Category Archives: Tennessee

The Fort Pillow Controversy

April 12, 1864 – Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest’s Confederate cavalry attacked the Federal garrison at Fort Pillow on the Mississippi River, and a controversy ensued over whether black troops were killed after surrendering.

Forrest’s troopers descended on Fort Pillow as part of their raid on Federal outposts and supply lines in western Tennessee. Forrest also sought to avenge Federal depredations being committed in the region; several men suspected of aiding the Confederacy were held without charges, and one of Forrest’s officers had been tortured and murdered.

The fort was a large earthwork on a bluff overlooking the Mississippi, about 40 land miles north of Memphis. Held by Federal forces since June 1862, the fort protected a nearby trading post, and it was garrisoned by 557 Federal troops under Major Lionel F. Booth. Of these troops, 262 were newly recruited former slaves, and the rest were mostly Tennessee Unionists (whom Forrest’s Tennesseans considered traitors). The Federal tinclad gunboat U.S.S. New Era patrolled the Mississippi riverfront behind the garrison.

Fort Pillow | Image Credit: FortWiki.com

A portion of Forrest’s command consisting of 1,500 horsemen under Brigadier General James R. Chalmers attacked the outposts at 5:30 a.m. on the 12th and surrounded the fort by 8 a.m. Federal artillery and the New Era’s guns could not be positioned to hit the Confederates, who took the high ground on the perimeter and killed Booth. Command passed to Major William F. Bradford.

Gen Nathan Bedford Forrest | Image Credit: Flickr.com

Forrest arrived around 10 a.m. and directed an attack in which the Confederates captured the Federal barracks on the south side of the fort. The New Era steamed downriver to replenish her ammunition. Forrest’s aide, Captain Charles W. Anderson, stated that “it was perfectly apparent to any man endowed with the smallest amount of common sense that to all intents and purposes the fort was ours.”

When Forrest’s ammunition train arrived around 3 p.m., he sent a courier to Bradford under a flag of truce demanding surrender and warning, “Should my demand be refused, I cannot be responsible for the fate of your command.”

Bradford asked for one hour to consult with his officers. However, Forrest could see the New Era on the river and feared that she carried reinforcements. He gave Bradford just 20 minutes, stating, “If at the expiration of that time the fort is not surrendered, I shall assault it.” During the 20-minute ceasefire, Federal troops mocked the Confederates from the fort parapets. Confident he could hold the fort, Bradford finally replied, “I will not surrender.” Forrest attacked immediately.

The Confederates easily broke through the outer defenses, scaled the parapets, and drove the defenders down the bluff toward the river. The Federals tried fleeing to the gunboat, but it pulled back under the heavy Confederate fire. The fight soon degenerated into a panic, as Forrest and his officers tried stopping their men from wiping out the entire garrison.

In the end, all 557 Federals were killed, wounded, or captured (231 killed, 100 wounded, and 226 captured). Of those taken prisoner, 58 were black and 168 were white. The Confederates also captured six guns and 350 stands of small arms while losing just 100 men (14 killed and 86 wounded). Federal Acting Master William Ferguson, assigned to investigate Fort Pillow the day after it fell, reported:

“About 8 a.m. the enemy sent in a flag of truce with a proposal from General Forrest that he would put me in possession of the fort and the country around until 5 p.m. for the purpose of burying our dead and removing our wounded, whom he had no means of attending to. I agreed to the terms proposed…

“All the wounded who had strength enough to speak agreed that after the fort was taken an indiscriminate slaughter of our troops was carried on by the enemy with a furious and vindictive savageness which was never equaled by the most merciless of the Indian tribes… Bodies with gaping wounds, some bayoneted through the eyes, some with skulls beaten through, others with hideous wounds as if their bowels had been ripped open with bowie-knives, plainly told that but little quarter was shown to our troops…

“Of course, when a work is carried by assault there will always be more or less bloodshed, even when all resistance has ceased; but here there were unmistakable evidences of a massacre carried on long after any resistance could have been offered, with a cold-blooded barbarity and perseverance which nothing can palliate…”

In his report, Forrest wrote:

“The victory was complete, and the loss of the enemy will never be known from the fact that large numbers ran into the river and were shot and drowned. The force was composed of about 500 negroes and 200 white soldiers (Tennessee Tories). The river was dyed with the blood of the slaughtered for 200 yards. There was in the fort a large number of citizens who had fled there to escape the conscript law. Most of these ran into the river and were drowned.

