Tag Archives: Philip Sheridan

The Death of Jeb Stuart

May 12, 1864 – The “Cavalier of Dixie” succumbed to a wound suffered at the Battle of Yellow Tavern, and another legendary Confederate general was gone.

Confederate General Jeb Stuart | Image Credit: Flickr.com

Major General Jeb Stuart, cavalry commander of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, had led a portion of his force in fighting a delaying action against Major General Philip Sheridan’s Federal troops just six miles from Richmond. Stuart was shot during the fight, and he was subsequently taken on an agonizing six-hour ambulance ride to the capital.

Along the way, Stuart said, “I don’t know how this will turn out; but if it is God’s will that I shall die, I am ready.” The ambulance stopped at the home of his sister-in-law on Grace Street at 11 p.m. Four of Richmond’s top physicians tended to him, but there was little they could do. The bullet had severed his intestines, and he was slowly dying most likely from internal bleeding and peritonitis.

Messages were sent to Stuart’s wife Flora and their children, who were staying at Beaver Dam Station. However, Federals had cut the telegraph lines out of Richmond, so the message did not arrive until noon on the 12th. Flora and the children boarded a train for Richmond, but Federals had wrecked the tracks. Wounded Confederate cavalry officers gave them their ambulance wagon to finish their journey.

That morning, Stuart dictated his will to Major Henry McClellan, his adjutant. Stuart noted the sound of artillery, and McClellan assured him that it was Major General Fitzhugh Lee chasing the Federals east, away from Richmond. Stuart said, “God grant that they may be successful, but I must be prepared for another world.”

President Jefferson Davis visited Stuart and asked his condition. Stuart replied, “Easy, but willing to die, if God and my country think I have fulfilled my destiny and done my duty.” When a doctor told him that he would probably die before nightfall, Stuart said, “I am resigned if it be God’s will, but I would like to see my wife… But God’s will be done.”

Around 7 p.m., a clergyman led everyone in the house in prayer. Stuart then asked him to lead a singing of “Rock of Ages,” his favorite hymn. Stuart tried singing along but could not. He said, “I am going fast now. I am resigned; God’s will be done.” James Ewell Brown Stuart, the “Cavalier of Dixie,” died at 7:38 p.m., at age 31. Flora and the children finally arrived at the Grace Street house at 11:30 that night.

Back at Spotsylvania, General Robert E. Lee received word of Stuart’s wounding and paid him his highest compliment: “He never brought me a false piece of information.” Composing himself, Lee announced to his officers, “Gentlemen, we have very bad news. General Stuart has been mortally wounded.” As Lee returned to his tent around midnight, he received word that Stuart had died. Lee quietly remarked, “I can scarcely think of him without weeping.”

Funeral services were held on the 13th at St. James Church in Richmond. Stuart’s wife Flora and their children attended, along with Davis, Chief of Staff Braxton Bragg, and several other high-ranking Confederates. Many others, including those still pursuing Sheridan and those at Spotsylvania, could not be there. Lee could not spare any men for a funeral escort as Stuart’s body was brought to Hollywood Cemetery and buried. News of his death shocked and deeply sorrowed the South.

Meanwhile, Sheridan’s raid continued. His Federals rode east, where they damaged the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad and temporarily cut communications between Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia and the capital. Sheridan planned to ride southeast and join Major General Benjamin F. Butler’s Federal Army of the James at Bermuda Hundred, south of the James River.

On the 14th, the Federal troopers entered Butler’s lines at Haxall’s Landing, bringing 400 freed Federal prisoners and 300 Confederate prisoners. They suffered 625 casualties on the raid, and while they did not attack Richmond as hoped, they damaged Beaver Dam and Ashland. And most importantly, Sheridan showed that he could match Stuart’s legendary cavalry. Sheridan reported that Stuart’s death at Yellow Tavern “inflicted a blow from which entire recovery was impossible.”

Sheridan’s men rested and refit their horses for the next three days before heading back north to rejoin the Army of the Potomac. They returned on the 24th, 15 days after their expedition began. The raid proved successful, as the Federals wrecked telegraphic communications and 10 miles of railroad track on three different lines while freeing imprisoned comrades and capturing vast amounts of supplies.

More importantly, this demonstrated the growing skill of the Federal cavalry. Perhaps most importantly, it permanently deprived the Confederacy of Stuart, whose leadership could not be replaced.

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References

Anderson, Nancy Scott; Anderson, Dwight, The Generals: Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), p. 475; CivilWarDailyGazette.com; Davis, Jefferson, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government: All Volumes (Heraklion Press, Kindle Edition 2013, 1889), Loc 20102; Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 406, 408, 410, 412; Foote, Shelby, The Civil War: A Narrative: Volume 3: Red River to Appomattox (Vintage Civil War Library, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, Kindle Edition, 2011), Loc 4932-73; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 437; Freeman, Douglas Southall, Lee (Scribner, Kindle Edition, 2008), Loc 7070-82; http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-yellow-tavern.htm; Jaynes, Gregory, The Killing Ground: Wilderness to Cold Harbor (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983), p. 123-24; Kallmann, John D., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 679-80, 727-28; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 499-502, 504; Wert, Jeffry D., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 680, 846-47

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The Battle of Yellow Tavern

May 11, 1864 – Major General Philip Sheridan embarked on a Federal cavalry raid intended to disrupt Confederate supply lines and destroy the famed command of Major General Jeb Stuart.

