Major-General William T. Sherman, commanding the unified Federal Army of the West, had assigned Major-General James B. McPherson to lead his Army of the Tennessee around the left flank of General Joseph E. Johnston’s Confederate Army of Tennessee and capture Resaca, Georgia. However, McPherson had failed to use his 23,000 troops to wreck the railroad and knock the 4,000 Confederates out of town before they were reinforced. This meant that Johnston’s communication and supply lines (and perhaps most importantly, his line of retreat) remained intact.
Although frustrated, Sherman acknowledged that McPherson had used sound judgment. He wrote McPherson, “I regret beyond measure that you did not break the railroad, however little, but I suppose it was impossible. Should he attack you, fight him to the last and I will get to you.” When Sherman met up with McPherson a few days later, he told him, “Well, Mac, you missed the opportunity of your life.”
Sherman opted to go with the plan originally developed by Major-General George H. Thomas, commanding the Federal Army of the Cumberland, which entailed a much larger Federal movement around Johnston’s left flank. Sherman informed his superiors at Washington that he intended to move “between Johnston and Resaca, when we will have to fight it out.”
The Federals spent May 10 probing the Confederate defenses at Rocky Face Ridge, Buzzard’s Roost Gap, and points farther south. Unable to dislodge Johnston from such strong positions, Sherman hoped to send his entire force around the Confederate left, through Snake Creek Gap, and attack Resaca with overwhelming force. This would isolate Johnston north of the Oostanaula River.
Meanwhile, Johnston dispatched three divisions from Lieutenant-General John Bell Hood’s corps to hold Resaca. They reported that McPherson had fallen back, leaving Johnston confused as to Sherman’s real intent. Johnston therefore opted to defend Dalton, Resaca, and all points in between. The Confederates had the advantage of holding the interior line, which ran 18 miles from Dalton to Resaca via the Western & Atlantic Railroad.
In a cold, violent thunderstorm that night, Lieutenant-General Leonidas Polk’s Confederate Army of Mississippi began arriving in bulk and taking up positions at Resaca. Polk himself arrived to take command in the area the next day. Polk’s army thereafter became known as “Polk’s corps” of Johnston’s Army of Tennessee.
Sherman issued marching orders on the 11th. McPherson would stay put while the armies of Thomas and Major-General John Schofield would swing southeast along Taylor Ridge to join McPherson’s army at the mouth of Snake Creek Gap. A small Federal force would remain at Rocky Face Ridge as a diversion, consisting of Major-General Oliver O. Howard’s Fourth Corps and two mounted divisions from Major-General George Stoneman’s command. Howard was “terrified” by the idea of facing the Confederates at Rocky Face alone. However, Johnston remained purely on the defensive and did not threaten his small force.
The Federal advance was extremely slow because the troops, guns, and wagons all used just one road. This gave Johnston’s scouts time to confirm that the main Federal movement was taking place to the west, around the Confederate left. By this time, the 15,000 men of Polk’s corps were now entrenched at Resaca.
The next day, Major-General Joseph Wheeler’s cavalry scouts reported that just a skeleton force remained at Rocky Face Ridge, thus proving that Sherman’s intent was to slide around the left. Johnston ordered Lieutenant-General William Hardee’s corps and the rest of Hood’s corps to fall back and join Polk at Resaca. Federal signalmen notified Sherman that the Confederates were evacuating Dalton on the night of the 12th. But Sherman’s troops still had not fully arrived at Snake Creek Gap due to the delays that came with marching along a single road.
Johnston’s Confederates were on the move by 1 a.m. on the 13th. As they abandoned Dalton, Howard’s Federals entered the town. Johnston’s men soon joined Polk’s corps at Resaca, a town within a peninsula formed by the Oostanaula and Conasauga rivers. The Federals began probing through Snake Creek Gap but were stopped by Polk. This gave the rest of Johnston’s men time to take positions on the high ground west of town. Johnston soon had over 60,000 men ready to defend against any Federal movement that might come their way.
Johnston hoped to stay on the defensive and stretch the Federal supply lines to the point where Sherman would have to either engage in an open fight or fall back for sustenance. Sherman hoped to cut Johnston off from the Oostanaula, but by the time he was ready to advance in force, the Confederate wagon train was already crossing that river.
The Federals finally began advancing through Snake Creek Gap in force. McPherson’s army was on the right (south), with its right flank anchored on the Oostanaula. Thomas’s army was in the center, and Schofield’s Army of the Ohio was on the left. The opposing line consisted of Polk on the left (south), Hardee in the center, and Lieutenant-General John Bell Hood’s corps on the right.
Sherman did not expect Johnston to put up a fight; he believed that Johnston just wanted to stall until his wagons got over the river. He therefore directed McPherson and Thomas to demonstrate in the Confederate front while Schofield’s Federals built bridges over the Oostanaula and crossed over to cut off the Confederate line of retreat. The action would begin the next morning.
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