“The approximate loss was upward of 500 killed, but few of the officers escaping.

“It is hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the northern people that negro soldiers cannot cope with Southerners. We still hold the fort.”

Witnesses accused the Confederates of killing Federal soldiers–particularly the black soldiers–even after they surrendered. Survivors later testified at a congressional hearing that the Confederates shouted, “No quarter!” while shooting or bayoneting several men who had already laid down their arms. Northerners generally decried the “Fort Pillow Massacre,” viewing it as indicative of the atrocities that Confederates committed against black soldiers for fighting against them.

Forrest argued that the engagement could hardly be called a “massacre” since he had taken 226 prisoners, none of whom were seriously injured. He also maintained that some Federals picked up their weapons and resumed firing after they surrendered, and therefore suffered the consequences. Others claimed the high black casualty rate was due to their brave defense, as they were the last to flee.

Four of President Abraham Lincoln’s cabinet members—Secretary of State William H. Seward, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase, and Navy Secretary Gideon Welles—publicly supported the execution of an equal number of Confederate prisoners of war in retaliation. But Major General William T. Sherman, overall commander in the region, recommended no vengeance, and Lincoln ultimately agreed. Forrest and his men were not called upon to testify in their own defense after the war. Nevertheless, black soldiers used the rallying cry, “Remember Fort Pillow!” for the rest of the conflict.

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References

Angle, Paul M., A Pictorial History of the Civil War Years (New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 167; Bailey, Ronald H., The Battles for Atlanta: Sherman Moves East (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983), p. 24, 25; CivilWarDailyGazette.com; Crocker III, H.W., The Politically Incorrect Guide to the Civil War (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2008), p. 187-89; Davis, Jefferson, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government: All Volumes (Heraklion Press, Kindle Edition 2013, 1889), Loc 20657-81; Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 392; Foote, Shelby, The Civil War: A Narrative: Volume 3: Red River to Appomattox (Vintage Civil War Library, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, Kindle Edition, 2011), Loc 2298-338; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 417-19; Linedecker, Clifford L. (ed.), The Civil War A to Z (Ballantine Books, 2002), p. 108; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 484-85; McPherson, James M., War on the Waters: The Union and Confederate Navies, 1861-1865 (Littlefield History of the Civil War Era, The University of North Carolina Press, Kindle Edition, 2012), p. 190-91; Stanchak, John E., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 277-78

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Forrest’s Confederates Enter Kentucky

March 16, 1864 – Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest launched a Confederate cavalry expedition into western Tennessee and Kentucky.

Brig Gen N.B. Forrest | Image Credit: CivilWarDailyGazette.com

Forrest, stationed at Columbus, Mississippi, with 5,000 troopers, received orders to move north. His mission was to attack Federal outposts, recruit volunteers, capture deserters, and disrupt the Federal supply line along the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad. Forrest took 2,700 of his men on the excursion.

A little over a week later, a detachment of Forrest’s 7th Tennessee Cavalry surprised and captured the Federal 7th Tennessee Cavalry at Union City in northwestern Tennessee. The Confederates placed logs on wheels to resemble cannon and left a note: “If you persist in defense, you must take the consequences. N.B. Forrest, Major General, Commanding.” The Confederates took 481 prisoners, 300 horses, and a large amount of supplies.

Meanwhile, Forrest’s main force continued north toward Paducah, a strategic Kentucky town near the confluence of the Ohio and Tennessee rivers which had been under Federal control since September 1861. After riding 100 miles in 50 hours, the troopers arrived outside Paducah on the 25th. The Federals, led by Colonel Stephen G. Hicks, quickly fell back to Fort Anderson, a strong fortification west of town.

Hicks had just 665 men, but they were supported by artillery and two tinclad gunboats (the U.S.S. Peosta and Paw Paw) on the Tennessee River. Forrest sent Hicks a message: “If you surrender you shall be treated as prisoners of war, but if I have to storm your works you may expect no quarter.” Forrest did not actually intend to assault the fort; he only wanted horses and supplies.