Maj. Gen. P.H. Sheridan | Image Credit: Wikimedia.org

Major General George G. Meade, commanding the Federal Army of the Potomac, blamed Cavalry Corps commander Sheridan for failing to clear the Brock Road on the 8th, which helped the Confederates win the race to Spotsylvania Court House. As the two men argued, Sheridan snapped that if headquarters left him alone, he could ride out and whip Stuart’s Confederate horsemen.

Meade relayed this to Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant, the overall Federal commander. Grant responded, “Did Sheridan say that? Well, he generally knows what he is talking about. Let him start right out and do it.” Meade issued orders for Sheridan to lead 10,000 troopers south to cut Confederate supply lines and destroy Stuart’s command. Sheridan could then either ride south to join Major General Benjamin F. Butler’s Army of the James or return to the Army of the Potomac.

Sheridan gathered his three division commanders–Brigadier Generals Wesley Merritt, David M. Gregg, and James H. Wilson–on the night of the 8th and announced, “We are going out to fight Stuart’s cavalry in consequence of a suggestion from me. In view of my recent representations to General Meade I shall expect nothing but success.” According to Theophilus F. Rodenbough of Sheridan’s staff:

“The command was stripped of all impediments, such as unserviceable animals, wagons and tents. The necessary ammunition train, two ambulances to a division, a few pack-mules for baggage, three days’ rations and a half-day’s forage carried on the saddle, comprised the outfit.”

The troopers, along with six batteries of horse artillery, rode out at 6 a.m. on the 9th, with Sheridan vowing to whip Stuart out of his boots. To conserve energy, the Federals kept a slow pace as their line stretched 13 miles along the Telegraph Road.

Confederate scouts learned of the enemy movement almost as soon as it began, and elements of Stuart’s cavalry under Brigadier General William C. Wickham quickly began harassing Sheridan’s rear. Sheridan disregarded these sporadic attacks, telling his command, “Keep moving, boys. We’re going on through. There isn’t cavalry enough in all the Southern Confederacy to stop us.”

Maj Gen Jeb Stuart | Image Credit: Flickr.com

Stuart, perhaps underestimating Sheridan’s strength, kept nearly half his command at Spotsylvania to guard the Army of Northern Virginia’s flanks while leading his remaining 5,000 men (in three brigades under Generals Fitzhugh Lee, Lunsford Lomax, and James B. Gordon) to positions between Sheridan and Richmond.

Sheridan’s horsemen reached the North Anna River by nightfall. Merritt’s division continued to Beaver Dam Station, a key Confederate supply depot on the Virginia Central Railroad. Confederates burned the depot before retreating, and the advancing Federals burned 100 railroad cars and two locomotives. Some 504,000 rations of bread and 904,000 rations of meat for Confederate soldiers was destroyed. The Federals also freed 400 of their comrades held as prisoners of war.

Unable to beat Sheridan to the North Anna, Stuart continued south to try beating him to the South Anna. He reported to Chief of Staff Braxton Bragg in Richmond that Sheridan was heading south from Beaver Dam Station, while Federal detachments continued destroying tracks on the Virginia Central between the North and South Anna rivers.

Stuart wrote, “Should he attack Richmond, I will certainly move in his rear and do what I can; at the same time, I hope to be able to strike him if he endeavors to escape.” Stuart intended to make a stand outside Richmond that would delay Sheridan just long enough for the Confederate troops in Richmond to man the capital’s defenses.

Sheridan stopped after crossing the South Anna that night. Stuart’s command, having rode 36 straight hours, halted north of that same river. The next morning, Stuart divided his force even further by sending Gordon’s troopers to harass Sheridan’s rear while the other two Confederate brigades headed to Yellow Tavern, an old stagecoach stop on the Brook Turnpike about six miles north of Richmond.

The Federals came up around 11 a.m., and the fight that Sheridan had hoped to draw Stuart into soon began. With Confederates continuing to harass his rear, Sheridan patiently scouted Stuart’s positions and deployed Merritt’s division in line of battle. The Federals had three divisions versus just two Confederate brigades; the Federals also had superior Spencer repeating rifles.

Merritt attacked Lomax’s brigade, sending the Confederates reeling back to their second defense line under Fitz Lee. A lull came over the field as both sides held back until reinforcements could arrive. Then, a Federal brigade under Brigadier General George A. Custer appeared in the clearing and charged an artillery battery. One of the Federal cavalrymen later wrote:

“As soon as our line appeared in the open, indeed, before it left the woods, the Confederate artillery opened with shell and shrapnel; the carbines and sharpshooters joined with zest in the fray and the man who thinks they did not succeed in making that part of the neighborhood around Yellow Tavern an uncomfortably hot place, was not there at the time.”

