Category Archives: Military

The Battle of Jonesboro

August 31, 1864 – Federal and Confederate forces clashed south of Atlanta as the Federals sought to cut the last Confederate supply line into the city.

Major General William T. Sherman’s three Federal armies shifted from north to south of Atlanta to cut the Macon & Western Railroad:

  • Major General John Schofield’s Army of the Ohio targeted Rough and Ready, about five miles south of Atlanta.
  • Major General Oliver O. Howard’s Army of the Tennessee targeted Jonesboro, another five miles down the line.
  • Major General George H. Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland targeted the area between Schofield and Howard.

    Confederate Lieut Gen William Hardee | Image Credit: Flickr.com

General John Bell Hood, commanding the Confederate Army of Tennessee defending Atlanta, thought that Sherman had divided his army into two equal parts, with one staying north of the city and the other moving south. Hood therefore sent two of his three corps to Jonesboro, with Lieutenant General William Hardee in overall command. The force totaled about 24,000 men who were exhausted from marching all night. And none of the Confederates, including Hood, knew that they would be facing six of Sherman’s seven corps.

Howard’s Federals moved east toward Jonesboro, and the two leading corps entrenched themselves on high ground before the Confederates could get there:

  • Major General John A. Logan’s XV Corps faced the railroad to the east.
  • Major General Thomas Ransom’s XVI Corps formed a right angle to Logan’s men and faced south.
  • Brigadier General H. Judson Kilpatrick’s cavalry extended the Federal line to Ransom’s right. The combined force of Logan, Ransom, and Kilpatrick numbered about 17,000 men.

Hardee was delayed in getting his men into line. His own corps, now led by Major General Patrick R. Cleburne, held the Confederate left (south) at Lovejoy’s Station, and Lieutenant General Stephen D. Lee’s corps held the right (north) outside Jonesboro. Hardee planned for Cleburne to move north and make the major attack on Ransom while Lee launched a secondary attack against Logan.

Cleburne’s Confederates began moving north as planned, but they unexpectedly ran into Kilpatrick’s dismounted cavalry troopers. The lead Confederate division under Brigadier General Mark Lowrey turned west to face Kilpatrick’s force. According to Lowrey:

“About 3:30 p.m. the division moved forward in good order, and soon encountered the enemy in an open field, strongly posted behind breast-works, with four pieces of artillery. From prisoners taken the force was ascertained to have been cavalry dismounted, under command of the Federal General Kirkpatrick. Both artillery and small-arms opened vigorously on my lines, but after a short contest the enemy fled in confusion, and were pursued by my command with great impetuosity.”

The Confederates drove the Federals back across the Flint River but were stopped by Howard’s reserve XVII Corps. Meanwhile, Lee ordered his men to advance, unaware that Cleburne had engaged Kilpatrick, not Ransom. With their flank unprotected, Lee’s Confederates were sharply repulsed by Logan’s Federals. Hardee wanted to renew the assault, but Lee informed him that his corps could not do so. Lee suffered 1,300 of the 1,725 total Confederate casualties, while the Federals lost just 179 men.

Hardee reported, “It now became necessary for me to act on the defensive, and I ordered Cleburne to make no further attempt upon the enemy’s works. It is proper to state that the enemy were strongly intrenched and had one flank resting on the Flint River and both well protected.”

At 3 p.m., Major General Jacob D. Cox, commanding a division within Schofield’s army, seized the Macon & Western Railroad line about a mile below Rough and Ready. The Federals drove the Confederates away from the area and forced a supply train heading into Atlanta to go back to Macon. The last Confederate supply line into Atlanta was cut.

When Hood learned that the Federals were on the railroad line, he feared that they were targeting Atlanta. As such, he ordered Lee’s corps to return to Jonesboro at 6 p.m. This left Hardee hopelessly shorthanded. Hood later called the Confederate assault a “disgraceful effort” because it was not the all-out attack that he hoped it would be.

North of Atlanta, Sherman had kept Major General Henry W. Slocum’s XX Corps from Thomas’s army to hold the bridge over the Chattahoochee River. Now that Hood was scrambling to meet the threat to the south, Sherman told Thomas to have Slocum “feel forward toward Atlanta, as boldly as he can. Assure him that we will fully occupy the attention of the rebel army outside of Atlanta.”