The Federals responded to Forrest’s demand by blasting the streets with their artillery, joined by fire from the gunboats. Brigadier General Mason Brayman, the overall commander at Paducah, later wrote that the tinclads–

“… shelled the rebels out of the buildings from which their sharpshooters annoyed our troops. A large number took shelter in heavy warehouses near the river and maintained a furious fire upon the gunboats, inflicting some injury, but they were promptly dislodged and the buildings destroyed…”

Colonel Albert P. Thompson disregarded Forrest’s orders and led two regiments in an assault on Fort Anderson. The Federals repelled them, inflicting 50 casualties (10 killed and 40 wounded), though Hicks claimed to have inflicted 1,500 casualties. Thompson, who lived nearby, was among those killed. The Federals sustained 60 casualties (14 killed and 46 wounded).

Meanwhile, the gunboats fired about 700 rounds. According to a gunner on the Peosta:

“We kept putting the shell and grape into them from all the guns we could get to bear. Their riflemen and some of the people of the town got into the buildings down by the river and pelted us with musket balls but we soon gave them enough of that for we directed our whole fire on them at short range with shell grape and canister and soon fetched the bricks around their eyes… They would have had the fort and the city if it had not been for us, for they were out of ammunition in the fort.”

Forrest finally withdrew the next morning, taking 50 prisoners, 400 horses, and more supplies. Before leaving, the Confederates destroyed cotton and a steamer in dry dock. Forrest’s raid had alarmed residents of the Ohio River Valley, but the Confederates failed to establish a foothold in Kentucky. They fell back toward Fort Pillow on the Mississippi.

After Forrest left Paducah, he learned from a local newspaper that his troopers had missed out on capturing 140 army horses hidden in a mill. Forrest resolved to return next month and get those mounts.

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References

Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 385, 388; Foote, Shelby, The Civil War: A Narrative: Volume 3: Red River to Appomattox (Vintage Civil War Library, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, Kindle Edition, 2011), Loc 2249-79; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 409, 411-12; Harrison, Lowell H., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 552; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 477-78; McPherson, James M., War on the Waters: The Union and Confederate Navies, 1861-1865 (Littlefield History of the Civil War Era, The University of North Carolina Press, Kindle Edition, 2012), p. 190

Eastern Tennessee: Longstreet Wins and Foster Leaves

January 28, 1864 – The Federals looked to follow up their victory at Fair Gardens, while Major General Ulysses S. Grant looked to replace the Federal commander at Knoxville.

On the 27th, Brigadier General Samuel D. Sturgis, commanding the cavalry in the Federal Army of the Ohio, defeated half of Lieutenant General James Longstreet’s Confederate cavalry under Major General William T. Martin with just one division. That night, Sturgis vowed to pursue and destroy the enemy, as locals reported that the retreating Confederates “presented the appearance of a panic-stricken mob as they were running through the mountains.”

The next morning, Sturgis directed his other two divisions to advance on Dandridge, where Longstreet’s corps was based. Martin, calling for reinforcements, received support from cavalry under Brigadier General Frank C. Armstrong and infantry under Brigadier General Bushrod R. Johnson. The Federals approached the French Broad River and came upon the Confederate reinforcements crossing the waterway and taking up strong defenses.

The Confederates easily repulsed Federal attacks near Swann’s Island. When Sturgis received word that Longstreet was trying to get between the Federal army base at Knoxville and Sturgis’s base at Sevierville, he ordered a withdrawal. The Federals fell back to Sevierville, but when the Confederates advanced to confront them, they continued retreating to Maryville, south of Knoxville.

Confederate Lt Gen James Longstreet | Image Credit: BlogSpot.com

Longstreet now controlled the region between Sevierville and Dandridge, which provided much-needed forage for his troops. Sturgis reported, “Our loss in this engagement is pretty severe, about eight officers that I now know of, and a great many men I fear.” He also regretted the loss of Sevierville, stating, “It is hard to leave these loyal people to the mercies of the enemy, but it can’t be helped. If I had had a division of infantry at Sevierville, I could have annihilated both these divisions of rebel cavalry…”

Meanwhile, General Grant, commanding the Federal Military Division of the Mississippi, continued pressing Major General John G. Foster, commanding the Army of the Ohio, to send his entire army to confront Longstreet. Foster had resisted, citing the unforgiving countryside, his troops’ lack of supplies, and his own condition (he was still recovering from a wound that needed treatment).

