Tag Archives: Maryland Campaign

The Maryland Campaign Ends

Maryland, Military September 18, 2017 1 Comment

September 18, 1862 – General Robert E. Lee’s Confederate Army of Northern Virginia defiantly awaited another attack from Major General George B. McClellan’s Federal Army of the Potomac after the Battle of Antietam.

Gen. R.E. Lee, CSA and Maj Gen G.B. McClellan, USA | Image Credit: Wikispaces.com

The opposing forces worked out truces the morning after the battle to collect the wounded and bury the dead. Many men saw the terrible carnage the fight had produced for the first time. Nearly 12,000 men were killed or wounded in the Cornfield alone. Bodies were stacked four-high in “Bloody Lane.”

The U.S. Sanitary Commission distributed massive amounts of clothing, foodstuffs, and medical supplies that had been bought by donations from northerners. Even so, many wounded soldiers died of infections due to unsanitary hospital conditions. That night, a wounded sergeant of the 15th Massachusetts wrote in his diary:

“… Another painful night. Oh good a whole line of our skirmishers are coming… By and by our boys come along. What lots of the 15th… Dr. looks at my wound and calls it doubtful case. Get me on ambulance at 3 p.m. but do not get to hospital till nearly dark. Plenty of water which gives us a chance to take down inflammation. Nurses worn out by fatigue. Placed on straw near the barn.”

Besides moving 200 yards inward in the center, Lee’s Confederate line remained as it stood 24 hours before, poised to meet another Federal attack. Lee considered moving around the Federal left, but massed artillery in that sector made such a move impossible.

On the Federal side, McClellan wired General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck, “The battle will probably be renewed today. Send all the troops you can by the most expeditious route.” McClellan awaited reinforcements despite his overwhelming numerical superiority, which included about 20,000 reserves who did not get into yesterday’s fight. Two divisions arrived later that day, giving McClellan more fresh men than Lee had total men.

But McClellan still would not move, instead writing that “a careful and anxious survey of the condition of my command, and my knowledge of the enemy’s force and position” showed that “the success of an attack was not certain” without more men. Thus, both armies remained stationary.  

Lee considered attacking, but his scouts told him the Federal positions were too strong to break. If Lee could not attack, and if McClellan refused to attack, then Lee resolved to go back to Virginia. Around 2 p.m., Lee informed Major General James Longstreet that the army would retire across the Potomac River that night. Commanders issued orders, and after midnight, the men left their campfires burning as Longstreet led the withdrawal. The Confederates left dead and wounded comrades who could not be moved.

This marked the first time that the Army of Northern Virginia had been compelled to retreat, even though the Battle of Antietam had been a tactical stalemate and Lee held his ground for two days before leaving. Despite McClellan’s sluggish combat performance, his army had captured an unprecedented 39 Confederate battle flags in the fights at South Mountain and Antietam.

McClellan boasted to his superiors, “I have the honor to report that Maryland is entirely freed from the presence of the enemy, who has been driven across the Potomac. We may safely claim a complete victory.” He wrote his wife, “Our victory was complete. I feel some little pride in having with a beaten and demoralized army defeated Lee so utterly, & saved the North so completely.” Apparently, McClellan was so emboldened by his “complete victory” that he vowed to make demands on the Lincoln administration:

“I have insisted that (Secretary of War Edwin) Stanton shall be removed and that Halleck shall give way to me as Commander in Chief. I will not serve under him–for he is an incompetent fool–in no way fit for the important place he holds… I have shown that I can fight battles and win them! I think my enemies (in Washington) are pretty effectively killed by this time.”

Yet McClellan did little to follow up his “complete victory,” and he missed a chance to destroy the Confederates as they crossed the Potomac. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles wrote in his diary, “Nothing from the army, except that, instead of following up the victory, attacking and capturing the Rebels, they… are rapidly escaping across the river… Oh dear!”

McClellan was deeply disturbed to receive an admonition, and not a congratulation, from Halleck for failing to keep Washington more closely informed of what was happening. McClellan angrily responded:

“I regret that you find it necessary to couch every dispatch I have the honor to receive from you, in a spirit of fault finding, and that you have not yet found leisure to say one word in commendation of the recent achievements of this Army, or even to allude to them.”

The last Confederate infantrymen waded across the Potomac near dawn on the 19th. Brigadier General John G. Walker informed Lee that all had crossed unmolested except for an artillery battery and the ambulance wagons. Lee replied, “Thank God!” He directed Brigadier General William N. Pendleton to guard Boteler’s Ford, which the Federals would use to pursue the Confederates across the river, with two brigades and 45 guns.

Federals attacked near dusk on the 19th, driving the Confederates off. Pendleton could not see the action in the dark and hurriedly reported to Lee that the Federals had captured all 45 guns. Lee responded by sending Major General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s Confederates to regain the cannon and drive the Federals back into Maryland.

Jackson deployed General A.P. Hill’s “Light Division” on the morning of the 20th. The Confederates advanced through Federal artillery fire and drove the enemy back across the river. The 118th Pennsylvania, also known as the “Corn Exchange Regiment,” sustained heavy casualties after being pushed over a bluff and then fired upon from above while trying to escape.

The Federals suffered 363 casualties while the Confederates lost 261. Pendleton had been wrong; the Federals captured only four of the Confederates’ 45 guns. He was relegated to desk duty following this engagement. This skirmish secured Lee’s rear and enabled him to complete his withdrawal to Opequon Creek, near Martinsburg in western Virginia, where he could rest and retool his army. He had just 36,418 infantrymen present for duty, many of whom lacked adequate clothing or footwear.

The Federals scored a major victory in the Maryland campaign. They stopped the Confederate incursion and forced Lee to return to Virginia. This in turn discouraged Great Britain from formally recognizing the Confederacy as an independent nation, thus depriving the South of much-needed economic and military aid. However, the Lincoln administration noted that McClellan’s reluctance to pursue Lee and finish the fight may have been a missed opportunity to destroy the Confederate army and end the war.