But the Federals managed to capture the battery and turn Stuart’s left flank around 4 p.m. Stuart directed a countercharge by the 1st Virginia, which he held in reserve, and they repelled Custer’s Federals. As Stuart rode forward with the Virginians, a bullet from a .44-caliber Federal pistol hit him in the right side below the ribs. His aides helped him off his horse. Fitz Lee soon arrived, and Stuart passed command to him: “Go ahead, Fitz, old fellow, I know you will do what is right.”

Stuart’s aides loaded him into an arriving ambulance, with one aide recalling:

“As he was being driven from the field he noticed the disorganized ranks of his retreating men and called out to them: ‘Go back! Go back! And do your duty, as I have done mine, and our country will be safe. Go back! Go back! I had rather die than be whipped.’”

Under command of Fitz Lee, the Confederates ultimately held firm. After probing for weaknesses, Sheridan disengaged and rode down the Brook Turnpike toward Richmond. However, the Confederate delaying action gave city officials enough time to bolster their defenses.

The Federals rode past the capital’s outer works as alarm bells rang and artillery fire erupted. Sheridan surveyed the defenses and told an aide, “I could capture Richmond, if I wanted, but I can’t hold it. It isn’t worth the men it would cost.” Sheridan reported to Meade:

“It is possible that I might have captured the city of Richmond by assault, but the want of knowledge of your operations and those of General Butler, and the facility with which the enemy could throw in troops, made me abandon the attempt.”

Sheridan asserted, “I should have been the hero of the hour. I could have gone in and burned and killed right and left.” But it was not worth sacrificing his men “for no permanent advantage,” since they could have only temporarily occupied the capital. Besides, Stuart had been Sheridan’s main objective, not Richmond. The Federals turned east to eventually join either Butler or Meade.

This marked a turning point in the cavalry struggle in Virginia, as the Federals now had not only the numbers but the skill to easily match the Confederate cavaliers. Estimated casualties at Yellow Tavern for each side were about 800, but the greatest loss of them all was Stuart himself.

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References

CivilWarDailyGazette.com; Davis, Jefferson, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government: All Volumes (Heraklion Press, Kindle Edition 2013, 1889), Loc 20093-102; Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 403-05; Foote, Shelby, The Civil War: A Narrative: Volume 3: Red River to Appomattox (Vintage Civil War Library, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, Kindle Edition, 2011), Loc 4728-48, 4894-914, 4942-52; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 433-34, 436; Freeman, Douglas Southall, Lee (Scribner, Kindle Edition, 2008), Loc 6986; Jaynes, Gregory, The Killing Ground: Wilderness to Cold Harbor (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983), p. 114-15, 117-23; http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-yellow-tavern.htm; Kallmann, John D., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 727-28; Linedecker, Clifford L. (ed.), The Civil War A to Z (Ballantine Books, 2002), p. 244, 275-76; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 496-99; McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States Book 6, Oxford University Press, Kindle Edition, 1988), p. 728; Wert, Jeffry D., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 551, 680, 846-47

The Battle of Spotsylvania Begins

May 8, 1864 – After two terrible days in the Wilderness, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant led the Federal Army of the Potomac into a new battle that promised to become even more terrible.

The Battle of the Wilderness resulted in nearly 18,000 Federal casualties, leading Grant and Major General George G. Meade, commanding the Federal Army of the Potomac, to conclude that the Confederate positions were too strong to assault again. This left them with just two options: retreat as all their predecessors had done, or push forward and try getting around the Confederate right. Grant chose the latter, directing Meade at 6:30 a.m. on the 7th: “Make all preparations during the day for a night march to take position at Spotsylvania Court House with one corps–”

The Federals would continue moving southeast. This would force General Robert E. Lee, commanding the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, to follow to keep his army between them and Richmond. Grant’s decision to advance turned a tactical defeat into a strategic victory. It also raised the morale of the troops, who had been accustomed to retreating after battles. When word spread that they would be moving forward instead of back, the men cheered until Grant ordered them to stop; he did not want the Confederates learning his intentions.

But Lee already guessed his intentions. Confederates from Lieutenant General Richard Ewell’s Second Corps probed forward and found that the Federals had disappeared from their front. Since this was on the northern flank, Lee figured that the Federals had either moved east toward Fredericksburg or southeast along the Brock Road. Lee began preparing to move to Spotsylvania, where he could block the Federals should they come from either direction.

Both Grant and Lee recognized that Spotsylvania was important because the crossroads there led to Wilderness Tavern, Hanover Junction, and Fredericksburg. It was also the point where two major railroads–the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac and the Virginia Central–intersected, both of which supplied the Confederate army. And it was 12 miles closer to Richmond than the Wilderness. Whoever won the race to Spotsylvania would have a distinct advantage in the struggle between the two armies.

Gen R.H. Anderson | Image Credit: CivilWarDailyGazette.com

Major General Richard H. Anderson, replacing the wounded Lieutenant General James Longstreet in command of First Corps, received orders from Lee to start moving after dark to get to Spotsylvania first. Meade directed Major General Gouverneur Warren’s V Corps to lead the march down the Brock Road, followed by Major General Winfield Scott Hancock’s II Corps. VI and IX corps under Major Generals John Sedgwick and Ambrose E. Burnside respectively would move east along the Orange Turnpike.