Grant responded, “While you may deem it impracticable to immediately assume the offensive against Longstreet, keep at least far out toward him active parties to watch his movements and impede any advance he may make by positive resistance.” Unaware of the fighting between Sturgis and Martin, Grant advised Foster to “be prepared at any moment on receipt of orders for offensive operations.”

Grant contacted Major General George H. Thomas, commanding the Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga, and reiterated that Foster may need his help. Thomas replied, “I am trying to get up forage enough for a 10-days’ expedition, and if successful will make a strong demonstration on Dalton and Resaca (in Georgia), unless Longstreet’s movements compel me to go to East Tennessee.”

Revisiting Foster’s request to be removed as commander so he could tend to his wound, Grant considered several candidates. These included Thomas and Major General James B. McPherson, commanding a corps in the Army of the Tennessee. Ultimately, Major General John Schofield was chosen, having recently been removed as commander of the contentious Department of Missouri. Schofield headed toward his new assignment as Foster prepared to obey Grant’s orders to launch an offensive.

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References

CivilWarDailyGazette.com; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 392; Stanchak, John E., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 252-53; Wilson, David L., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 642

Eastern Tennessee: The Sevierville Engagement

January 26, 1864 – Federals and Confederates clashed for two days, resulting in minor victories for both sides in this forbidding region of eastern Tennessee.

Gen J.G. Foster | Image Credit: Wikimedia.org

Major General John G. Foster, commanding the Federal Army of the Ohio from Knoxville, had been pressured by his superior, Major General Ulysses S. Grant, to drive the enemy out of eastern Tennessee. A portion of Foster’s army had clashed with Lieutenant General James Longstreet’s Confederates at Dandridge, and Longstreet had threatened to pursue the Federals all the way back to Knoxville.

Foster feared that Longstreet might have been reinforced to the point that he could lay siege to Knoxville once more. But after receiving further information, Foster reported to Grant on the 22nd, “The enemy presses vigorously, and is about seven miles from town… I am now satisfied that Longstreet has been considerably re-enforced, but not large enough, I think, to warrant his renewing the siege of this place.” Scouts informed Foster that Longstreet’s Confederates still held Dandridge and had been reinforced by a division.

The next day, Federal scouts from Major General Jacob D. Cox’s XXIII Corps probed for nearby Confederates but could not find them. Foster reported that “the rebels have ceased to press vigorously.” With Longstreet no longer an immediate threat, Foster stated that it was “absolutely necessary that the army have rest.” He then informed Major General George H. Thomas, commanding the Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga, that “the enemy has retired and I am now putting the tired troops in cantonment, where they may rest a little before the spring campaign.”

Foster placed IX Corps between Longstreet and Knoxville, and IV and XXIII corps on the Tennessee River, with the former at Kingston and the latter at Loudon. He continued complaining of supply shortages, stating that “the bread thus far received from Chattanooga has not amounted to one-tenth of the ration. We now have only enough for the hospitals.”

Meanwhile, Grant misinterpreted Foster’s messages to mean that Longstreet was still pursuing the Federals. He asked Foster if he could “organize a cavalry force to work its way past Longstreet south of him, to get into his rear and destroy railroad and transportation, or cannot (Orlando) Willcox (who temporarily commanded IX Corps) do this from the north?” If this could not be done, Grant ordered Foster to see that battle was “given where Longstreet is now.”

Grant then asked Thomas to send the rest of IV Corps to reinforce Foster, and “take the command in person, and on arrival at Knoxville to take command of all the forces” since Foster was suffering from a wound that made it “impossible for him to take the field. In justice to himself, and as I want Longstreet routed and pursued beyond the limits of the State of Tennessee, it is necessary to have a commander physically able for the task.”

Grant wired General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck, who had pressed Grant to keep the Federal hold on eastern Tennessee:

“Foster telegraphs that Longstreet is still advancing toward Knoxville. I have directed him to get his cavalry to Longstreet’s rear, or give battle if necessary. I will send Thomas with additional troops to insure Longstreet’s being driven from the state.”