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References

Bailey, Ronald H., The Battles for Atlanta: Sherman Moves East (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983), p. 144-47; Castel, Albert, Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 404-05; CivilWarDailyGazette.com; Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 451; Foote, Shelby, The Civil War: A Narrative: Volume 3: Red River to Appomattox (Vintage Civil War Library, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, Kindle Edition, 2011), Loc 11010-41, 11072-82; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 492; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 563-64; McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States Book 6, Oxford University Press, Kindle Edition, 1988), p. 774; Ward, Geoffrey C., Burns, Ric, Burns, Ken, The Civil War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), p. 325-26

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Atlanta: Federals Approach Jonesboro

August 30, 1864 – Major General William T. Sherman’s three Federal armies worked their way to the west and south of Atlanta, threatening the key town of Jonesboro on the Macon & Western Railroad.

Maj Gen W.T. Sherman | Image Credit: Wikispaces.com

Sherman’s Federals continued moving around Atlanta to avoid directly attacking General John Bell Hood’s Confederate Army of Tennessee. Sherman hoped to use his force “against the communications of Atlanta, instead of against its entrenchments.” His main targets were the two railroads supplying Hood’s men in the city. The Federals were to cross the Atlanta & West Point Railroad below East Point and capture the Macon & Western at Rough and Ready and Jonesboro.

Major General George H. Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland moved out on the 25th, and the Army of the Tennessee under Major General Oliver O. Howard began moving the next day. The Confederates did not discover that Thomas was gone until it was too late, but they spotted Howard’s troops. Howard wrote, “The enemy seemed aware of our withdrawing during its progress and opened on us with artillery and considerable skirmish-firing, but, providentially, we had but one casualty, one poor fellow losing his leg by a round shot.”

Meanwhile, Major General John Schofield’s Army of the Ohio demonstrated against the Confederate defenses at Utoy Creek, west of East Point. Thomas’s army moved past Schofield’s right and stopped at Camp Creek, southwest of Atlanta. Howard’s army continued past Thomas’s right flank.

Hood initially believed that Major General Joseph Wheeler’s Confederate cavalry raid was forcing Sherman to withdraw. One of Hood’s corps commanders, Lieutenant General Alexander P. Stewart, learned that the Federals were on the move but could not tell whether they were withdrawing; he reported that “thus far their whereabouts (have) not been ascertained.”

Hood reported on the 27th:

“Last night the enemy continued to change their position by their left and center. They have drawn back so that their left is now on the Chattahoochee at the railroad bridge; their right is unchanged, and they appear to be moving troops in that direction. They have no troops nearer than four miles of Atlanta.”

However, by that time the Federals were beyond the Confederate defenses below Atlanta, where they began their arc to the southeast. Confederate scouts soon reported that the Federals were operating near the railroad divergence at East Point, and, “They are constructing works rapidly.” To prevent Sherman from cutting the line, Hood dispatched Lieutenant General William Hardee’s corps to defend East Point, unaware that Sherman intended to move below that depot on his way east to Rough and Ready and Jonesboro.

Thomas advanced to Red Oak, down the Atlanta & West Point line from East Point, on the 28th. Howard’s army advanced further down the line to Fairburn. The Federals spent that day and the 29th wrecking the track, even though that railroad was seldom used by the Confederates. Sherman recalled how the men destroyed the railroad:

“The track was heaved up in sections the length of a regiment, then separated rail by rail; bonfires were made of the ties and of fence rails on which the rails were heated, carried to trees or telegraph poles, wrapped around and left to cool.”

These became known as “Sherman’s neckties,” or “Sherman’s hairpins.” The railroad was wrecked for six miles. Federals filled the railroad cuts with trees, brush, and live ammunition shells that would explode if any Confederates tried repairing the line.

The Federals began their eastward advance on the 30th. Schofield held the left (north) flank, moving toward Rough and Ready. Thomas held the center, moving between Rough and Ready and Jonesboro. Howard held the right flank, moving directly toward Jonesboro. Sherman rode with Thomas and told him, “I have Atlanta as certainly as if it were in my hand!”