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References

Anderson, Nancy Scott; Anderson, Dwight, The Generals: Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), p. 332; Bailey, Ronald H., The Bloodiest Day: The Battle of Antietam (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983), p. 150-52, 156; Catton, Bruce, The American Heritage Picture History of the Civil War (New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., 1960), p. 213; CivilWarDailyGazette.com; Crocker III, H.W., The Politically Incorrect Guide to the Civil War (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2008), p. 55-57; Davis, Jefferson, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government: All Volumes (Heraklion Press, Kindle Edition 2013, 1889), Loc 17429, 17498; Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 214-17; Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative: Fort Sumter to Perryville (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), p. 701-02; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 213-14; Freeman, Douglas Southall, Lee (Scribner, Kindle Edition, 2008), Loc 4878-90, 4901; Goodwin, Doris Kearns, Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), p. 481; Linedecker, Clifford L. (ed.), The Civil War A to Z (Ballantine Books, 2002), p. 15-18; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 268-69; McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States Book 6, Oxford University Press, Kindle Edition, 1988), p. 544-45; Pollard, Edward A., Southern History of the War (New York: C.B. Richardson, 1866; revised version New York: The Fairfax Press, 1990), p. 488; Wert, Jeffry D., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 19-20, 679; White, Howard Ray, Bloodstains, An Epic History of the Politics that Produced and Sustained the American Civil War and the Political Reconstruction that Followed (Southernbooks, Kindle Edition, 2012), Q362

The Battle of Antietam

Maryland, Military September 17, 2017 Comments: 8

September 17, 1862 – The bloodiest day in American history occurred as the armies of Robert E. Lee and George B. McClellan fought to a standoff near Sharpsburg, Maryland, along Antietam Creek.

Gen. R.E. Lee, CSA and Maj Gen G.B. McClellan, USA | Image Credit: Wikispaces.com

Before dawn, Lee had arrayed his Confederate Army of Northern Virginia with Major General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s men on the north (left), Major General James Longstreet’s Confederates in the center, and the small remainder of Lee’s command holding the south (right) until Jackson’s remaining division under General A.P. Hill could arrive from Harpers Ferry, 17 miles away.

Combat opened around 5:30 a.m. as Major General Joseph Hooker’s Federal corps advanced on the Hagerstown turnpike and attacked Jackson’s men in fog. The Federals hoped to seize the ground around the Dunker Church and turn the Confederate left.

Federals drove the first Confederate line out of the North Woods and into an area later known as the Cornfield. A Confederate counterattack led by General John Bell Hood pushed the Federals back to the Miller farm, with the lines surging back and forth over a dozen times.

Hooker later reported that “every stalk of corn in the northern and greater part of the field was cut as closely as could have been done with a knife, and the slain lay in rows precisely as they had stood in the ranks a few moments before.” Hooker was wounded himself and taken from the field, replaced by General George G. Meade.

Major General Joseph K. Mansfield’s Federal XII Corps then charged along Hooker’s left, moving through the East Woods and making a stand north of Dunker Church. Mansfield was shot in the chest after riding into a group of Confederates that he thought were Federals firing on their own men; he was replaced by General Alpheus Williams and died the next day.

The attack stalled until General John Sedgwick’s division from Major General Edwin V. Sumner’s corps attacked around 9 a.m. Confederates fired on them from three sides and sent them reeling. Sedgwick was wounded and out of active duty for several months.

During the fight, Lee shifted troops from his right to reinforce Jackson on the left. Meanwhile, McClellan’s plan to attack with overwhelming numbers turned into uncoordinated attacks that failed to reach their maximum impact. The Confederates held their ground, but Federals repelled a final counterattack. Fighting subsided around 10 a.m. with over 8,000 casualties inflicted in the northern sector of the field alone, including two Federal corps commanders.

A new fight soon erupted farther south, where General William French’s division of Sumner’s corps veered away from the fighting to the north and confronted Major General D.H. Hill’s 5,000 Confederates along a sunken road. French sent his troops against the Confederates one brigade at a time, and they were all repelled within an hour, sustaining 1,750 casualties out of 5,700 men.

Lee committed his last division in reserve, 3,400 men under Major General Richard H. Anderson, to Hill’s right, around 10:30. By that time, Major General Israel Richardson’s 4,000-man division under Sumner came up on French’s left. Federal troops eventually surged through a gap in the line caused by a Confederate officer mistakenly pulling out a regiment.

The Federals then opened a murderous enfilade fire on the defenders along the road. A sergeant of the 61st New York said, “We were shooting them like sheep in a pen. If a bullet missed the mark at first it was liable to strike the further bank, angle back, and take them secondarily.” The road was later called “Bloody Lane.”

The Federals were on the verge of breaking the Confederate line when Longstreet brought up artillery. A Confederate artillery shell wounded Major General Israel B. Richardson, who lingered 47 days before dying. This stalled Federal momentum, and the fighting soon ended in this sector. Some 5,600 total casualties were sustained along the sunken road from 9:30 a.m. to 1 p.m.

McClellan held some 20,000 Federals in reserve that could have been used to split Lee’s army in two. Major General George Sykes offered to lead these men in a charge through the Confederate center, but McClellan turned him down. The Federal commander missed a golden opportunity to destroy the Confederate army. McClellan wrote his wife that afternoon, “We are in the midst of the most terrible battle of the age. So far God has given us success but with many variations during the day.”

Action shifted to the weakened Confederate right, where Major General Ambrose E. Burnside’s IX Corps moved to cross Antietam Creek after various delays. Burnside directed his men to cross Rohrbach’s Bridge, even though Antietam Creek was only waist deep at various spots beyond Confederate range. The Federals were held up several hours at what became known as Burnside Bridge, allowing Lee to send more reinforcements to his left and center.

Federal attack on Burnside Bridge | Image Credit: Wikipedia.org

Meanwhile, other Federals struggled through brush to find Snavely’s Ford, about two miles downstream. They finally began wading across in early afternoon, around the time that the Confederates guarding the bridge were running low on ammunition. With Federals now on their flank, the Confederates withdrew after stalling Burnside’s main advance for over three hours.

Burnside prepared to pursue the Confederates, but he was delayed two hours by ammunition and supplies being funneled across the creek on the narrow bridge. This gave Lee time to reinforce his right. Burnside planned to turn Lee’s right and block Boteler’s Ford, Lee’s only escape back to Virginia. But by this time, A.P. Hill’s 3,000-man “Light Division” was arriving across the ford to bolster the flank. Hill’s men had marched since 7:30 a.m. and arrived just in time to save Lee’s army.

Hill slammed into the Federal left, prompting Burnside to order a withdrawal all the way back to Antietam Creek. When he called for reinforcements, McClellan responded, “I can do nothing more. I have no infantry.” But McClellan had V and VI corps under Major Generals Fitz John Porter and William B. Franklin in reserve. Fighting ended around 5 p.m. when McClellan called off the attacks.

Both sides sustained a combined total of 26,193 casualties in the most terrible single day of the war. The Federals suffered 12,469 losses (2,010 killed, 9,416 wounded, and 1,043 missing) out of about 75,000 effectives, while the Confederates lost 13,724 (2,700 killed, 9,024 wounded, and 2,000 missing) from roughly 40,000. Casualties were inflicted at the rate of about 2,200 per hour. The Federal Black Hat Brigade, recently nicknamed the “Iron Brigade,” lost 42 percent of its strength.