Andrew Johnson, Tennessee’s military governor, joined with Grant in urging a command change at Knoxville. However, Johnson did not have Thomas in mind. He wrote President Abraham Lincoln on the 24th, “I hope that it will be consistent with the public interest for General (Ambrose E.) Burnside to be sent back to East Tennessee. He is the man; the people want him; he will inspire more confidence than any other man at this time.” But Burnside had left the Army of the Ohio to oversee soldier recruitment in his native New England.

Gen S.D. Sturgis | Image Credit: Wikipedia.org

While the opposing infantries settled into tenuous winter quarters in eastern Tennessee, the opposing cavalries continued their foraging and scouting operations. Both Federals and Confederates operated around the French Broad River, skirmishing from time to time as the Federals held the south bank and the Confederates held the north. Brigadier General Samuel D. Sturgis, commanding the Federal cavalry, lamented that stripping the countryside of foodstuffs forced civilians to starve:

“I do not know that it can be avoided, but I may say that it is a pity that circumstances should compel us to entirely exhaust the country of these loyal people. If we remain here long they must suffer, and it will be impossible for them to raise anything next year. The necessity for pressing supplies leads immediately to plundering that soldiers find no difficulty in taking the step from the one to the other, and in spite of all I can do to the contrary. It is distressing to witness the sufferings of these people at the hands of the friends for whom they have been so long and so anxiously looking. You cannot help it; neither can I, and I only refer to it because my heart is full of it.”

Both sides had to venture farther and farther from their bases to find food, and soon Longstreet’s Confederates were out near Newport, some 15 miles east of their base. Moxley Sorrell, Longstreet’s aide-de-camp, advised, “As the enemy has now a large force on the south side of the French Broad, it will be necessary for your operations and movements to be conducted with great caution.”

Grant’s orders to drive Longstreet out of the region filtered down to Sturgis, commanding the Federal cavalry, who was to push the Confederates out of their winter quarters at Morristown and Russellville. Foster informed Grant that Sturgis was preparing to move, “but thus far he has found it impossible to execute it from the opposition met with and the worn-down condition of the horses. I do not think it practicable at this time to advance in force and attack Longstreet at Morristown.”

Foster then referred to his own condition, which was made worse by the terrible weather: “The sooner I obtain relief by an operation, the sooner I can return to active duty. Cannot I leave now for this purpose?” Grant briefly considered taking command himself as he began searching for a suitable replacement.

Foster did not want to fight Longstreet, but a fight was coming regardless. Sturgis left his base at Sevierville on the 26th, heading north and east toward Dandridge. As the Federals approached, Longstreet dispatched his cavalry under Major General William T. Martin to cross the French Broad and attack Sturgis’s rear. The Confederates rode to the Fair Gardens area, about 10 miles east of Sevierville.

As skirmishing began, Sturgis initially reported that the Confederates were “making no very determined assault.” However, Martin’s troopers eventually drove one of Sturgis’s regiments to the fork in the Sevierville road leading to either Fair Gardens or Newport.

A Confederate detachment attacked Federals under Colonel Frank Wolford northeast of Sevierville and pushed them toward the town as the day ended. Sturgis reported from Sevierville, “Many of his (Wolford’s) men came into this place and report that the enemy had infantry.” Sturgis began concentrating his cavalry while calling for infantry support. He wrote Foster, “The enemy is evidently very strong and exultant over their last few days’ operations. We will do the best we can, but I do not feel like promising much.”

By the next day, the Confederates had concentrated on the Newport road, with their line running from near the Dickey House southeast to McNutt’s Bridge on the Big East Fork of the Little Pigeon River. On the Federal side, Sturgis was now reinforced by three infantry regiments. Sturgis decided to act first and sent his Federals against Martin’s troopers.

Supported by artillery, the Federals pushed the Confederates back a mile before crossing the East Fork under cover of their guns. The two sides charged and countercharged, with neither giving ground as the Confederates made a stand near McNutt’s Bridge. Colonel Oscar La Grange’s Federal brigade charged a Confederate battery, and a group of soldiers rallied around their flag. According to La Grange, the guns were captured, “the drivers sabered, and the teams stopped in a deep cut within a quarter of a mile.”