Hardee reported that the Federals were moving east, and only then did Hood realize Sherman’s true objective. Hood held a council of war that night, where he announced that he thought Sherman had left part of his army north of Atlanta while sending the rest south. As such, he would keep Stewart’s corps in Atlanta’s defenses while he sent the corps of Hardee and Lieutenant General Stephen D. Lee to Jonesboro, with Hardee in overall command.

Hood directed Hardee, “Your corps will move to Jonesborough tonight. Put it in motion at once if necessary to protect the railroad.” He issued similar orders to Lee, with instructions for both to “attack the enemy, and drive him, if possible, across Flint River.”

As the day ended, Howard’s army had crossed the Flint River and was within two miles of Jonesboro. Thomas’s army was within six miles, having not yet crossed the Flint. Schofield’s army was within striking distance of Rough and Ready. Hardee’s Confederates began moving to Jonesboro, hoping to get there and launch their assault on the Federals while they were supposedly separated.

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References

Bailey, Ronald H., The Battles for Atlanta: Sherman Moves East (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983), p. 141-44; Castel, Albert, Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 404-05; CivilWarDailyGazette.com; Davis, Jefferson, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government: All Volumes (Heraklion Press, Kindle Edition 2013, 1889), Loc 20938, 20947; Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 450-51; Foote, Shelby, The Civil War: A Narrative: Volume 3: Red River to Appomattox (Vintage Civil War Library, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, Kindle Edition, 2011), Loc 10923-67, 10979-99; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 491-92; Linedecker, Clifford L. (ed.), The Civil War A to Z (Ballantine Books, 2002), p. 22-23; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 560-63; McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States Book 6, Oxford University Press, Kindle Edition, 1988), p. 774

The Missouri Incursion Begins

August 28, 1864 – Major General Sterling “Pap” Price organized a new Confederate army to move north into Missouri and claim that state for the Confederacy.

Confederate General Sterling Price | Image Credit: CivilWarDailyGazette.com

Price, a former Missouri governor, now commanded Confederates at Camden, Arkansas. He had been urging his superiors to let him take the offensive so that he might drive Federal influence out of his home state. In July, Price wrote:

“My opinion is that the people of Missouri are ready for a general uprising, and that the time was never more propitious for an advance of our forces into Missouri. Our friends should be encouraged and supported promptly. Delay will be dangerous. Unsustained, they may be overwhelmed by superior numbers, become dispirited, and, finally, disheartened and hopeless.”

Price traveled to Shreveport, Louisiana, to meet with General Edmund Kirby Smith, commanding the Confederate Trans-Mississippi Department, and Texas Governor Thomas Reynolds. Both Smith and Reynolds approved the expedition, but only if someone besides Price led it. Realizing they had nobody else, they reluctantly gave Price the assignment. Reynolds urged Smith to ensure that Price had “the best division and brigade commanders and an unusually efficient staff.”

Smith issued orders for Price to “make immediate arrangements for a movement into Missouri, with the entire cavalry force of your district.” Price would collect the forces scattered around the District of Arkansas to form the 12,000-man Army of Missouri, which consisted of three cavalry divisions under Brigadier Generals James F. Fagan, John S. Marmaduke, and Joseph O. “Jo” Shelby.

Price instructed his commanders: “Make Saint Louis the objective point of your movement, which, if rapidly made, will put you in possession of that place, its supplies, and military stores, and which will do more toward rallying Missouri to your standard than the possession of any other point.” The commanders were to–

“… scrupulously avoid all wanton acts of destruction and devastation, restrain your men, and impress upon them that their aim should be to secure success in a just and holy cause and not to gratify personal feeling and revenge. Rally the loyal men of Missouri, and remember that our great want is men, and that your object should be, if you cannot maintain yourself in that country, to bring as large an accession as possible to our force.”

The Confederates were to capture supplies at both St. Louis and Jefferson City, redeem Missouri from the Unionists, and then ride back south through Kansas and the Indian Territory (now Oklahoma).