Medical personnel hurried to tend to the wounded; they turned nearby houses, churches, barns, and other buildings into makeshift hospitals. Local women volunteered as nurses. Doors were ripped from hinges to serve as operating tables. Surgeons worked nonstop through the night without washing their hands or instruments before going from one patient to another. A U.S. Sanitary Commission worker reported:

“Indeed there is not a barn, or farmhouse, or store, or church, or schoolhouse, between Boonesville, Sharpsburg, and Smoketown that is not gorged with wounded–Rebel and Union. Even the corn-cribs, and in many cases the cow stable, and in one place the mangers, were filled. Several thousands lie in open air upon straw, and all are receiving the kind services of farmers’ families and the surgeons.”

McClellan demonstrated his tactical ineptitude yet again by never committing more than 20,000 men to the fight at any one time. This helped Lee thwart the many Federal attacks. Antietam was one of the war’s few battles in which both commanders chose the battlefield and planned their tactics in advance. It was also the first battle that Lee directed from start to finish. Although the Confederates had not won, Lee skillfully directed reinforcements to points on the line where and when they were needed most, which prevented his army’s complete destruction.

Not only did the Confederates hold their ground against vastly superior numbers, but Lee even proposed to counterattack the next day. Lee believed an attack could succeed based on McClellan’s chronic lack of aggression. But after receiving his commanders’ reports and determining that he had no more than 30,000 men left, Lee decided that he could not renew the contest, especially with his back to the Potomac River. Even so, he defiantly held his ground and waited for McClellan to renew the battle on the 18th. McClellan characteristically declined.

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References

Anderson, Nancy Scott; Anderson, Dwight, The Generals: Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), p. 332; Angle, Paul M., A Pictorial History of the Civil War Years (New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 83-85; Bailey, Ronald H., The Bloodiest Day: The Battle of Antietam (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983), p. 69, 78, 98, 130, 150-51; Catton, Bruce, The American Heritage Picture History of the Civil War (New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., 1960), p. 234-35; CivilWarDailyGazette.com; Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 213-14; Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative: Fort Sumter to Perryville (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), p. 700; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 210-12; Freeman, Douglas Southall, Lee (Scribner, Kindle Edition, 2008), Loc 4839-51, 4878, 4901-13; Linedecker, Clifford L. (ed.), The Civil War A to Z (Ballantine Books, 2002), p. 15-18; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 267-68; Longacre, Edward G., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 456; McMurry, Richard M., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 385; McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States Book 6, Oxford University Press, Kindle Edition, 1988), p. 539, 544; Wert, Jeffry D., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 19-20, 229-30, 473, 629

Maryland: The Armies Gather at Sharpsburg

Maryland, Military September 16, 2017 1 Comment

September 16, 1862 – General Robert E. Lee concentrated his Confederate Army of Northern Virginia near Sharpsburg as Major General George B. McClellan’s Federal Army of the Potomac approached.

Gen. R.E. Lee, CSA and Maj Gen G.B. McClellan, USA | Image Credit: Wikispaces.com

Following his defeat at South Mountain, Lee led the Confederates under Major Generals James Longstreet and D.H. Hill west to Sharpsburg, a hamlet among various hills and ridges between Antietam Creek and the Potomac River. Lee planned to concentrate the forces at hand before returning to Virginia, but he changed his mind when he received word that Major General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s Confederates captured Harpers Ferry. Lee read the message and said, “That is indeed good news. Let it be announced to the troops.”

Lee had just 18,000 men, but he relied on Jackson and the rest of the Confederates at Harpers Ferry to hurry and join his army at Sharpsburg, which would give him close to 45,000. Then, pointing to the hills outside Sharpsburg, Lee told his staff, “We will make our stand on those hills.”

Lee needed to make a stand in Maryland. Retreating without a fight would demoralize the Confederacy and possibly even destroy hopes of foreign recognition. Lee was confident that, like in the Seven Days Battles, McClellan would fold in the face of aggression, having never waged an offensive battle in the war thus far.

Even with all his 45,000 men, Lee still had a very small army to face McClellan’s 90,000 Federals closing in. But Lee counted on McClellan’s usual cautiousness, and he would not be disappointed. McClellan’s troops slowly began crossing Antietam Creek, east of Sharpsburg, on the afternoon of the 15th. The entire army was across by nightfall, gathering in the hills opposite the Confederates. As Lee guessed, McClellan was in no hurry to attack.

McClellan received varying accounts of the fight at South Mountain, with some reporting that Lee had been wounded and others claiming that the entire Confederate army had been pushed back into Virginia. McClellan wired General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck, “Lee last night stated publicly that he must admit they had been shockingly whipped.”

McClellan then boasted to his old adversary, former General-in-Chief Winfield Scott, “R.E. Lee in command. The rebels routed, and retreating in disorder.” Scott replied, “Bravo, my dear general! Twice more and it’s done.” President Abraham Lincoln read this message and replied to McClellan, “God bless you and all with you. Destroy the rebel army if possible.”

But to McClellan’s surprise, the Confederates were not retreating. They were holding their ground in the hills around Sharpsburg. McClellan did not order any reconnaissance to determine the enemy’s strength, otherwise he might have learned that the Confederates were hopelessly outnumbered and vulnerable to annihilation (which he should have already known since he had a copy of Lee’s Special Orders No. 191). McClellan vowed to attack the next day.

Sharpsburg, Maryland | Image Credit: Wikimedia.org

McClellan wrote his wife on the morning of the 16th, boasting that he “no doubt delivered Penna & Maryland.” Writing to Halleck, McClellan could “ascertain that some of the enemy are still there,” but he would not attack until he learned how many there were. He wrote Major General William B. Franklin, commanding VI Corps, “I think the enemy has abandoned the position in front of us, but the fog is so dense that I have not yet been able to determine.”

Reports continued arriving at McClellan’s headquarters stating that Lee was returning to Virginia. He shared these with Halleck, who responded, “I think you will find that the whole force of the enemy in your front has crossed the river. I fear now more than ever that they will recross at Harper’s Ferry or below, and turn your left, thus cutting you off from Washington.”

As McClellan spent the day guessing how many enemy troops he faced, two of Jackson’s divisions and Brigadier General John G. Walker’s Confederate division arrived to reinforce Lee at Sharpsburg. The troops had marched through the night to hurry there. Lee directed Jackson to take positions on the left, while Walker took the extreme right. Longstreet and D.H. Hill would hold the center and right. A.P. Hill’s division remained at Harpers Ferry, 17 miles away, paroling Federal prisoners and collecting captured supplies. That night, Lee ordered those men to hurry and join the main force as well.

The Confederates could see the enormous Federal army gathering in the hills across the fields; Longstreet called it “an awe-inspiring sight.” Lee’s army remained vastly outnumbered, but the Federals only threatened him with a light artillery barrage. Lincoln, trying to gather all the information he could, wired Pennsylvania Governor Andrew Curtin, “What do you hear from Gen. McClellan’s army?”