Martin finally fell back to Fair Gardens. The Federals sustained 60 to 70 casualties, while the Confederates lost 312 (200 killed or wounded and 112 captured), along with two guns. Sturgis had defeated Longstreet’s cavalry using just one of his three cavalry divisions. Sturgis claimed, “In the whole day’s fighting their loss must be very large.” Longstreet confirmed this:

“General Martin had a severe cavalry fight on the 27th. He was driven back four miles, with a loss of 200 killed, wounded, and missing, and 2 pieces of artillery. The enemy’s cavalry has been greatly increased by the cavalry from Chattanooga. Most of the cavalry force from that place is now here… We can do but little while this superior cavalry force is here to operate on our flank and rear. Do send me a chief of cavalry.”

Sturgis declared, “We will pursue them until we drive them out of the country, or are driven out ourselves.”

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References

CivilWarDailyGazette.com; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 391-92; Stanchak, John E., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 252-53

Reconstruction Gets Under Way in Tennessee

January 21, 1864 – Unionists assembled at Nashville and approved a resolution forming a constitutional convention to restore Tennessee to the Union.

17th U.S. President Andrew Johnson | Image Credit: learnnc.org

Military Governor Andrew Johnson, who attended the assembly, called upon the delegates to form a new government. He urged them, “Begin at the foundation, elect the lower officers, and, step by step, put the government in motion.”

Regarding who should be allowed to vote in the election for convention delegates, Johnson declared that anyone “who has engaged in this Rebellion has been, by his own act, expatriated” and thus had no right to suffrage “until he has filed his declaration and taken the oath of allegiance.” Johnson went further than other governors by equating Confederates with foreigners, but at the same time he opened a path for them to regain their rights as citizens.

Johnson hoped to encourage Confederates to lay down their arms and pledge loyalty to the Union by announcing that he was “for a white man’s Government, and in favor of free white qualified voters controlling this country, without regard to Negroes.”

As for the slavery issue, Johnson said, “Now is the time to settle it.” He alleged that the Confederates had “commenced the destruction of the Government for the preservation of slavery, and the Government is putting down the Rebellion, and, in the preservation of its own existence, has put slavery down, justly and rightfully, and upon correct principles.”

There was no need to debate emancipation, as it was already being done in Tennessee. According to Johnson, the main focus should now be on restoring a Unionist government while “leaving the Negroes out of the question.” After that, the next phase would be “assigning the Negro his new relation” to whites in society. And since slaves outnumbered free blacks in Tennessee, it should be as simple to “contain them in one condition as in another.”

Of the black man, Johnson asserted, “If he can rise by his own energies, in the name of God let him rise,” though he reminded his white Unionist audience that he did not “argue that the Negro race is equal to the Anglo-Saxon–not at all.” In keeping with President Abraham Lincoln’s policy of colonization, Johnson expressed hope that “the Negro will be transferred to Mexico, or some other country congenial to his nature, where there is not that difference in class or distinction, in reference to blood or color.”

After ranging over various other topics, Johnson returned to the task at hand of restoring Tennessee to the Union. He concluded, “Things have a beginning, and you have put the ball in motion.”

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References

CivilWarDailyGazette.com; Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 361; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 391; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 456

Eastern Tennessee: The Dandridge Engagement

January 17, 1864 – Federals and Confederates moved toward Dandridge to gather much-needed foodstuffs for the hungry troops in the bitter eastern Tennessee winter.

The Federal Army of the Ohio, stationed at Strawberry Plains, had stripped the surrounding countryside of forage. The troops therefore began moving toward Dandridge, an important crossroads town near the East Tennessee & Virginia Railroad, that promised more provisions. They were led by Major General Philip Sheridan.

Gen S.D. Sturgis | Image Credit: Wikipedia.org

Federal cavalry under Brigadier General Samuel D. Sturgis drove off Confederate horsemen probing near the town, unaware that Lieutenant General James Longstreet had mobilized his infantry to seize Dandridge as well. Most of Sturgis’s men took the Morristown Road to Kimbrough’s Crossroads, while a detachment met enemy cavalry southeast of Dandridge, at the bend of Chunky Road. When these Federals could not drive the Confederates off, they fell back to Dandridge.

