, either by crossing the Chickahominy and marching near to City Point, or by going to the mouth of the Chickahominy on north side and crossing there. To provide for this last and most possible contingency, several ferry-boats of the largest class ought to be immediately provided…
“The feeling of the two armies now seems to be that the rebels can protect themselves only by strong intrenchments, whilst our army is not only confident of protecting itself without intrenchments, but that it can beat and drive the enemy wherever and whenever he can be found without this protection.”
Disengaging from the Confederate army and moving 100,000 men across the wide James River was a major gamble because if Lee found out about it, he could attack and destroy the Federal army as it crossed. It would also expose Washington to a potential enemy counterthrust. And Grant could expect no more reinforcements to replace his losses, as Halleck notified him on the 6th, “I inclose a list of troops forwarded from this department to the Army of the Potomac since the campaign opened–48,265 men. I shall send you a few regiments more, when all resources will be exhausted till another draft is made.”
To obscure his main movement, Grant planned three diversions:
- Major-General Philip Sheridan would lead two cavalry divisions in a raid on the Virginia Central Railroad in the Confederate rear
- Major-General Benjamin F. Butler’s Federal Army of the James would try breaking out of Bermuda Hundred below the James
- A portion of the Army of the Potomac would feign another attack on Cold Harbor
Moving south of the James River would cut Lee’s supply line coming into Richmond from the south. It would also threaten the vital railroad town of Petersburg. If the Federals captured Petersburg, Richmond would most likely follow. As Lee said, “We must destroy this army of Grant’s before he gets to the James River. If he gets there, it will become a siege, and then it will be a mere question of time.”
Grant began the grand movement by issuing orders to Sheridan on the 5th to ride west and join forces with Major-General David Hunter’s Federal Army of the Shenandoah at Charlottesville. The combined force would then destroy track on the Virginia Central as it headed back east to rejoin the Potomac army. Grant wrote Hunter the next day:
“General Sheridan leaves here to-morrow morning, with instructions to proceed to Charlottesville, Va., and to commence there the destruction of the Va. Cen. R.R., destroying this way as much as possible. The complete destruction of this road and of the canal on James River is of great importance to us… If you should be on the railroad between Charlottesville and Lynchburg, it may be practicable to detach a cavalry force to destroy the canal. Lose no opportunity to destroy the canal.”
Meanwhile, Grant notified Butler that the Potomac army would be crossing the James to join forces with his army. Butler’s army was currently bottled up at Bermuda Hundred by General P.G.T. Beauregard’s Confederates, but part of Grant’s diversion involved Butler making a breakout attempt.
Beauregard warned the Confederate high command that Grant may next target Petersburg. President Jefferson Davis discounted this in a message to Lee: “Our scouts give no information as to the arrival of troops from below, and if none have come I cannot believe the attack to be of much force.” Lee acknowledged that Grant might consider such a move, but he did not believe Grant could pull it off without detection.
Bibliography
- Anderson, Nancy Scott; Anderson, Dwight, The Generals: Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee. New York: Vintage Books, 1987.
- Angle, Paul M., A Pictorial History of the Civil War Years. New York: Doubleday, 1967.
- Bearss, Edwin C. with Suderow, Bryce, The Petersburg Campaign: The Eastern Front Battles, June-August 1864, Volume I. El Dorado Hills, Calif.: Savas Beattie LLC; Casemate Publishers, Kindle Edition, 2012.
- Catton, Bruce, Grant Takes Command. Open Road Media, Kindle Edition, 2015.
- Davis, William C., Death in the Trenches: Grant at Petersburg. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983.
- Grant, Ulysses S., Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. New York: Da Capo Press, 1982 (original 1885, republication of 1952 edition).