About 60,000 Federals had arrived by the end of the 16th, with the rest en route. The Federal army was short of medical supplies and personnel, having left most of their equipment and ambulances on the Virginia Peninsula. Hospital tents were also a rare commodity, prompting the army’s medical director, Jonathan Letterman, to commandeer homes and barns in the vicinity and prepare them to receive wounded troops.

McClellan finally drafted a plan of attack around 2 p.m., or 24 hours after arriving in the Confederates’ front. The plan called for each of the six corps commanders to report directly to McClellan rather than operate within the three wings he had created before leaving Washington. This decentralized the command structure at a time when centralization could have been much more effective.

The attack, which McClellan had said would happen on the 16th, was postponed until the morning of the 17th. Three corps would overwhelm the Confederate left, with a fourth corps in the center joining in once the left was turned. A fifth corps would move against the right to secure the Potomac River crossing, thus cutting off Lee’s escape, and the last corps would remain in reserve.

Major General Joseph Hooker’s I Corps was to begin the attack. Hooker’s Federals advanced west and took up assault positions around 4 p.m. They briefly exchanged fire with Confederates under General John Bell Hood, which indicated to Lee that McClellan would focus on that sector of the field. Rain fell during the evening as troops on both sides readied themselves for the fight.

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References

Anderson, Nancy Scott; Anderson, Dwight, The Generals: Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), p. 326-28; Bailey, Ronald H., The Bloodiest Day: The Battle of Antietam (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983), p. 60-61, 63-64; Catton, Bruce, The American Heritage Picture History of the Civil War (New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., 1960), p. 228; CivilWarDailyGazette.com; Davis, Jefferson, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government: All Volumes (Heraklion Press, Kindle Edition 2013, 1889), Loc 17344, 17373; Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 212-13; Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative: Fort Sumter to Perryville (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), p. 682; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 209-10; Freeman, Douglas Southall, Lee (Scribner, Kindle Edition, 2008), Loc 4744-67; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 266-67; McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States Book 6, Oxford University Press, Kindle Edition, 1988), p. 537-39; Pollard, Edward A., Southern History of the War (New York: C.B. Richardson, 1866; revised version New York: The Fairfax Press, 1990), p. 485; Wert, Jeffry D., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 19-20

The Fall of Harpers Ferry

Maryland, Military September 15, 2017 1 Comment

September 15, 1862 – As part of General Robert E. Lee’s Confederate Army of Northern Virginia fought at South Mountain, another portion led by Major General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson forced the largest Federal surrender of the war.

Harpers Ferry | Image Credit: Wikispaces.com

About 12,500 troops guarded the Federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry in northwestern Virginia. On the night of September 14, Jackson began bombarding the Federals with artillery positioned on the heights above them, and General A.P. Hill led one of Jackson’s divisions to Bolivar Heights. In addition, Confederates led by General Lafayette McLaws held Maryland Heights east of town, and Brigadier General John G. Walker’s Confederates held Loudoun Heights south of town.

The Confederate defeat at South Mountain earlier that day meant Jackson had to hurry if he wanted to capture the vital position. He contacted McLaws on the morning of the 15th:

“So soon as you get your batteries all planted, let me know, as I desire, after yourself, Walker, and myself have our batteries ready to open, to send in a flag of truce, for the purpose of getting out the non-combatants, should the commanding officer refuse to surrender. Should we have to attack, let the work be done thoroughly; fire on the houses when necessary. The citizens can keep out of harm’s way from your artillery. Demolish the place if it is occupied by the enemy, and does not surrender.”

Confederate artillery opened as Hill’s 3,000 men lined up on Bolivar Heights. Colonel Dixon Miles, commanding the Federal garrison, conferred with his officers and decided to surrender before the attack began, but an artillery shell nearly tore his leg off before he could notify the Confederates; he died the next day. Federals raised the white flag at 7:20 a.m., and Brigadier General Julius White surrendered the vital Federal garrison.

The Confederates captured all 12,500 men, 73 artillery pieces, 13,000 sorely needed small arms, and tons of valuable equipment and livestock in the largest Federal capitulation of the war. In addition to those surrendered, the Federals sustained 217 casualties (44 killed and 173 wounded), while the Confederates lost 286 (39 killed and 247 wounded).

Federal officials posthumously charged Miles with drunkenness and ineptitude for his feeble defense of Harpers Ferry. He had failed to secure Maryland Heights, and he had released Confederate prisoners without considering they could have told their officers all about the Federal defenses. Some of his men accused him of treason, and some even alleged that a Federal cavalryman had fired the shell that killed him.

When Jackson rode into town in his customary threadbare uniform, a Federal prisoner said, “Boys, he’s not much for looks, but if we’d had him we wouldn’t have been caught in this trap!” Jackson wrote Lee:

“Through God’s blessing, Harpers Ferry and its garrison are to be surrendered. As Hill’s troops have borne the heaviest part of the engagement, he will be left in command until the prisoners and public property shall be disposed of, unless you direct otherwise. The other forces can move off this evening so soon as they get their rations. To what place shall they move?”

When Lee learned of Jackson’s victory, he canceled plans to return to Virginia and instead ordered Jackson to hurry and join the rest of the army to make a stand at Sharpsburg, a small hamlet 17 miles away. Jackson left Hill to conduct the surrender and rushed to Sharpsburg. Meanwhile, Lee positioned his forces on a ridge overlooking Antietam Creek, with the Federal Army of the Potomac closing in on them.

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References

Bailey, Ronald H., The Bloodiest Day: The Battle of Antietam (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983), p. 50, 56-59; Catton, Bruce, The American Heritage Picture History of the Civil War (New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., 1960), p. 227, 228; CivilWarDailyGazette.com; Davis, Jefferson, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government: All Volumes (Heraklion Press, Kindle Edition 2013, 1889), Loc 17335-44; Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 212; Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative: Fort Sumter to Perryville (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), p. 681; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 208-09; Krick, Robert K., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 340-41; Linedecker, Clifford L. (ed.), The Civil War A to Z (Ballantine Books, 2002), p. 245; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 266-67; McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States Book 6, Oxford University Press, Kindle Edition, 1988), p. 538; Pollard, Edward A., Southern History of the War (New York: C.B. Richardson, 1866; revised version New York: The Fairfax Press, 1990), p. 477; Stanchak, John E., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 493; Wert, Jeffry D., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 19-20

The Battle of South Mountain

Maryland, Military September 14, 2017 1 Comment

September 14, 1862 – A portion of General Robert E. Lee’s Confederate Army of Northern Virginia defended key mountain passes in Maryland against Major General George B. McClellan’s Federal Army of the Potomac.

