The fighting that broke out between Federals and Confederates south of Petersburg, Virginia, on August 18 continued the next day. The Federals held a section of the Weldon Railroad, which the Confederates had used to supply both Petersburg and Richmond. The Confederates sought to take that section back.
General P.G.T. Beauregard, temporarily commanding the Petersburg sector of the Confederate defenses, wrote to General Robert E. Lee, commanding the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, at 8 a.m. on the 19th: “I will endeavor to-day to dislodge him with four brigades of our infantry and the division of cavalry you have promised. Result would be more certain with a stronger force of infantry.”
The Confederate attack force was led by Lieutenant-General A.P. Hill. He was reinforced by Major-General Rooney Lee’s cavalry division and Major-General William Mahone’s infantry division. Hill’s force numbered about 15,000 troops. The heavy rain that had begun the previous day continued.
The Federals holding the railroad numbered about 20,000 men and were commanded by Major-General Gouverneur Warren. They belonged to Major-General George G. Meade’s Army of the Potomac, with General-in-Chief Ulysses S. Grant commanding the whole. Warren’s move to seize the railroad was done in conjunction with a diversionary attack against Richmond to the north by Major-General Winfield Scott Hancock.
Grant wrote Meade at 8:50 a.m. that Hancock, “by detaining a large force north of the James, makes our force at Petersburg relatively as strong as it would be if he was with it.” In an effort “to threaten as long a line as possible,” Meade reinforced Warren with the bulk of Major-General John G. Parke’s Ninth Corps. Warren initially told Meade that this would be sufficient to hold the railroad.
Skirmishing occurred throughout the 19th in the rain. Mahone’s Confederates approached Brigadier-General Samuel W. Crawford’s division on the Federal right, concealed by the woods, and launched a fierce attack at 4:15 p.m. Meade was shocked to receive word from Warren that despite being reinforced he was about to be outflanked. The Federals wavered to the point that two brigades nearly surrendered, and Crawford was almost captured trying to rally his men. During this time, Major-General Henry Heth attacked the Federal center and left, but Brigadier-General Romeyn B. Ayres’s men repelled him.
Warren was eventually able to stabilize his position after vicious hand-to-hand combat, and Meade was relieved to learn that Warren was not outflanked after all. Warren lost another 2,900 men (382 killed or wounded and 2,518 missing or captured) and fell back a mile down the Weldon line. When Meade asked if Warren could attack the next morning, Warren answered that he had “given orders to advance at daylight in every direction.”
But Warren’s corps had taken a bad beating. The troops were demoralized, as one onlooker wrote, “Attacked by Confederates on their front and flank, subjected to friendly artillery fire from the rear, Warren’s soldiers cracked and surrendered in droves… when it was over 2,700 Federals filed into captivity.” The night was filled with “the groans and cries of the Confederate wounded in the dark forest, who had to wait until daylight before they could be moved.”
The Confederates pulled back for the night. They had not broken the Federal grip on the railroad, but they inflicted substantial damage to the enemy. Even so, the Confederates now had only two lines from which to feed Richmond and Petersburg: the South Side and the Richmond & Danville railroads. To continue using the Weldon line, they would have to unload cargo at Stony Creek Station and then haul it in wagons 30 miles into Petersburg.
Beauregard wrote Lee on the 20th, “General Hill reports enemy still occupying part of railroad where he is fortifying. Am endeavoring to make necessary arrangements to dislodge him to-day, if practicable… Every available man who can be spared from (the Petersburg) trenches has been withdrawn. Shall try attack in the morning with all the force I can spare.”
Lee urged Beauregard to use every available resource to dislodge the Federals before they could build fortifications. Beauregard pulled three more brigades from the Petersburg lines to reinforce Hill, with the remaining troops stretching to the “utmost” to maintain their works. Hill assembled the new troops and prepared for an attack on the 21st.