The operation was delayed over three weeks due to lack of ammunition. Price took command of the divisions of Fagan and Marmaduke at Princeton on the 28th, but he feared that the Federals had found out about his line of march. Price therefore led the two divisions back to Little Rock, from which he could link with Shelby’s division at Batesville. Such a roundabout movement was not a good sign of things to come for Price.

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References

CivilWarDailyGazette.com; Foote, Shelby, The Civil War: A Narrative: Volume 3: Red River to Appomattox (Vintage Civil War Library, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, Kindle Edition, 2011), Loc 12075-95; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 480, 491; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 562

Prisoner Exchange Remains Suspended

August 27, 1864 – Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant instructed the Federal prisoner exchange agents to refuse any Confederate offers to exchange prisoners.

By this month, prison camps in both North and South were becoming overcrowded. Federal authorities continued refusing to exchange prisoners because the Confederates continued refusing to recognize black soldiers as prisoners of war. The suspension of the exchange program benefited the Federals because it added to the growing manpower shortage in the Confederacy.

Because of the Federal blockade and military occupation of much of the South, Confederate officials could barely feed their own people, let alone the increasing number of Federal prisoners. Consequently, southern prison camps ran rampant with malnutrition, famine, and disease. The most notorious of these camps was Andersonville, in southwestern Georgia.

Andersonville Prison | Image Credit: Wikipedia.org

Andersonville held 33,000 inmates by this month, which equated to the fifth largest city in the Confederacy. Having originally been built to hold just 10,000 men, it was expanded to 26 acres, but that still only allowed for an average of 34 square feet per man. Prison Commandant Henry Wirz prohibited the inmates from building shelters except what they could improvise by digging holes and propping up blankets with sticks. Any prisoner coming within 15 feet of the prison fence was to be shot on sight.

Sweet Water Branch flowed through Andersonville, originally intended to provide drinking water for the prisoners but long since tainted by raw sewage. Each inmate received a daily ration of a half-pint of cornmeal, three tablespoons of beans, and a teaspoon of salt. Over the summer, up to 100 men per week died at Andersonville, and 13,000 of the 45,000 total inmates perished. Northerners were infuriated by an article in an Atlanta newspaper that reported, “During one of the intensely hot days of last week more than 300 sick and wounded Yankees died at Andersonville. We thank Heaven for such blessings.”

Conditions in northern prison camps were not much better, even though the Federals had an abundance of food, clothing, and medical supplies for the inmates. Among the most notorious was Elmira Prison in New York. Dr. Eugene F. Sanger, chief surgeon at Elmira, warned the prison commandant, Seth Eastman, that the stagnant pond within the prison was a “source of miasma.” Sanger wrote, “Unless the laws of hygiene are carefully studied and observed in crowded camps, disease is the inevitable consequence.”

Elmira Prison | Image Credit: Wikipedia.org

Eastman forwarded Sanger’s report to William Hoffman, head of all Federal prisons. Eastman added, “I respectfully request that you give instructions in regard to this with as little delay as possible, for if this work is to be done, it should be done immediately.” However, Hoffman did not act upon the findings. In fact, on the 10th he issued Circular Number 4, which restricted fruit and vegetables only to sick prisoners.

Two weeks later, Federal prison inspector Bennett Munger reported that at Elmira, 226 inmates were “sick in hospital and a larger number in quarters. Some are destitute of blankets and proper underclothes, and all without hospital rations; clothing of prisoners deficient, especially in blankets and shirts. The stench arising from the stagnant water in the pond is still very offensive.”

It was also reported that 793 prisoners were suffering from scurvy, mainly due to a lack of produce, despite the rich harvest in New York that year. The report was forwarded up the chain of command to Hoffman, where it went no further.

The worsening prison conditions prompted Colonel Robert Ould, the Confederate agent for prisoner exchange, to once again ask that discussions be opened with the Federals to renew the exchange system. The Confederates offered to exchange prisoners officer for officer and man for man, which would increase the Federals’ manpower just as much as it would the Confederates’. This included a Confederate offer to release all men on parole, as well as a listing of the mortality rate at Andersonville.