Meade ordered Major General Philip Sheridan’s Cavalry Corps to clear the Brock Road for Warren and Hancock. However, Sheridan’s troopers clashed with elements of Major General Jeb Stuart’s Confederate cavalry at Todd’s Tavern. This prevented Sheridan from clearing the road before Anderson’s Confederates passed by during the night. Stuart’s men felled trees which, along with traffic jams among the troops and wagons, delayed the Federal advance.

As the Federals struggled southward early on the 8th, they came upon Confederate cavalry blocking their path on a ridge called Laurel Hill, just north of Spotsylvania Court House. Anderson’s infantry arrived behind the cavalry just as the Federals came within 100 yards. The Confederates had won the race to Spotsylvania, with Lee himself arriving around 3 p.m.

Maj Gen Gouverneur Warren | Image Credit: Wikimedia.org

Warren, thinking that only cavalry blocked his way, ordered an attack. However, the Confederates repelled several thrusts and inflicted heavy casualties. Warren notified Meade at 12:30 p.m., “I have done my best, but with the force I now have I cannot attack again.” Frustrated, Meade fumed that Warren “lost his nerve.” Meade ordered him to renew the attack as soon as Sedgwick came up on his left (east), but Warren objected. The commanders discussed the situation at Meade’s headquarters and, as Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Lyman of Meade’s staff recalled:

“In fact the sudden transition from a long winter’s rest to hard marching, sleepless nights, and protracted fighting, with no prospect of cessation, produced a powerful effect on the nervous system of the whole army. And never, perhaps, were officers and men more jaded and prostrated than on this very Sunday.”

Meanwhile, Hancock guarded the Federal rear at Todd’s Tavern and sent a division forward to probe for Confederates. The Federals encountered Lieutenant General A.P. Hill’s Third Corps, led by Brigadier General William Mahone’s division. After some fighting, the Federals pulled back and the Confederates resumed their march toward Spotsylvania.

Back in front of Laurel Hill, the Federals finally got into attack positions around 6 p.m., but by that time Ewell’s corps was coming up on Anderson’s right (east). Hill’s corps (led by Major General Jubal Early because Hill was sick) would soon arrive on Ewell’s right. The Federals attacked around 7 p.m. but were repulsed with heavy losses.

The action on the 8th greatly frustrated Meade. In addition to being angry with Warren, he accused Sheridan of not properly clearing the Brock Road, and he called Sedgwick “constitutionally slow.” As the fighting stopped that night, both sides began digging trenches and building earthworks for the fight that was sure to resume the next day.

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References

Anderson, Nancy Scott; Anderson, Dwight, The Generals: Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), p. 462-65; Catton, Bruce, The American Heritage Picture History of the Civil War (New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., 1960), p. 444, 456-57; CivilWarDailyGazette.com; Davis, Jefferson, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government: All Volumes (Heraklion Press, Kindle Edition 2013, 1889), Loc 20268-77; Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 401-03; Foote, Shelby, The Civil War: A Narrative: Volume 3: Red River to Appomattox (Vintage Civil War Library, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, Kindle Edition, 2011), Loc 4728-48; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 431-32; Freeman, Douglas Southall, Lee (Scribner, Kindle Edition, 2008), Loc 6938; Jaynes, Gregory, The Killing Ground: Wilderness to Cold Harbor (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983), p. 82-85, 114; Linedecker, Clifford L. (ed.), The Civil War A to Z (Ballantine Books, 2002), p. 238; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 495-96; McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States Book 6, Oxford University Press, Kindle Edition, 1988), p. 727-28; Mullins, Michael A., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 825-27; Ward, Geoffrey C., Burns, Ric, Burns, Ken, The Civil War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), p. 290-91; Wert, Jeffry D., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 551, 709

Northern Virginia: The Army of the Potomac is Ready

April 26, 1864 – Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant confidently reported to Washington from his headquarters at Culpeper Court House, “The Army of the Potomac is in splendid condition and evidently feels like whipping somebody. I feel much better with this command than I did before seeing it.”

Maj Gen G.G. Meade | Image Credit: CivilWarDailyGazette.com

The army reorganization continued: two corps were eliminated with the troops placed in the three remaining corps, and four divisions were eliminated with the troops placed in the remaining 11. Many soldiers resented Grant for making these changes, even though they had been done at the request of the Lincoln administration and ordered by the army commander, Major General George G. Meade.

One of the few changes that Grant made was to replace Brigadier General David Gregg as commander of the Federal Cavalry Corps with Major General Philip Sheridan, an infantry commander who had impressed Grant during the Chattanooga campaign. When Sheridan was introduced to officials in Washington, one told Grant, “That officer you brought on from the West is rather a little fellow to handle your cavalry.” Grant replied, “You will find him big enough for the purpose before we get through with him.”

