Lee and Grant Prepare for Offense

Nearly half of Confederate General-in-Chief Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia assembled near Colquitt’s Salient across from Fort Stedman, east of Petersburg, on March 24. Lee hoped to break the Federal siege line and seize the railroad supplying the Federals from City Point. Fort Stedman was manned by Brigadier-General Orlando B. Willcox’s division of the Ninth Corps/Army of the Potomac, which was not expecting an attack.

Federal General-in-Chief Ulysses S. Grant had long feared that once the muddy roads dried, Lee would escape to the southwest. He therefore planned a major offensive to destroy Lee’s army before it could get moving. On the same day that the Confederates were making final preparations to attack Fort Stedman, Grant issued orders to his top three commanders (Major-Generals George G. Meade, Philip Sheridan, and E.O.C. Ord):

“On the 29th instant the armies operating against Richmond will be moved by our left, for the double purpose of turning the enemy out of his present position around Petersburg and to insure the success of the cavalry under General Sheridan, which will start at the same time in its efforts to reach and destroy the South Side and Danville (rail)roads.”

Three divisions from Ord’s Army of the James would stay in the lines at Bermuda Hundred and east of Richmond, and the Ninth Corps from Meade’s Army of the Potomac would stay in the lines east of Petersburg. Sheridan’s Federals would turn Lee’s right flank southwest of Petersburg. As Grant directed Sheridan, “You may go out the nearest roads in rear of the Fifth Corps, pass by its left, and passing near to or through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as soon as you can. It is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched positions, but to force him out if possible…”

Grant wrote that if “you find the enemy keeps within his main intrenched line, you may cut loose and push for the Danville road. If you find it practicable, I would like you to cross the South Side railroad between Petersburg and Burkesville and destroy it to some extent.” Grant warned the commanders that their line could be spread dangerously thin due to the rough ground they needed to cover:

“The enemy, knowing this, may as an only chance strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in the hope of advantage not being taken of it, while they hurl everything against the moving column, and return. It cannot be impressed too strongly upon commanders of troops left in the trenches not to allow this to occur without taking advantage of it… the very fact of the enemy coming out to attack, if he does, might be regarded as almost conclusive proof of such a weakening of his lines.”

Grant was right: Lee’s lines were extremely weak. With only about 25,000 troops, Lee had to hold White Oak Swamp, east of Richmond, to Hatcher’s Run, southwest of Petersburg. This was a distance of about 35 miles, or just over 1,000 men per mile. And these men were poorly fed, clothed, and equipped. Conversely, Grant had over 100,000 troops in the Federal lines who were constantly supplied from the railroad running from their massive base at City Point on the James River.

Lt Gen U.S. Grant and Gen R.E. Lee | Image Credit: Wikispaces.com

Nevertheless, Lee hoped that capturing Fort Stedman would force Grant to contract his line to protect his supply base, thus leaving an opening to the southwest for Lee to escape. And if he escaped, he might be able to prolong the war long enough for the northern public to finally demand a ceasefire. The assault, set to begin before dawn on the 25th, was to be led by Major-General John B. Gordon.

Fort Stedman was just 150 yards from the Confederate trenches, with just 50 yards between the opposing picket lines. Gordon was to use the short distance to his advantage, along with the Federals’ policy of allowing Confederate deserters into their lines with their arms. What would appear to be a mass desertion would turn into a swarming assault. Gordon spent the night of the 24th assembling the attack force. The result could potentially decide the fate of the entire Confederate war effort.


Bibliography

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