Federal General U.S. Grant | Image Credit: Wikispaces.org

The offer went through Major General E.A. Hitchcock, who forwarded it to Grant, the overall Federal commander. For the second time, Grant refused. He wrote to Major General Benjamin F. Butler, special prisoner exchange agent:

“On the subject of exchange, however, I differ from General Hitchcock. It is hard on our men held in Southern prisons not to exchange them, but it is humanity to those left in the ranks to fight our battles. Every man released on parole, or otherwise, becomes an active soldier against us at once, either directly or indirectly. If we commence a system of exchange, which liberates all prisoners taken, we will have to fight on until the whole South is exterminated. If we hold those caught, they amount to no more than dead men. At this particular time to release all rebel prisoners North would insure Sherman’s defeat, and would compromise our safety here.”

Privately, Grant said, “We have got to fight until the military power of the South is exhausted, and if we release or exchange prisoners captured it simply becomes a war of extermination.” The Federals also refused to renew exchanges because the Confederates said nothing about exchanging black soldiers. Butler wrote a letter to Confederate officials on the subject that he also submitted to the press:

“The wrongs, indignities, and privations suffered by our soldiers would move me to consent to anything to procure their exchange, except to barter away the honor and the faith of the Government of the United States, which has been so solemnly pledged to the colored soldiers in its ranks. Consistently with national faith and justice we cannot relinquish that position.”

Thus, prisoners on both sides would continue languishing in their camps.

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References

Davis, Jefferson, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government: All Volumes (Heraklion Press, Kindle Edition 2013, 1889), Loc 21546-60; Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 449; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 487; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 556-57; McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States Book 6, Oxford University Press, Kindle Edition, 1988), p. 796, 97, 799; Pollard, Edward A., Southern History of the War (New York: The Fairfax Press, 1990), p. 435-36; Robbins, Peggy, Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 241; Ward, Geoffrey C., Burns, Ric, Burns, Ken, The Civil War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), p. 325-26; White, Howard Ray, Bloodstains, An Epic History of the Politics that Produced and Sustained the American Civil War and the Political Reconstruction that Followed (Southernbooks, Kindle Edition, 2012), Q364

Atlanta: Sherman’s Armies Start Moving

August 25, 1864 – Major General William T. Sherman’s Federals began a major movement to the west and south of Atlanta to cut the supply lines leading into the city and starve the Confederate Army of Tennessee into submission.

Maj Gen W.T. Sherman | Image Credit: CivilWarDailyGazette.com

After failing to seize the railroad below Atlanta, Sherman, commanding the Federal armies in Georgia, admitted to his superiors that he was “too impatient for a siege.” Northern confidence that Atlanta would soon fall was replaced by southern confidence that the city would hold. A Wisconsin soldier wrote that “we make but little progress toward Atlanta, and it may be some time before we take the place.”

Sherman sought to cut the Macon & Western Railroad below Atlanta, the last supply line running into the city. But until he could develop a plan to get to that heavily guarded line, he opted to bombard the city. He wrote Major General Oliver O. Howard, commanding the Army of the Tennessee, “Let us destroy Atlanta and make it a desolation.”

The Federals emplaced siege artillery and Parrott rifles atop Bald Hill, overlooking the city, and began their barrage on the 9th. They fired an average of 5,000 rounds into Atlanta every day for the next two weeks, killing several non-combatants, including women and children. The bombardment was meant not only to destroy Atlanta, but to demoralize the citizenry.

Maj Gen Joseph Wheeler | Image Credit: CivilWarDailyGazette.com

General John Bell Hood, commanding the Confederate Army of Tennessee, had prevented Sherman from capturing Atlanta thus far, but he lacked the strength to drive the Federals off permanently. He therefore assigned Major General Joseph Wheeler to lead 4,500 cavalrymen on a raid of Sherman’s supply line, the Western & Atlantic Railroad, which stretched north into Tennessee. Hood hoped that wrecking the railroad would starve Sherman into falling back or attacking the strong Confederate defenses.

Wheeler was to ride north into Tennessee, leave half his command to operate against the railroad in that state, and return to Atlanta with his remaining men. He set out on the 10th, and over the next four days, he destroyed railroad track spanning 30 miles from Marietta to Dalton. Wheeler demanded the surrender of the Federal garrison at Dalton, but the commander refused. Federal reinforcements soon arrived, and Wheeler continued on, skirmishing with enemy pursuers along the way.