Major General Ambrose E. Burnside was reunited with his prized IX Corps at Annapolis, Maryland. These 25,000 men would be reinforcing the Army of the Potomac when it began its spring offensive against General Robert E. Lee’s Confederate Army of Northern Virginia. However, IX Corps would stay independent and report directly to Grant because Burnside technically outranked Meade. Grant directed Burnside to “divert all troops you may now have on the way to Annapolis or yet to start, to Alexandria, and send a general there to take charge of them.”

As the army prepared for battle, Meade wrote his wife about the new general-in-chief on the scene:

“Grant has not given an order, or in the slightest degree interfered with the administration of this army since he arrived, and I doubt if he knows much more about it now than he did before coming here… It is undoubtedly true that he will go with it when it moves, and will in a measure control its movements, and should success attend its operation, that my share of the credit will be less than if he were not present… the press, and perhaps the public, will lose sight of me in him.”

Nevertheless, Meade preferred Grant to former General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck: “He is so much more active than his predecessor, and agrees so well with me in his view, I can not but be rejoiced at his arrival, because I believe success to be the more probable from the above facts.” Meade concluded:

“My position before, with inadequate means, no power myself to increase them, and no effort made by others to do so, placed me in a false position, causing me to be held responsible, when in fact I could do nothing. My duty is plain, to continue quietly to discharge my duties, heartily co-operating with him and under him.”

Lt Gen U.S. Grant | Image Credit: Wikispaces.org

Grant wanted the army to begin moving the first week of May, before most of the three-year enlistments expired. The Lincoln administration had anticipated this potential shortfall in manpower by offering generous bounties and furloughs for soldiers who reenlisted. The administration also continued enforcing the conscription law, thereby creating an army of reenlisted men (driven by patriotism and/or bounties), draftees, and hired substitutes.

As he continued preparing, Grant took the time to write his wife Julia on his 42nd birthday (the 27th), “… I am still very well. Don’t know exactly the day when I will start or whether Lee will come here before I am ready to move. Would not tell you if I did know. Give my kindest regards to Col. and Mrs. Hillyer. Kisses for yourself and Jess. I sent $1100.00 to J.R. Jones to day in liquidation of my indebtedness.”

By this time, Grant had secretly scheduled the offensive to begin on May 4. This was nine days behind schedule, but it gave him more time to prepare and for the muddy roads to dry. Grant began issuing specific orders for the upcoming campaign, while many within the Army of the Potomac remained skeptical that he could defeat Lee after so many others had failed.

Near month’s end, rumors began circulating that Lieutenant General James Longstreet’s Confederate corps had returned to Lee’s army from eastern Tennessee and “will move (north) down the Shenandoah Valley.” Grant wrote Halleck that if this happened, “throw all the force you can to head them, taking, if General Burnside should still be north of the Rappahannock, all or as much of his force as necessary.”

On the last day of April, President Abraham Lincoln wrote a farewell message to Grant:

“Not expecting to see you again before the spring campaign opens, I wish to express in this way my entire satisfaction with what you have done up to this time, so far as I understand it. The particulars of your plan I neither know nor seek to know… I wish not to obtrude any constraints or restraints upon you… If there is anything wanting which is within my power to give, do not fail to let me know it. And now, with a brave army and a just cause, may God sustain you.”

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References

CivilWarDailyGazette.com; Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 390, 398; Foote, Shelby, The Civil War: A Narrative: Volume 3: Red River to Appomattox (Vintage Civil War Library, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, Kindle Edition, 2011), Loc 2687-707, 2893-903, 2923-44; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 414, 419, 425; Jaynes, Gregory, The Killing Ground: Wilderness to Cold Harbor (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983), p. 38, 42-43; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 481, 490; Sommers, Richard J., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 177-78

Eastern Tennessee: The Dandridge Engagement

January 17, 1864 – Federals and Confederates moved toward Dandridge to gather much-needed foodstuffs for the hungry troops in the bitter eastern Tennessee winter.

The Federal Army of the Ohio, stationed at Strawberry Plains, had stripped the surrounding countryside of forage. The troops therefore began moving toward Dandridge, an important crossroads town near the East Tennessee & Virginia Railroad, that promised more provisions. They were led by Major General Philip Sheridan.

Gen S.D. Sturgis | Image Credit: Wikipedia.org

Federal cavalry under Brigadier General Samuel D. Sturgis drove off Confederate horsemen probing near the town, unaware that Lieutenant General James Longstreet had mobilized his infantry to seize Dandridge as well. Most of Sturgis’s men took the Morristown Road to Kimbrough’s Crossroads, while a detachment met enemy cavalry southeast of Dandridge, at the bend of Chunky Road. When these Federals could not drive the Confederates off, they fell back to Dandridge.

Sturgis received word on the 17th that the Confederates were preparing to attack, and he invited Sheridan to come watch him “whip the enemy’s cavalry.” Sheridan declined, as he was still leading his infantry toward Dandridge. Sturgis readied for the enemy horsemen, but he was surprised to see that they were backed by Longstreet’s infantry. Sturgis fell back to join the main Federal force.