Warren, who initially planned to advance, now reconsidered after seeing the carnage from the previous day’s fight. He wrote Meade, “I do not think with our present force we can hold a line across where I established the picket-line yesterday.” Skirmishing erupted throughout the 20th, as the Federals continued wrecking the railroad while pulling out of the underbrush and forming a new line two miles to the rear that connected to the Jerusalem Plank Road.
President Jefferson Davis expressed concern about the Federal presence on the railroad. Beauregard wrote that night, “Expect to attack early in the morning. No available force shall be left behind.” He hoped to follow up his success on the 19th with a complete victory, but he was still extremely shorthanded. On the 21st, Lee sent a cavalry division and two brigades from Major-General Charles W. Field’s division south of the James after learning that the Federals threatening Richmond had withdrawn.
The Confederates launched an intense artillery barrage before renewing their assaults at 9 a.m. With ranks three-deep, Mahone struck the Federal left while Heth hit the center, but they could not dislodge the entrenched Federals from the railroad. Hill finally called off the attack, and the Confederates returned to their original siege lines. This signaled Confederate acknowledgement that they had permanently lost the Weldon supply line, from Ream’s Station north to Petersburg. According to Lee, “the smallness of the attacking force prevented it from dislodging” the Federals.
Around 10:30 a.m., Warren notified Meade that he had repelled a Confederate assault, adding, “Whipped it easily.” But simply repelling an attack was not enough for Grant. He wrote, “It seems to me that when the enemy comes out of his works and attacks and is repulsed he ought to be followed vigorously to the last minute with every man. Holding the line is of no importance whilst troops are operating in front of it.” Meade sent this message to Warren at 11:10 a.m., but Warren did not acknowledge receiving it until 3 p.m. He then assured Meade that if he was able to achieve “a crushing repulse” then he would follow up with a pursuit.
Meade informed Grant that he “found it impracticable to arrange any offensive movement for tomorrow.” Warren continued to maintain that he could hold the railroad but could not launch an offensive of his own. In the four-day engagement between August 18 and 21, the Federals sustained 4,455 total casualties (198 killed, 1,105 wounded, and 3,152 missing) out of about 20,000 effectives, while the Confederates lost some 1,600 from about 14,000.
Without the railroad, Lee quickly arranged for supplies from Wilmington to be sent to Stony Creek Station and then by wagon train up the Boydton Plank Road running northeast into Petersburg. A Confederate staff officer optimistically noted, “Whilst we are inconvenienced, no material harm is done us.” But the continuous Federal attacks were taking their toll on the Confederates. Lee reported to Davis on the 22nd:
“As I informed your Excellency when we first reached Petersburg, I was doubtful of our ability to hold the Weldon road so as to use it. The proximity of the enemy and his superiority of numbers rendered it possible for him to break the road at any time, and even if we could drive him from the position he now holds we could not prevent him from returning to it or to some other point, as our strength is inadequate to guard the whole road. These considerations induced me to abandon the prosecution of the effort to dislodge the enemy.
“I think it is his purpose to endeavor to compel the evacuation of our present position by cutting off our supplies, and that he will not renew the attempt to drive us away by force… It behooves us to do everything in our power to thwart his new plan of reducing us by starvation.”
Lee also warned Secretary of War James A. Seddon: “Unless some measures can be devised to replace our losses, the consequences may be disastrous… Without some increase of strength I cannot see how we are to escape the natural military consequence of the enemy’s numerical superiority.”
By this time, Hancock’s command had returned from their diversionary attack north of the James River. As the exhausted troops settled back into line east of Petersburg, they received orders to support Warren on the Weldon line. Their new objective was to cut the new Confederate supply line at Ream’s Station, between Globe Tavern and Stony Creek.
Bibliography
- Bearss, Edwin C. with Suderow, Bryce, The Petersburg Campaign: The Eastern Front Battles, June-August 1864, Volume I. El Dorado Hills, Calif.: Savas Beattie LLC; Casemate Publishers, Kindle Edition, 2012.
- Davis, William C., Death in the Trenches: Grant at Petersburg. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983.
- Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative: Red River to Appomattox. New York: Vintage Civil War Library, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group (Kindle Edition), 2011.
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