Sturgis received word on the 17th that the Confederates were preparing to attack, and he invited Sheridan to come watch him “whip the enemy’s cavalry.” Sheridan declined, as he was still leading his infantry toward Dandridge. Sturgis readied for the enemy horsemen, but he was surprised to see that they were backed by Longstreet’s infantry. Sturgis fell back to join the main Federal force.

Sheridan set up defenses outside Dandridge and called on the remaining troops under Major Generals Gordon Granger and John G. Parke for support. As the Federals probed the Confederate lines about four miles from town, Longstreet’s troops moved around the Federals’ flank and nearly into their rear. Longstreet did not send his heavy guns with them because “the ringing of the iron axles of the guns might give notice to our purpose.”

Granger arrived to take command, and Sheridan’s division began building a bridge below Dandridge that would allow the Federals to forage in the region and return to their camps at Strawberry Plains and Knoxville. Sheridan’s bridge was seemingly completed, “but to his mortification, he found at dark that he was on an island, and that it would require four more hours to complete this bridge.”

Longstreet arranged his men in attack positions around 4 p.m. Parke, who had arrived on the scene with Granger and Sheridan, reported to Major General John G. Foster, commanding the Army of the Ohio from Knoxville, at 6:30 p.m.:

“There is no doubt that Longstreet’s whole force is immediately in our front on the Bull’s Gap and the Bend of Chunky Roads. They advanced on us this evening. We have no means of crossing the river. I shall fall back on Strawberry Plains.”

According to Longstreet, “As the infantry had had a good long march before reaching the ground, we only had time to get our position a little after dark. During the night the enemy retired to New Market and to Strawberry Plains, leaving his dead upon the ground.” Granger issued the orders to withdraw at 9 p.m. The Federals left their partially completed bridge behind.

As the Confederates camped for the night, Foster feared they may have been reinforced by General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. However, General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck informed him that according to the latest intelligence, “Longstreet has had no re-enforcements from Lee of late.”

Confederate Lt Gen James Longstreet | Image Credit: BlogSpot.com

The Confederates entered Dandridge on the morning of the 18th. In his memoirs, Longstreet wrote:

“When I rode into Dandridge in the gray of the morning the ground was thawing and hardly firm enough to bear the weight of a horse. When the cavalry came at sunrise the last crust of ice had melted, letting the animals down to their fetlocks in heavy limestone soil. The mud and want of a bridge to cross the Holston made pursuit by our heavy columns useless.”

Longstreet noted that the Federal retreat seemed “to have been made somewhat hastily and not in very good order.” He began a half-hearted pursuit, and “the men without shoes were ordered to remain as camp guards, but many preferred to march with their comrades.” The Confederates could not make much progress because “the bitter freeze of two weeks had made the rough angles of mud as firm and sharp as so many freshly-quarried rocks, and the partially protected feet of our soldiers sometimes left bloody marks along the roads.”

The Federals continued falling back, as Foster directed them to keep retreating all the way to Knoxville. Major General Jacob D. Cox, commanding XXIII Corps, stated that “in the afternoon, the rain changed to moist driving snow. The sleepy, weary troops toiled doggedly on; the wagons and cannon were helped over the bad places in the way, for we were determined not to abandon any, and the enemy was not hurrying us.”

Stopping short of Strawberry Plains that night, Cox recalled, “We halted the men here and went into bivouac for the night… sheltered from the storm and where the evergreen boughs were speedily converted into tents of a sort, as well as soft and fragrant beds.” Cox wrote that “it had been a wretchedly cheerless and uncomfortable march, but the increasing cold and flying snow made the camp scarcely less inclement.”

This small engagement at Dandridge caused an uproar in Washington, as officials believed that the Federals might abandon eastern Tennessee altogether. Halleck reminded Major General Ulysses S. Grant, commanding the Western Theater, that President Abraham Lincoln considered holding the region “the very greatest importance, both in a political and military point of view, and no effort must be spared to accomplish that object.”

Halleck then asked Major General George H. Thomas, commanding the Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga, to “please give particular attention to the situation of General Foster’s army in East Tennessee, and give him all the aid which he may require and you may be able to render.” Thomas could do nothing except ship more supplies to Foster’s army. The Federal high command would eventually realize that the engagement did not portend the disaster that they feared.