Sheridan set up defenses outside Dandridge and called on the remaining troops under Major Generals Gordon Granger and John G. Parke for support. As the Federals probed the Confederate lines about four miles from town, Longstreet’s troops moved around the Federals’ flank and nearly into their rear. Longstreet did not send his heavy guns with them because “the ringing of the iron axles of the guns might give notice to our purpose.”

Granger arrived to take command, and Sheridan’s division began building a bridge below Dandridge that would allow the Federals to forage in the region and return to their camps at Strawberry Plains and Knoxville. Sheridan’s bridge was seemingly completed, “but to his mortification, he found at dark that he was on an island, and that it would require four more hours to complete this bridge.”

Longstreet arranged his men in attack positions around 4 p.m. Parke, who had arrived on the scene with Granger and Sheridan, reported to Major General John G. Foster, commanding the Army of the Ohio from Knoxville, at 6:30 p.m.:

“There is no doubt that Longstreet’s whole force is immediately in our front on the Bull’s Gap and the Bend of Chunky Roads. They advanced on us this evening. We have no means of crossing the river. I shall fall back on Strawberry Plains.”

According to Longstreet, “As the infantry had had a good long march before reaching the ground, we only had time to get our position a little after dark. During the night the enemy retired to New Market and to Strawberry Plains, leaving his dead upon the ground.” Granger issued the orders to withdraw at 9 p.m. The Federals left their partially completed bridge behind.

As the Confederates camped for the night, Foster feared they may have been reinforced by General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. However, General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck informed him that according to the latest intelligence, “Longstreet has had no re-enforcements from Lee of late.”

Confederate Lt Gen James Longstreet | Image Credit: BlogSpot.com

The Confederates entered Dandridge on the morning of the 18th. In his memoirs, Longstreet wrote:

“When I rode into Dandridge in the gray of the morning the ground was thawing and hardly firm enough to bear the weight of a horse. When the cavalry came at sunrise the last crust of ice had melted, letting the animals down to their fetlocks in heavy limestone soil. The mud and want of a bridge to cross the Holston made pursuit by our heavy columns useless.”

Longstreet noted that the Federal retreat seemed “to have been made somewhat hastily and not in very good order.” He began a half-hearted pursuit, and “the men without shoes were ordered to remain as camp guards, but many preferred to march with their comrades.” The Confederates could not make much progress because “the bitter freeze of two weeks had made the rough angles of mud as firm and sharp as so many freshly-quarried rocks, and the partially protected feet of our soldiers sometimes left bloody marks along the roads.”

The Federals continued falling back, as Foster directed them to keep retreating all the way to Knoxville. Major General Jacob D. Cox, commanding XXIII Corps, stated that “in the afternoon, the rain changed to moist driving snow. The sleepy, weary troops toiled doggedly on; the wagons and cannon were helped over the bad places in the way, for we were determined not to abandon any, and the enemy was not hurrying us.”

Stopping short of Strawberry Plains that night, Cox recalled, “We halted the men here and went into bivouac for the night… sheltered from the storm and where the evergreen boughs were speedily converted into tents of a sort, as well as soft and fragrant beds.” Cox wrote that “it had been a wretchedly cheerless and uncomfortable march, but the increasing cold and flying snow made the camp scarcely less inclement.”

This small engagement at Dandridge caused an uproar in Washington, as officials believed that the Federals might abandon eastern Tennessee altogether. Halleck reminded Major General Ulysses S. Grant, commanding the Western Theater, that President Abraham Lincoln considered holding the region “the very greatest importance, both in a political and military point of view, and no effort must be spared to accomplish that object.”

Halleck then asked Major General George H. Thomas, commanding the Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga, to “please give particular attention to the situation of General Foster’s army in East Tennessee, and give him all the aid which he may require and you may be able to render.” Thomas could do nothing except ship more supplies to Foster’s army. The Federal high command would eventually realize that the engagement did not portend the disaster that they feared.

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References

CivilWarDailyGazette.com; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 390

The Battle of Chattanooga: Aftermath

November 26, 1863 – Major General Ulysses S. Grant’s Federal victory at Chattanooga opened Georgia to invasion and led to a command change in the Confederate Army of Tennessee.

General Braxton Bragg | Image Credit: Wikimedia.org

By this date, General Braxton Bragg’s two-month siege of Chattanooga had ended in defeat. As his Confederates fell back into northern Georgia, he reported:

“No satisfactory excuse can possibly be given for the shameful conduct of the troops… in allowing their line to be penetrated. The position was one which ought to have been held by a line of skirmishers against any assaulting column.”

But Bragg took no responsibility for erroneously detaching troops to Knoxville, issuing vague orders, and failing to anticipate the Federals’ intentions until it was too late. His retreating Confederates continued moving southeast on the 26th, past Chickamauga Station to Ringgold, 15 miles down the railroad connecting Chattanooga and the vital industrial city of Atlanta.

