Major-General William T. Sherman explained his intentions of marching through Georgia to Federal General-in-Chief Ulysses S. Grant. Sherman wrote that his Federals would “act in such a manner against the material resources of the South as utterly to negate (President Jefferson) Davis’ boasted threat” to cut them off from the rear. Sherman wrote, “If we can march a well-appointed army right through his territory, it is a demonstration to the world, foreign and domestic, that we have a power which Davis cannot resist. This may not be war, but rather statesmanship… If the North can march an army right through the South, it is proof positive that the North can prevail.”
To ensure high morale and support for President Abraham Lincoln in the upcoming election, Federal paymasters visited all the camps before the troops moved out. Sherman informed Grant that he would begin moving after Lincoln’s victory, “which is assured.” Once in motion, “I will not attempt to send couriers back, but trust to the Richmond papers to keep you well advised.”
Grant replied the next day, “I see no present reason for changing your plan. Should any arise, you will see it, or if I do I will inform you. I think everything here is favorable now. Great good fortune attend you! I believe you will be eminently successful, and, at worst, can only make a march less fruitful of results than hoped for.”
On November 8, Sherman issued Special Field Orders Number 119 from his Kingston, Georgia, headquarters. These announced the imminent march and the perils that may come with it:
“The general commanding deems it proper at this time to inform the officers and men of the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Twentieth Corps, that he has organized them into an army for a special purpose, well known to the War Department and to General Grant. It is sufficient for you to know that it involves a departure from our present base, and a long and difficult march to a new one… Of all things, the most important is, that the men, during marches and in camp, keep their places and do not scatter about as stragglers or foragers, to be picked up by a hostile people in detail. It is also of the utmost importance that our wagons should not be loaded with any thing but provisions and ammunition. All surplus servants, noncombatants, and refugees, should now go to the rear, and none should be encouraged to encumber us on the march. At some future time we will be able to provide for the poor whites and blacks who seek to escape the bondage under which they are now suffering. With these few simple cautions, he hopes to lead you to achievements equal in importance to those of the past.”
The next day, Sherman issued Special Field Orders Number 120, which detailed the upcoming march. The army would consist of 60,000 infantry in two wings:
- Major-General Oliver O. Howard would lead the Fifteenth and Seventeenth corps (i.e., the Army of the Tennessee) on the right wing.
- Major-General Henry W. Slocum would lead the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps (i.e., the Army of Georgia) on the left wing.
The wings were to move along four principal roads that ran parallel to the southeast. A cavalry division of 5,500 men under Brigadier-General H. Judson Kilpatrick would also join the march, and artillery would be “reduced to the minimum, one gun per 1,000 men.”
Each regiment was assigned just one ambulance and one wagon for ammunition and supplies. Each brigade was to have “a due proportion of ammunition-wagons, provision-wagons, and ambulances.” The columns were to begin their march at 7 a.m. each morning and cover at least 15 miles per day, “unless otherwise fixed in orders.” “The army will forage liberally on the country during the march,” Sherman wrote, with brigade commanders organizing foraging parties to gather “corn or forage of any kind, meat of any kind, vegetables, cornmeal, or whatever is needed by the command,” keeping “in the wagons at least ten days’ provisions for his command, and three days’ forage.”
Corps commanders were the only officers empowered “to destroy mills, houses, cotton-gins… In districts and neighborhoods where the army is unmolested, no destruction of each property should be permitted; but should guerrillas or bushwhackers molest our march, or should the inhabitants burn bridges, obstruct roads, or otherwise manifest local hostility, then army commanders should order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless, according to the measure of such hostility.”
Troops of the cavalry and artillery were allowed to commandeer horses, mules, and wagons, “discriminating, however, between the rich, who are usually hostile, and the poor and industrious, usually neutral or friendly.” The Federals involved in these interactions “will endeavor to leave with each family a reasonable portion for their maintenance.”
“Negroes who are able-bodied and can be of service to the several columns may be taken along,” Sherman wrote, but for the army commanders, their “first duty is to see to those who bear arms.” Each army corps was to organize a pioneer battalion to make road repairs and do whatever was needed to facilitate the march. Troops on the move were to yield the road to artillery and wagons whenever possible, with the chief engineer assigning each army wing a pontoon train for water crossings.
Sherman’s plan was loosely based on Grant’s march down the west bank of the Mississippi River to get into the rear of Vicksburg in 1863. It was to be put in motion the next day, November 10, after Lincoln’s victory in the election was confirmed. Sherman’s final move before leaving was to make northern Georgia useless to the Confederacy. To that end, Atlanta as a city was doomed.
Bibliography
- Catton, Bruce, Grant Takes Command. Open Road Media, Kindle Edition, 2015.
- Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative: Red River to Appomattox. New York: Vintage Civil War Library, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group (Kindle Edition), 2011.
- Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day. New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971.
- Sherman, William T., Memoirs of General William T. Sherman, Vol. I. New York: D. Appleton and Co. (Kindle Edition), 1889.