The Confederates did not cause the damage that Hood hoped; Sherman’s Federals quickly repaired the railroad and supplies continued getting to the armies as Wheeler veered off into eastern Tennessee for the rest of the month. Meanwhile, Sherman assigned Brigadier General H. Judson Kilpatrick to conduct a cavalry raid of his own, leading 4,000 troopers and horse artillery in wrecking the two remaining railroads below Atlanta.

The Macon & Western ran south of Atlanta to Macon, and it also diverged into a second (Atlanta & West Point) railroad at East Point, which ran east to Montgomery, Alabama. However, the Confederates seldom used this line. Kilpatrick’s Federals reached their first objective, Fairburn, on the 18th, and destroyed a section of the seldom-used Atlanta & West Point. At the same time, Major General John Schofield’s Army of the Ohio advanced along Utoy Creek, southwest of Atlanta. Sherman wanted Schofield to be the pivot for the rest of the Federals to swing west and cut off the city’s south side.

The next day, Kilpatrick’s force arrived at Jonesboro, a key depot on the Macon & Western Railroad. They kept the guards busy as they destroyed large amounts of supplies. The troopers then rode south along the railroad to Lovejoy’s Station. They began destroying more supplies and wrecking more track when they were suddenly confronted by Confederate infantry under Brigadier General William H. Jackson.

The two forces battled into the night, when Kilpatrick ordered a withdrawal back to Sherman’s lines. Jackson’s troops attacked the Federal rear guard and nearly surrounded the force, but Kilpatrick fought them off long enough to escape. He returned to the main Federal force two days later.

Kilpatrick reported that his men had wrecked enough of the railroads to prevent supplies from reaching Hood’s army for 10 days. Sherman hoped that this would force Hood to withdraw his starving army from Atlanta. However, the Confederates repaired the track and trains resumed their deliveries the very next day. The cavalry failed Sherman again. He later wrote, “I became more than ever convinced that cavalry could not or would not work hard enough to disable a railroad properly, and therefore resolved at once to proceed to the execution of my original plan.”

Sherman’s original plan involved shifting six of his seven corps around to the southwest to permanently cut the railroads and force Hood to either evacuate the city or give battle. This was risky because the Federals would be separated from their communication and supply lines, but Sherman preferred this to attacking the strong Confederate fortifications ringing the city. Sherman notified his superiors, “I will be all ready, and will commence the movement around Atlanta by the south, tomorrow night, and for some time you will hear little of us.”

The movement began on the night of the 25th, as troops of Major General George H. Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland left their trenches. IV and XIV corps began the circuitous movement, while XX Corps stayed back to guard the railroad bridge over the Chattahoochee River. Thomas would pivot on Schofield’s army, which consisted of XXIII Corps, below Utoy Creek.

The next morning, the Federal artillery bombardment stopped, and Confederates reported that the trenches north of Atlanta were empty. Hood believed that Wheeler had forced Sherman to fall back across the Chattahoochee. Residents even planned victory celebrations for that night. However, Wheeler’s men were in Tennessee, unable to inform Hood of the real reason why the Federals abandoned their northern trenches.

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References

Bailey, Ronald H., The Battles for Atlanta: Sherman Moves East (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983), p. 139, 141, 143; Castel, Albert, Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 404-05, 819; Catton, Bruce, The American Heritage Picture History of the Civil War (New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., 1960), p. 517; Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 446-48, 450; Foote, Shelby, The Civil War: A Narrative: Volume 3: Red River to Appomattox (Vintage Civil War Library, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, Kindle Edition, 2011), Loc 10287-97, 10870-91, 10902-22; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 484-86, 488-90; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 554, 556-58, 560; Longacre, Edward G., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 450; McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States Book 6, Oxford University Press, Kindle Edition, 1988), p. 755

The Second Battle of Ream’s Station

August 25, 1864 – Confederates scored a decisive victory that decimated the Federal II Corps, but it did little to affect the Federal siege of Petersburg.