As Bragg continued retreating toward Dalton, he ordered Major General Patrick R. Cleburne’s division to block the Federals at Ringgold “at all hazards.” He then turned to his familiar pattern of blaming others by removing one of his two corps commanders, Major General John C. Breckinridge, from command. Bragg and Breckinridge had long been enemies, and Bragg alleged that Breckinridge had gotten so drunk after the battle that a division commander had to care for him during the retreat.

Meanwhile, Grant’s pursuit continued, with Major General Philip Sheridan’s division of Major General George H. Thomas’s army in the lead. Major General William T. Sherman’s forces advanced on Ringgold to cut supply lines and drive out any remaining Confederates, and Major General Joseph Hooker’s Federals also pushed toward Ringgold through Rossville Gap.

Hooker’s lead division under Brigadier General Peter J. Osterhaus approached Ringgold at 8 a.m. on the 27th. By that time, Cleburne’s 4,000 Confederates had entrenched themselves on Taylor’s Ridge south of town. The numerically superior Federals drove in enemy skirmishers and then tried moving around Cleburne’s right (north) flank. When that failed, Osterhaus attacked the Confederate left, but Cleburne repelled that effort as well.

Hooker brought up Brigadier General John W. Geary’s division, which made little progress until Geary committed Colonel David Ireland’s brigade against the enemy left which, according to Geary, forced the Confederates “to recoil in the zenith of (Ireland’s) audacious charge…” The Federals then brought up several guns and began pounding Cleburne’s left. The Confederate line finally wavered, and Lieutenant General William Hardee directed Cleburne to withdraw around 1 p.m.

Cleburne lost 221 men while Hooker lost 442; the Confederates also took over 100 prisoners and three stands of colors. As they fell back to rejoin Bragg’s main army, Grant halted the pursuit. Federal supplies were running low, and Grant soon turned his attention to breaking Lieutenant General James Longstreet’s Confederate siege of Knoxville in eastern Tennessee.

Bragg fell back behind Rocky Face Ridge the next day and arrived at Dalton, where he consolidated his scattered army. The troops cheered the arrival of Cleburne’s men after holding the Federals off at Ringgold. As President Jefferson Davis urged Bragg to concentrate and counterattack as soon as possible, Bragg reported:

“We hope to maintain this position, (but) should the enemy press on promptly we may have to cross the Oostenaula (River, 15 miles south). My first estimate of our disaster was not too large, and time only can restore order and morale. All possible aid should be pushed on to Resaca. I deem it due to the cause and to myself to ask for relief from command and an investigation into the causes of the defeat.”

Adjutant General Samuel Cooper responded on the 30th:

“Your dispatches of yesterday received. Your request to be relieved has been submitted to the President, who, upon your representation, directs me to notify you that you are relieved from command, which you will transfer to Lieutenant-General Hardee, the officer next in rank and now present for duty.”

Bragg immediately prepared to relinquish command of the army he had led since June 1862. During that time, he had taken the fight to the Federals by invading Kentucky, but his retreat after Perryville ended his invasion. He then lost Middle Tennessee by retreating after Stones River and Tullahoma. Bragg rebounded after giving up Chattanooga by routing the Federals at Chickamauga, but his siege of Chattanooga failed, and now his Army of Tennessee had been ousted from its home state.

For the Federals, Grant immediately looked to drive Longstreet out of eastern Tennessee. After that, he would begin planning a move into the southern heartland which included a drive on Atlanta.

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References

Angle, Paul M., A Pictorial History of the Civil War Years (New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 140-42; CivilWarDailyGazette.com; Crocker III, H.W., The Politically Incorrect Guide to the Civil War (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2008), p. 80-81; Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 345-47; Foote, Shelby, The Civil War: A Narrative: Volume 2: Fredericksburg to Meridian (Vintage Civil War Library, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, Kindle Edition, 2011), p. 858, 860-61, 867; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 378-80; Korn, Jerry, The Fight for Chattanooga: Chickamauga to Missionary Ridge (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983), p. 117-55; Linedecker, Clifford L. (ed.), The Civil War A to Z (Ballantine Books, 2002), p. 33-35, 65-67, 182; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 439-41; Longacre, Edward G., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 743-44; McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States Book 6, Oxford University Press, Kindle Edition, 1988), p. 680-81; Stanchak, John E., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 133-35, 498-99

The Battle of Chattanooga: Missionary Ridge

November 25, 1863 – Major General Ulysses S. Grant’s Federals finally broke the siege of Chattanooga and nearly broke General Braxton Bragg’s Confederate Army of Tennessee in the process.

By this time, the three Federal armies had made progress in pushing the Confederates away from Chattanooga:

  • Major General William T. Sherman’s Army of the Tennessee held a spur across a ravine from Tunnel Hill, north of Chattanooga.
  • Major General George H. Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland held Orchard Knob in the center.
  • Major General Joseph Hooker’s forces from the Army of the Potomac held Lookout Mountain southwest of Chattanooga.

Thomas’s Federals, unaware of Hooker’s victory the night before, cheered when they saw the U.S. flag waving atop Lookout Mountain the next morning. Grant’s plan for this day’s action included:

  • Sherman seizing Tunnel Hill and driving the Confederates off Missionary Ridge.
  • Thomas advancing after Sherman seized his objective.
  • Hooker advancing toward Rossville Gap to cut off the Confederate line of retreat.