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References

CivilWarDailyGazette.com; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 390

Suffering in Eastern Tennessee

January 15, 1864 – Lieutenant General James Longstreet mobilized his Confederate forces as both his men and the Federal troops languished in the harsh winter of mountainous eastern Tennessee.

Gen J.G. Foster | Image Credit: Wikimedia.org

Major General Ulysses S. Grant, the Federal commander in the Western Theater, traveled to Knoxville to personally inspect Major General John G. Foster’s Army of the Ohio. Grant had urged Foster to drive Longstreet out of eastern Tennessee, but Foster argued that the men were in no condition to conduct such an operation in the bitter cold and forbidding terrain.

Foster’s army was stationed on Strawberry Plains, north of Knoxville and about 30 miles from Longstreet’s Confederates at Russellville. Grant visited the army on the 2nd and saw that the men suffered from a severe lack of winter clothing and footwear. They also had very little food left, having stripped the surrounding countryside of forage. Foster was right: the Federals could not be expected to confront Longstreet. Grant contacted Major General George H. Thomas, commanding the Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga:

“Send forward clothing for this command as fast as it arrives at Chattanooga. If you have clothing on hand that can possibly be spared, send it forward and deduct the same amount from that coming forward for Foster. Troops here are in bad condition for clothing, and before making much advance must be supplied.”

In a controversial move, Grant authorized Foster to organize local blacks into what became the 1st U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery. Tennessee was a slave state exempted from the Emancipation Proclamation, so Foster had to get permission from the slaves’ masters before inducting them into the military, and then compensate the masters for their loss of labor.

After Grant left, Foster reported to him, “The cold weather and high rivers have made things worse, (and) many animals are dying daily.” The Holston River was flooding with water and ice, and he had to build a bridge to send men to Dandridge “to obtain forage and corn and wheat. Everything is eaten out north of Holston River, also nearly everything is eaten up at Mossy Creek.”

Foster noted that since Grant had called on Federals at both Chattanooga and Nashville to send supplies, “Some quartermaster stores have arrived, but not in sufficient quantity. No rations by last boats. Am entirely destitute of bread, coffee, and sugar.”

According to Confederate deserters, Longstreet’s main force was between Morristown and Russellville, and his cavalry was at Kimbrough’s Crossroads. Foster added that the Confederates were suffering just as much as his men: “They lack clothing, especially shoes, rations and forage. The condition is every way bad.”

The deserters dispelled rumors that Longstreet had been reinforced. They also told the Federals that their comrades had stripped the countryside of foodstuffs for 20 miles around. Foster explained, “They have now to cross to the south side of the French Broad for forage. The talk among the officers and men is that they will soon have to retreat to Bristol.” For now, the armies would battle the weather and starvation instead of each other.

Foster then wrote Thomas, explaining the “rapid destruction of our teams by death of animals from starvation.” Thomas immediately answered that “stores will be forwarded you as fast as possible, but unless great care is exercised both armies will be suffering.” In a second message, Thomas wrote, “Two of our largest steamers are up the river, with all the subsistence stores we can spare from here until they are returned.”

Grant reported to General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck that no offensive would be undertaken any time soon in eastern Tennessee, as the men were “suffering for want of clothing, especially shoes.” Grant reconnoitered the road leading through Cumberland Gap as a possible supply line, but he saw that “no portion of our supplies can be hauled by teams” along that route. Foster would have to rely on supplies being shipped up the winding Tennessee River.

Meanwhile, Federal cavalry probed the area around Longstreet’s camps, trying to gather intelligence. As the Federals inched closer, Longstreet decided that the only way to survive was to destroy the Federals and take back Knoxville. He mobilized his infantry on the 15th and put them on the march to Dandridge. This, Longstreet hoped, would secure an important point on the East Tennessee & Virginia Railroad, flank the Federals, and push them back into Knoxville, where Longstreet could renew his siege and this time starve them into submission.

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References

CivilWarDailyGazette.com; Hess, Earl J., The Knoxville Campaign: Burnside and Longstreet in East Tennessee (University of Tennessee Press, 2013); Official Records of the War of the Rebellion (Series 1, Volume 1), p. 44; OR (Series 1, Volume 2), p. 219; OR (Series 1, Volume 32, Part 2), p. 71-73