Sixteen hours after receiving Lee’s lost Special Order No. 191, McClellan finally moved to attack Lee’s scattered army. Part of Lee’s forces besieged the Federal garrison at Harpers Ferry, while another part guarded the path to Harpers Ferry and the army’s supply train through the passes of South Mountain, a part of the Blue Ridge chain about 20 miles south of the Pennsylvania border. McClellan planned to “cut the enemy in two and beat him in detail.”

The Federals descended on three mountain passes: Turner’s Gap in the north, Fox’s Gap in the center, and Crampton’s Gap in the south. A small Confederate force led by Major General D.H. Hill guarded Turner’s and Fox’s, which were essential to preserving the army’s supplies. The Federal army’s right wing–two corps numbering some 30,000 men under Major General Ambrose E. Burnside–advanced on these two gaps.

Fighting began when Major General Jesse L. Reno’s Federal IX Corps attacked Confederates in the pastures in front of Fox’s Gap around 9 a.m. Confederates led by Brigadier General Samuel Garland counterattacked, and both Reno and Garland were killed in action. The Federals captured most of Garland’s brigade, but their assault on Fox’s Gap stalled in the face of stubborn resistance and the arrival of Confederate reinforcements.

The Battle of South Mountain | Image Credit: CivilWarDailyGazette.com

Meanwhile, the Federal I Corps under Major General Joseph Hooker advanced on the National road in Boonsboro to seize Turner’s Gap, a mile north of Fox’s. Confederate defenders resisted into the afternoon, but superior Federal numbers eventually overwhelmed them. As the Confederates began breaking, two divisions under Major General James Longstreet reinforced them and prevented a rout. Fighting continued until the Federals secured the high ground at Turner’s around 10 p.m., and the Confederates withdrew near midnight.

At Crampton’s Gap, the southernmost defile, the Federal left wing–Major General William B. Franklin’s 12,000-man VI Corps–advanced with orders to break through the pass and “cut off, destroy or capture (General Lafayette) McLaws’ command & relieve Col (Dixon) Miles” at Harpers Ferry, just a few miles away.

A single Confederate brigade under Colonel William A. Parham guarded the gap when the Federals attacked around noon. The Confederates held against repeated attacks for several hours, but they eventually wavered and broke. Brigadier General Howell Cobb arrived with Confederate reinforcements, but they soon wavered as well and joined the panicked retreat down the mountainside into Pleasant Valley.

The arrival of McLaws and his men from Harpers Ferry finally stabilized the Confederate line. Franklin, unaware that his troops could have easily destroyed the enemy, called a halt and camped for the night, missing a prime opportunity to relieve the garrison and cripple Lee’s army.

The battle ended in Federal victory, but the Confederates had held the mountain passes for most of the day against a force five times their size. This gave Lee the time he needed to concentrate his army. The Federals sustained 2,325 casualties (443 killed, 1,807 wounded, and 75 missing) out of about 28,000 effectives. The Confederates lost 2,685 (325 killed, 1,560 wounded, and 800 missing or captured) from some 18,000.

When Lee received news of the fight at South Mountain, he decided to return to Virginia. Word of Federals taking Crampton’s Gap and threatening McLaws’s rear at Harpers Ferry confirmed Lee’s decision. Lee sent a message to McLaws that night: “The day has gone against us and this army will go by Sharpsburg and cross the (Potomac) river.”

Lee sought to concentrate his army at Sharpsburg, the first stop on his withdrawal, about six miles west of South Mountain. But news from Major General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson at Harpers Ferry soon compelled Lee to change his mind and make a stand.

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References

Angle, Paul M., A Pictorial History of the Civil War Years (New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 83-85; Bailey, Ronald H., The Bloodiest Day: The Battle of Antietam (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983), p. 45-48, 55; Catton, Bruce, The American Heritage Picture History of the Civil War (New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., 1960), p. 227; CivilWarDailyGazette.com; Davis, Jefferson, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government: All Volumes (Heraklion Press, Kindle Edition 2013, 1889), Loc 17326-35; Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 211; Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative: Fort Sumter to Perryville (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), p. 677; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 207-08; Freeman, Douglas Southall, Lee (Scribner, Kindle Edition, 2008), Loc 4719-31; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 266; McMurry, Richard M., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 385; McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States Book 6, Oxford University Press, Kindle Edition, 1988), p. 537; Pollard, Edward A., Southern History of the War (New York: C.B. Richardson, 1866; revised version New York: The Fairfax Press, 1990), p. 477; Schultz, Fred L., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 623-24; Wert, Jeffry D., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 19-20, 189-90, 706-07

Confederates Descend on Harpers Ferry

Maryland, Military, Virginia September 14, 2017 1 Comment

September 14, 1862 – Three Confederate forces converged on the Federal garrison at Harpers Ferry, at the confluence of the Potomac and Shenandoah rivers.

Maj Gen “Stonewall” Jackson | Image Credit: SonoftheSouth.net

Harpers Ferry had been the site of one of the Federals’ largest arsenals, but Major General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson had sent most of the weapons-making machinery south when he took the place in 1861. Now Jackson was coming to take the town again as he led one of the three forces approaching on the 11th.

Colonel Dixon Miles, commanding the Federal garrison at Harpers Ferry, was largely unaware that the Confederates were descending upon him. Scouting parties had reported seeing a Confederate force in the area, but, as Miles reported to his superiors, “I cannot learn he has any disposition to advance this way.”

That night, General Lafayette McLaws’s 8,000 Confederates arrived at Brownsville Gap, six miles northeast of Harpers Ferry in Pleasant Valley. Their target was Maryland Heights, the high ground east of the town. Brigadier General John G. Walker’s Confederate division advanced toward Loudoun Heights, the eminence south of Harpers Ferry (east of the Shenandoah River where it merged with the Potomac).

Jackson’s Confederates, slated to advance on the town from the north, took a detour around Martinsburg and were crossing the Potomac at Williamsport. Brigadier General Julius White, commanding 2,500 Federals at Martinsburg, learned from scouts that the town could not be held if Jackson decided to attack. He therefore loaded all the supplies he could onto trains and wagons and made for Harpers Ferry. Jackson dispatched General A.P. Hill’s division to probe Martinsburg.

By next morning, Miles estimated that about 10,000 Confederates were approaching him, which he felt confident to drive off since his force numbered about 12,000. He wrote, “I expect this will be the last you hear of me until this affair is over. All are cheerful and hopeful. Good-bye.” But Miles only expected McLaws’s division to threaten him; he was still unaware of Walker’s division and Jackson’s main force coming his way.

As McLaws’s Confederates approached, his men sealed off all eastern escape routes to Washington. By nightfall, McLaws’s advance units had ascended Maryland Heights. Walker was poised to take Loudoun Heights the next day, and Jackson accomplished his mission according to Special Orders No. 191, which was to “take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture such of them as may be at Martinsburg.” Jackson sent A.P. Hill’s division ahead to gain a foothold north of Harpers Ferry before the rest of Jackson’s Confederates arrived.