After the Battle of Globe Tavern, Federal forces extended their siege line to the south of Petersburg, Virginia. Troops of V Corps and other elements of the Army of the Potomac under Major General Gouverneur Warren held the Weldon Railroad, which connected Petersburg to the North Carolina coast. The Federals destroyed track on the Weldon so it could no longer be used to supply the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia in Petersburg.

Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant, the overall Federal commander, looked to make the Federal hold on the railroad permanent. He wrote Major General George G. Meade, commanding the Army of the Potomac, “If we can retain hold of the railroad it will be a great advantage.”

To do this, Grant looked to seize Ream’s Station, which was five miles south of Warren’s Federals at Globe Tavern and seven miles south of Petersburg. Grant selected Major General Winfield Scott Hancock’s II Corps for this mission. The men of II Corps had just finished their grueling operation at Deep Bottom Run, north of the James River.

Hancock’s force consisted of two infantry divisions under Major General John Gibbon and Brigadier General Nelson A. Miles, as well as Brigadier General David M. Gregg’s cavalry division. The troops arrived at Ream’s on the 23rd, exhausted from constant marching and fighting. They occupied the fortifications that had been built during the Wilson-Kautz raid in June, and Gregg’s cavalry guarded the infantrymen as they began wrecking the track.

Major General Wade Hampton’s Confederate horsemen clashed with Gregg’s troopers, indicating to Hampton that the Federals were at Ream’s. He quickly passed this news to General Robert E. Lee, commanding the Confederate army. This would not disrupt Lee’s supply line because he had already arranged to move supplies by wagon train from Stony Creek, farther south on the Weldon Railroad, to Petersburg via the Boydton Plank Road. But the Federal presence at Ream’s threatened Dinwiddie Court House, a possible point of retreat for Lee if he had to abandon Petersburg. Lee therefore resolved to drive the Federals off.

Meanwhile, the Federals continued destroying the railroad between Globe Tavern and Ream’s, and by the end of the 24th, Hancock reported that “the road is destroyed for about three miles and a half beyond Reams’.” That night, Hancock received word that Confederates were approaching from the northwest, “probably destined to operate against General Warren or yourself–most probably against your operations. The commanding general cautions you to look out for them.”

The approaching Confederates consisted of about 8,000 men under Lieutenant General A.P. Hill. As they advanced, Hampton’s cavalry forced Gregg’s Federals back. This prompted Hancock to suspend railroad operations and deploy his two infantry divisions to meet the threat. The Federals formed a U-shaped line, with Miles’s division on the right facing west and north, and Gibbon’s on the left facing west and south. Hancock reported to Meade:

“The enemy have been feeling all around me and are now cheering in my front, advancing and driving my skirmishers. I think they will next move across the road between Warren and myself as they press my lines. Two prisoners taken at different times say that all of Hampton’s cavalry and a part of Hill’s corps, or all of it, are in my front…”

The Confederate infantry crossed Rowanty Creek and moved along the road running northeast to Hancock’s positions. The initial Confederate attack came from Major General Cadmus M. Wilcox’s division against Miles’s troops around 2 p.m., but the Federals held their positions. Similar Confederate assaults along the line were also repulsed. Hancock reported:

“There is no great necessity of my remaining here, but it is more important that I should join Warren; but I do not think, closely engaged as I am at present, I can withdraw safely at this time. I think it will be well to withdraw tonight, if I am not forced to do so before.”

Meade told Hancock that he would send him reinforcements and added, “I hope you will be able to give the enemy a good thrashing.” When Meade received word that Hancock had stopped the Confederate advance, he authorized him to “withdraw tonight if you deem it best for the security of your command.”

“Frank Leslie’s – 2nd Reams Station” by Frank Leslie (publisher) – From Frank Leslie’s Scenes and Portraits of the Civil War. From a digital scan available at available at the Internet Archive. Licensed under Public Domain via Commons

However, a Confederate artillery barrage around 5 p.m. preceded a massive attack, which threatened Gibbon’s left. The Federals stood their ground until two regiments in Gibbon’s center suddenly fled in panic. The Confederates, surprised by the ease at which they broke the enemy line, exploited the gap while another force attacked the Federal left.