Federal Maj Gen W.T. Sherman | Image Credit: collaborationnation.wikispaces.com

Sherman’s 16,000 Federals advanced at dawn and arrived in front of Tunnel Hill around 11 a.m. Bragg’s best division, Major General Patrick R. Cleburne’s 4,000 men, defended the hill, with support from divisions under Major General Carter L. Stevenson and Brigadier General States Rights Gist. The small, narrow hill allowed for an easy defense against a superior attack force. Cleburne held the Federals off for four hours and earned the nickname “Stonewall Jackson of the West” for this action.

To the southwest, Major General John C. Breckinridge’s Confederate corps held Hooker off as the Federals had to stop and repair the bridge leading to Rossville Gap. When the bridge was finally repaired around 3 p.m., the Federals advanced in force and Breckinridge slowly fell back in the face of superior numbers. Grant had expected Sherman to destroy the Confederate right, but instead Hooker was threatening to crumble the Confederate left.

Meanwhile, Sherman signaled Grant’s headquarters several times asking him to send Thomas into action. With Sherman faltering and Hooker slowing down, Grant finally assented. In Thomas’s front, Bragg’s Confederates manned three lines of rifle pits ascending Missionary Ridge. Grant, who had little faith in Thomas’s Federals based on their combat history, ordered them to simply advance from Orchard Knob and capture the first line at the foot of the ridge.

Some 23,000 Federals advanced across the open plain along a two-mile front. The Confederates fired one volley and fell back to the second line. As the Federals entered the first line, they were in danger of being decimated by rifle and artillery fire from the two lines above them. Without orders, the divisions of Major General Philip Sheridan and Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood led a general charge up the mountain. Grant, watching from headquarters, asked, “Thomas, who ordered those men up the ridge?” Thomas replied, “I don’t know, I did not.” Grant did not abort the unauthorized assault, hopeful for success.

The Federal charge | Image Credit: CivilWarDailyGazette.com

The Confederates abandoned the second line, with many hit by friendly fire from their comrades in the line above. The Federals then continued their charge up to the third line, with some chanting, “Chickamauga! Chickamauga!” Confederate artillerists could not depress their guns low enough to fire on the attackers; some desperately lit fuses in shells and rolled them down the mountain. The Federals swept through the third line and raced to the top of Missionary Ridge, nearly capturing both Breckinridge and Bragg in the process.

Gen P.R. Cleburne | Image Credit: Wikipedia.org

While Cleburne’s men celebrated repelling Sherman, Lieutenant General William Hardee, Cleburne’s superior, informed him that the center had collapsed, and his Confederates were about to be isolated. Cleburne quickly formed a rear guard to prevent the Confederate retreat from becoming a rout. Bragg’s army retreated down the reverse slope of Missionary Ridge, and the Federal pursuit, led by Sheridan’s division, ended at nightfall. Hooker soon joined the rest of the Federals on Missionary Ridge.

Three days of fighting ended in a resounding Federal victory that ended the siege of Chattanooga. During that time, the Federals sustained 5,824 casualties (753 killed, 4,722 wounded and 349 missing). Grant telegraphed General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck:

“Although the battle lasted from nearly dawn until dark this evening I believe I am not premature in announcing a complete victory over Bragg. Lookout mountain-top, all the rifle pits in Chattanooga Valley, and Missionary Ridge entire, have been carried, and are now held by us. I have no idea of finding Bragg here tomorrow.”

The Confederates lost 6,667 men (361 killed, 2,160 wounded and 4,146 missing, mostly captured). They also lost 41 guns. Bragg regretfully reported, “A panic which I had never before witnessed seemed to have seized upon officers and men, and each seemed to be struggling for his personal safety regardless of his duty or his character.”

The Confederates crossed Chickamauga Creek, with Cleburne reporting:

“By 9 p.m., everything was across, except the dead and a few stragglers linger here and there under the shadow of the trees for the purpose of being captured: faint-hearted patriots succumbing to the hardships of the war and the imagined hopelessness of the hour.”

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References

Angle, Paul M., A Pictorial History of the Civil War Years (New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 138-42; Catton, Bruce, The American Heritage Picture History of the Civil War (New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., 1960), p. 436-37; CivilWarDailyGazette.com; Crocker III, H.W., The Politically Incorrect Guide to the Civil War (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2008), p. 80-81; Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 344-45; Foote, Shelby, The Civil War: A Narrative: Volume 2: Fredericksburg to Meridian (Vintage Civil War Library, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, Kindle Edition, 2011), p. 857-58; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 376-77; Korn, Jerry, The Fight for Chattanooga: Chickamauga to Missionary Ridge (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983), p. 117-55; Linedecker, Clifford L. (ed.), The Civil War A to Z (Ballantine Books, 2002), p. 33-35, 65-67, 182; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 437-38; McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States Book 6, Oxford University Press, Kindle Edition, 1988), p. 677-80; Stanchak, John E., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 133, 445-47, 498-99