By the 13th, about 23,000 Confederates had Harpers Ferry surrounded. McLaws drove the Federals off Maryland Heights and down into the town below after a six-hour fight. Meanwhile, Walker secured Loudoun Heights to the south, and Jackson’s main force soon came up to take School House Ridge north of town. White’s Federals retreating from Martinsburg arrived at Harpers Ferry to join the garrison, but there was little they could do at that point.

The arsenal sat on low ground surrounded by bluffs, making it extremely vulnerable to attack. Jackson once said he would rather “take the place 40 times than undertake to defend it once.” White outranked Miles, but he left Miles in command because of the latter’s knowledge of the positions. Miles refused to surrender, even though he had made little effort to secure the high ground outside the town. This virtually assured his defeat.

That night, Miles dispatched a small cavalry force to break through the Confederate lines and deliver a message to McClellan stating that the garrison could not hold out longer than 48 hours. Captain Charles Russell and nine men of the 9th Maryland Cavalry accomplished this mission, evading the Confederates and reaching the Federal lines by morning.

Jackson spent the next day positioning artillery to fire down into Harpers Ferry. McLaws had to dispatch some of his men to fend off the Federals at South Mountain, but the Confederate grip on the town remained tight nonetheless. Miles did nothing to try regaining Maryland Heights, even though McLaws’s force there had been severely depleted.

Still, the pressure was on the Confederates because Lee had ordered them to either capture Harpers Ferry by the 12th or return to the main army. They were two days behind schedule, with the rest of the army fighting a desperate holding action at South Mountain to the east.

A.P. Hill’s Confederates took positions on Bolivar Heights that night, in preparation for an assault the next day. Jackson’s guns opened fire on the garrison, but despite the noise, the cannon did little damage. Federal Colonel Benjamin F. “Grimes” Davis discovered an unguarded road out of town and led about 1,300 cavalrymen of the 8th New York and 12th Illinois out. Not only did they escape, but they captured 97 Confederate supply wagons.

Even with these heroics, the Confederate hold on Harpers Ferry would not slacken, and it was only a matter of time before the Federals would be compelled to surrender.

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References

Bailey, Ronald H., The Bloodiest Day: The Battle of Antietam (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983), p. 23-24, 39, 43-45, 56-59; CivilWarDailyGazette.com; Davis, Jefferson, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government: All Volumes (Heraklion Press, Kindle Edition 2013, 1889), Loc 17300, 17309, 17318, 17344; Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 211; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 206-08; Krick, Robert K., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 340-41; Pollard, Edward A., Southern History of the War (New York: C.B. Richardson, 1866; revised version New York: The Fairfax Press, 1990), p. 477

Maryland: Northerners Start Panicking

Maryland, Military September 9, 2017 1 Comment

September 9, 1862 – The Confederates resumed their advance as panic began spreading through southern Pennsylvania.

Confederate Gen R.E. Lee | Image Credit: Wikispaces.com

General Robert E. Lee was ready to move his Confederate Army of Northern Virginia north from Frederick, but first he needed to open lines of supply and communications to Virginia. A line through Manassas Junction could be easily disrupted by Federals guarding nearby Washington, so Lee opted to open a line into the Shenandoah Valley. To do this, he needed to capture the 12,000-man Federal garrison at Harpers Ferry, which protected the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad and the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal.

Under Lee’s Special Orders No. 191, Major General James Longstreet would lead three divisions out of Frederick toward Hagerstown, shielded by South Mountain. The rest of the army, split into three commands, would turn and cross the Potomac River, cut the B & O, and advance on Harpers Ferry from three separate directions. The garrison was to be captured within three days, at which time the three commands would join forces and rejoin the main army at either Hagerstown or Boonsboro. From there, the entire army would advance into Pennsylvania.

For the third time in his first three campaigns with the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee would defy military logic by splitting his army in the face of a larger enemy. But this time he would do it in enemy territory. Brigadier General John G. Walker, one of the three commanders slated to go to Harpers Ferry, expressed surprise that Lee would divide his army into so many pieces while Major General George B. McClellan’s Federals approached. Lee asked, “You doubtless regard it hazardous to leave McClellan practically on my line of communication, and to march into the heart of the enemy’s country?” Walker said yes. Lee replied:

“Are you acquainted with General McClellan? He is an able general, but a very cautious one. His enemies among his own people think him too much so. His army is in a very demoralized and chaotic condition, and will not be prepared for offensive operations–or he will not think so–for three or four weeks. Before that time I hope to be on the Susquehanna (River in Pennsylvania).”

Lee’s aide, Colonel Robert H. Chilton, wrote out copies of the order and delivered them to each division commander. Major General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson, who formerly had Major General D.H. Hill’s division under his command, sent a second copy to Hill, who never received the copy written by Chilton. This would produce important consequences.

Lee wrote President Jefferson Davis, “I believe that the enemy are pushing a strong column up the Potomac River by Rockville and Darnestown, and by Poolesville toward Seneca Mills. I hear that the commands of (Edwin) Sumner, (Franz) Sigel, (Ambrose) Burnside, and (Joseph) Hooker are advancing in the direction above mentioned.”

This was true. General William B. Franklin’s corps was near Rockville and Darnestown, General Darius Couch was near Seneca Mills, and Burnside and Hooker were east near Cracklintown. McClellan now knew the Confederates were at Frederick, supposedly 110,000 strong but actually half that number. McClellan reported to General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck, “They talk of going to Gettysburg and York” in Pennsylvania.

After advancing further and positioning his troops to descend on the Confederate flank, McClellan wrote, “The army is tonight well posted to act in any direction the moment the enemy develops his movements. I am now in condition to-watch him closely, and he will find it hard to escape me if he commits a blunder.”

The Confederates headed out of Frederick on the morning of the 10th. Longstreet’s three divisions and D.H. Hill’s division moved on the National road toward Hagerstown, when Lee suddenly received word that Federals from Pennsylvania were coming their way. Lee’s army was already divided into four sections, but since Hagerstown was the key to his entire plan, he divided it yet again by sending Longstreet to defend the town and Hill to guard the South Mountain passes near Boonsboro. Longstreet, who routinely protested any order that divided the army, told Lee, “General, I wish we could stand still and let the damned Yankees come to us!”

Meanwhile, the other three Confederate commands approached Harpers Ferry. Heading one of the three was Jackson, who led his men west through Turner’s Gap in South Mountain. This route required them to move through Martinsburg, but Jackson learned that Federals guarded that town, forcing him to retrace his route. This delayed part of the advance on Harpers Ferry. Meanwhile, Walker approached Loudoun Heights and General Lafayette McLaws approached Maryland Heights, two points overlooking Harpers Ferry, as planned.

When McClellan learned that Lee had abandoned Frederick, he ordered his Federals to hurry their northwest advance to catch them before they reached Pennsylvania. By the 11th, the Federals were still 15 miles from Frederick, moving an average of just six miles a day while occasionally stopping to loot civilian property.

Lee accompanied Longstreet to Hagerstown, where they found no Federals from Pennsylvania as feared. Pennsylvania Governor Andrew Curtin, terrified that the Confederates may invade his state, called for 50,000 volunteers to defend their homeland.

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References

Anderson, Nancy Scott; Anderson, Dwight, The Generals: Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), p. 325; Bailey, Ronald H., The Bloodiest Day: The Battle of Antietam (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983), p. 21-24, 39; CivilWarDailyGazette.com; Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 210-11; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 205-06; Freeman, Douglas Southall, Lee (Scribner, Kindle Edition, 2008), Loc 4672-96; Krick, Robert K., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 340-41; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 264; McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States Book 6, Oxford University Press, Kindle Edition, 1988), p. 536; Wert, Jeffry D., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 19-20

Maryland: Lee Tries Garnering Support

Maryland, Military, Politics September 7, 2017 1 Comment

September 7, 1862 – Confederate General Robert E. Lee tried garnering support from the people of Maryland, while Major General George B. McClellan’s Federals tried tracking him down.

Gen Robert E. Lee | Image Credit: Wikimedia.org

By Sunday the 7th, Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia was at Frederick, Maryland. Reports of “tremendous excitement” came from Baltimore, 45 miles away, as well as the nearby Pennsylvania capital of Harrisburg. Lee’s advance isolated the Federal garrisons at Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg from Washington. He developed a plan in which part of his army would capture Harpers Ferry while the rest moved north to cut the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad at Hagerstown. The Confederates would then destroy the Rockville bridge above Harrisburg.

The Confederates continued receiving a tepid response from the locals around Frederick, despite Major General Jeb Stuart hosting an elaborate ball southeast of town at Urbana. The festivities were interrupted by Federal artillery, which the Confederate horsemen rode out to silence before returning to their ladies at the party.

Concerned by the skepticism of Marylanders, President Jefferson Davis suggested to Lee:

“It is deemed proper that you should, in accordance with established usage, announce, by proclamation, to the people of Maryland, the motives and purposes of your presence among them at the head of an invading army; and you are instructed in such proclamation to make known.”

Lee assigned Colonel Bradley Johnson, a native of Frederick, to be provost marshal and issue an address to his friends, relatives, and neighbors:

“After 16 months of oppression more galling than the Austrian tyranny, the victorious Army of the South brings freedom to your doors. The men of Maryland, who during the long months have been crushed under the heel of this terrible despotism, now have the opportunity for working out their own redemption, for which they have so long waited and suffered and hoped.”

Johnson declared that the Confederate armies would not stop “until Maryland has the opportunity to decide for herself her own fate. We have the arms here for you, and rise at once in arms and strike for liberty and right!”

At the same time, Lee issued a statewide proclamation “To the People of Maryland”:

“The people of the Confederate States have long watched with the deepest sympathy the wrongs and outrages that have been inflicted upon the citizens… (The people) have seen with profound indignation their sister State deprived of every right and reduced to the condition of a conquered province… No constraint upon your free will is intended; no intimidation will be allowed within the limits of this army, at least. Marylanders shall once more enjoy their ancient freedom of thought and speech.”

“We know no enemies among you, and will protect all, of every opinion. It is for you to decide your destiny freely and without constraint. This army will respect your choice, whatever it may be; and while the Southern people will rejoice to welcome you to your natural position among them, they will only welcome you when you come of your own free will.”

The proclamations did not garner the support the Confederates hoped, indicating that the upcoming campaign may be harsher than expected. That same day, Lee wrote Davis suggesting that he offer to discuss peace with the Lincoln administration based on Confederate independence:

“Such a proposition, coming from us at this time, could in no way be regarded as suing for peace; but, being made when it is in our power to inflict injury upon our adversary, would show conclusively to the world that our sole object is the establishment of our independence and the attainment of an honorable peace.

“The rejection of this offer would prove to the country that the responsibility of the continuance of the war does not rest upon us, but that the party in power in the United States elect to prosecute it for purposes of their own. The proposal of peace would enable the people of the United States to determine at the coming elections whether they will support those who favor a prolongation of the war, or those who wish to bring it to a termination…”

Meanwhile, McClellan’s Army of the Potomac continued moving north, even though McClellan was still unsure where the Confederates were. As the Federals advanced to within 30 miles of the enemy, President Abraham Lincoln received alarming reports that General Braxton Bragg’s Confederate Army of Mississippi was moving north from Chattanooga to join forces with Lee. He sent messages, “Where is Gen. Bragg?” and “What about Harper’s Ferry?” but received no response.

By the 8th, McClellan’s Federals were at Rockville, Maryland, on the Monocacy River about 25 miles south of Lee. Lincoln asked, “How does it look now?” McClellan responded, “I think that we are now in position to prevent any attack in force on Baltimore, while we cover Washington on this side. We are prepared to attack anything that crosses the Potomac this side of the Monocacy.”

McClellan still asserted he was “by no means satisfied yet that the enemy has crossed the river in any large force. I am ready to push in any direction,” hoping “very soon to have the supplies and transportation so regulated that we can safely move farther from Washington, and clear Maryland of the rebels. The time occupied in ascertaining their position, strength, and intentions will enable me to place the army in fair condition. As soon as I find out where to strike, I will be after them without an hour’s delay.”

Intense skirmishing occurred in the Poolesville, Maryland, area as McClellan continued probing to find Lee’s army.

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References

Anderson, Nancy Scott; Anderson, Dwight, The Generals: Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), p. 325; Bailey, Ronald H., The Bloodiest Day: The Battle of Antietam (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983), p. 15, 17-18; CivilWarDailyGazette.com; Crocker III, H.W., The Politically Incorrect Guide to the Civil War (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2008), p. 55-57; Davis, Jefferson, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government: All Volumes (Heraklion Press, Kindle Edition 2013, 1889), Loc 17344-51; Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 210; Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative: Fort Sumter to Perryville (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), p. 665, 673; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 204-05; Freeman, Douglas Southall, Lee (Scribner, Kindle Edition, 2008), Loc 4637-48; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 261, 263-64; McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States Book 6, Oxford University Press, Kindle Edition, 1988), p. 536; Pollard, Edward A., Southern History of the War (New York: C.B. Richardson, 1866; revised version New York: The Fairfax Press, 1990), p. 492; Wert, Jeffry D., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 19-20

The Maryland Campaign Begins

Maryland, Military September 4, 2017 1 Comment

September 4, 1862 – General Robert E. Lee’s Confederate Army of Northern Virginia began crossing the Potomac River into Maryland to take the war to the North for the first time.

Following the Second Bull Run campaign, Lee’s army was within 25 miles of Washington. This gave Lee four options:

  • He could attack heavily defended Washington, which would probably end in failure.
  • He could remain in the area outside Washington, which had been stripped of foodstuffs.
  • He could fall back to the Rappahannock River and await an attack, allowing the Federal army to become even more powerful.
  • He could withdraw into the Shenandoah Valley, leaving Richmond vulnerable to capture.

Confederate Gen R.E. Lee | Image Credit: Wikispaces.com

Lee then came upon a fifth option, which he explained in a long letter to President Jefferson Davis from his Chantilly headquarters:

“The present seems to be the most propitious time since the commencement of the war for the Confederate Army to enter Maryland… We cannot afford to be idle, and though weaker than our opponents in men and military equipments, must endeavor to harass, if we cannot destroy them.”

Lee acknowledged:

“The army is not properly equipped for an invasion of an enemy’s territory. It lacks much of the material of war, is feeble in transportation, the animals being much reduced, and the men are poorly provided with clothes, and in thousands of instances are destitute of shoes… What occasions me the most concern is the fear of getting out of ammunition.”

However, invading Maryland outweighed the alternatives, and Lee noted there was strong pro-Confederate sentiment there, which could offer “an opportunity of throwing off the oppression to which she is now subject.” A Confederate invasion of the North would reduce the burden of war on Virginia’s resources and allow Lee’s troops to resupply in the rich northern farmlands. A Confederate military victory on northern soil could earn foreign recognition for the Confederacy and influence the upcoming Federal midterm elections by prompting northerners to elect anti-war politicians.

In Washington, General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck expressed confidence that Lee would not attack the capital, and even if he did, he could never penetrate such strong fortifications. But Halleck also knew that Lee would not sit outside Washington for long. He notified Major General George B. McClellan, who had recently been restored to command all Federals around the capital:

“There is every probability that the enemy, baffled in his intended capture of Washington, will cross the Potomac, and make a raid into Maryland or Pennsylvania. A movable army must be immediately organized to meet him again in the field.”

Halleck expected quick, decisive action, something McClellan had never done before. As McClellan set about merging the two armies around Washington into one, Lee informed Davis:

“I am more fully persuaded of the benefit that will result from an expedition into Maryland, and I shall proceed to make the movement at once, unless you should signify your disapprobation. Should the results of the expedition justify it, I propose to enter Pennsylvania.”

Lee’s army was reinforced by three divisions from Richmond. However, this did not make up for the 9,000 Confederates lost during the Second Bull Run campaign. Worse, straggling became an epidemic, as thousands of soldiers fell out due to exhaustion, malnutrition, or their refusal to enter Maryland. Many others moved deliberately slow to show they were “morally opposed to invasion.” Lee wrote Davis, “Our great embarrassment is the reduction of our ranks by straggling, which it seems impossible to prevent… Our ranks are very much diminished–I fear from a third to one-half of our original numbers.”

Lee assigned General Lewis Armistead to be a provost guard who would “follow in rear of the army, arrest stragglers, and punish summarily all depredators, and keep the men with their commands. Stragglers are usually those who desert their comrades in peril. Such characters are better absent from the army on such momentous occasions as those about to be entered upon.”

Those caught straggling would “come under the special attention of the provost-marshal, and be considered as unworthy members of an army which has immortalized itself in the recent glorious and successful engagements against the enemy, and will be brought before a military commission to receive the punishment due to their misconduct.” Major General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson ordered the immediate execution of anyone caught deserting.

Without waiting for Davis’s response, Lee moved his army out of Chantilly and toward the shallow Potomac River fords west of Washington near Leesburg, Virginia. Federal forces at Winchester abandoned the town in the face of the oncoming Confederates, leaving a large amount of ammunition which the Confederates picked up the next day. As they continued toward Leesburg, the Confederates skirmished with Federals at Harpers Ferry, Falls Church, Bunker Hill, and Fairfax Court House.

With Major General D.H. Hill’s division leading, the Confederates began crossing the Potomac at White’s Ford, about 35 miles above Washington, on the 4th. Regimental bands played “Maryland, My Maryland” as the troops entered the state. The small Federal force stationed a few miles north at Frederick, Maryland, quickly evacuated.

News of the Confederate advance reached Washington a few hours later, causing even greater panic than there had been after Second Bull Run. Gunboats prepared to defend Washington, government employees took up arms, and rumors circulated that the steamer U.S.S. Wachusett was ready to transport President Abraham Lincoln and other top officials to New York if necessary.

Contrary to Lee’s hopes, most Marylanders did not welcome the incoming Confederates, and few volunteered to join the army. In addition, Lee expected the Maryland incursion to scatter Federals stationed at Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry in western Virginia, thus opening a supply line into the Shenandoah Valley. But this did not happen, so Lee had to change his plans by detaching a portion of his army to force the Federals out of those locales.

McClellan began moving the revised Army of the Potomac out of Washington on the 5th. McClellan led six handpicked corps totaling 84,000 men as they moved north and west into Maryland. Two corps stayed behind to defend the capital. President Lincoln served water to Federal troops on the White House lawn as they moved out. McClellan boasted, “I will save the country.”

Residents of Baltimore and other northern cities began panicking as Jackson’s Confederates arrived in Frederick unopposed on the 6th. The Confederate command prohibited any looting or vandalism, but instead of being welcomed as liberators, businesses closed and residents shut their doors and windows. A witness noted that “everything partook of a churchyard appearance.”

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References

Anderson, Nancy Scott; Anderson, Dwight, The Generals: Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), p. 323; Angle, Paul M., A Pictorial History of the Civil War Years (New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 84-85; Bailey, Ronald H., The Bloodiest Day: The Battle of Antietam (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983), p. 8-10, 13-15; CivilWarDailyGazette.com; Davis, Jefferson, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government: All Volumes (Heraklion Press, Kindle Edition 2013, 1889), Loc 17275-82, 17300; Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 209; Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative: Fort Sumter to Perryville (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), p. 662; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 202-04, 207; Goodwin, Doris Kearns, Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), p. 480-81; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 261-62; McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States Book 6, Oxford University Press, Kindle Edition, 1988), p. 534; Ward, Geoffrey C., Burns, Ric, Burns, Ken, The Civil War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), p. 151-64, 267-68; Wert, Jeffry D., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 19-20; White, Howard Ray, Bloodstains, An Epic History of the Politics that Produced and Sustained the American Civil War and the Political Reconstruction that Followed (Southernbooks, Kindle Edition, 2012), Q362