Hancock desperately tried reforming his fleeing men, shouting, “We can beat them yet. Don’t leave me, for God’s sake!” The Federals fell back nonetheless, with many of Gibbon’s green New Yorkers surrendering. One of Miles’s reserve brigades sent in to close the gap in the center “could neither be made to go forward nor fire.” Two Federal divisions were sent to reinforce Hancock, but he withdrew in disgust that night to the Jerusalem Plank Road.

Of the 2,750 Federal casualties, over 2,000 surrendered. The Federals also lost nine cannon, 12 battle flags, and over 3,000 small arms. This fight shattered the famed II Corps, as Hancock’s chief of staff, Colonel Charles H. Morgan, later said, “The agony of that day never died from that proud soldier (Hancock), who, for the first time, saw his lines broken and his guns taken.” Gibbon explained that his men fled because they had lost nine brigade and 40 regimental commanders in four months, but Hancock would have none of it. Gibbon, the former commander of the feared Iron Brigade, ultimately resigned.

In contrast, the Confederates lost just 720 men. This second engagement at Ream’s Station ended in Confederate victory just like the first, but it did little to stop the gradual westward extension of the Federal siege lines around Petersburg. Hill’s Confederates returned to the Petersburg trenches, and Warren’s Federals continued destroying the Weldon Railroad.

Military success was beginning to prove more costly than it was worth for Lee. On the 29th, he reported to President Jefferson Davis that the Confederate army had sustained some sort of combat loss in 100 consecutive days. Lee also informed Secretary of War James A. Seddon, “Without some increase of strength, I cannot see how we can escape the natural military consequences of the enemy’s numerical superiority.”

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References

CivilWarDailyGazette.com; Davis, Jefferson, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government: All Volumes (Heraklion Press, Kindle Edition 2013, 1889), Loc 22242; Davis, William C., Death in the Trenches: Grant at Petersburg (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983), p. 104-10; Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 449-50; Foote, Shelby, The Civil War: A Narrative: Volume 3: Red River to Appomattox (Vintage Civil War Library, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, Kindle Edition, 2011), Loc 11458-68; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 489-90; Freeman, Douglas Southall, Lee (Scribner, Kindle Edition, 2008), Loc 7905, 7918, 7941; Linedecker, Clifford L. (ed.), The Civil War A to Z (Ballantine Books, 2002), p. 214; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 560; Longacre, Edward G., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 617-18

 

Forrest Raids Memphis

August 21, 1864 – Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest led his Confederate cavalry on a daring raid while Federal forces were out trying to hunt him down.

After the Battle of Tupelo in July, the Federals had regrouped and renewed their efforts to destroy Forrest’s command, which threatened Federal supply lines in Tennessee and northern Mississippi. Major General Cadwallader C. Washburn, the new Federal department commander at Memphis, announced that Major General Andrew J. Smith’s new Federal force would “whip the combined force of the enemy this side of Georgia and east of the Mississippi.”

Washburn informed his superior, Major General William T. Sherman, that Smith would renew his hunt for Forrest “as soon as possible… Forrest’s forces were near Okolona a week since. (Brigadier General James R.) Chalmers in command. Forrest not been able to resume command by reason of wound in fight with Smith (last month). I have a report today that he died of lockjaw some days ago.” The report was wrong.

Gen A.J. Smith | Image Credit: Wikipedia.org

Smith led about 18,000 Federals on another expedition in search of Forrest in early August. They entered northern Mississippi and crossed the Tallahatchie River, and Brigadier General Benjamin H. Grierson’s Federal cavalry seized Oxford, an important town on the Mississippi Central Railroad. Forrest directed Chalmers to “contest every inch of ground” as he led a division to oppose Grierson at Oxford.

Grierson fell back to Smith’s main force, which was building a bridge across the Tallahatchie. Rain delayed their operations for a week, during which time Forrest assembled a Confederate force at Oxford. While Chalmers held Smith off with 3,000 men, Forrest planned to lead 2,000 troopers north to raid the Federal headquarters at Memphis.

Forrest knew that Sherman had ordered Washburn to assign most of his men to Smith’s expedition, which meant that the Memphis garrison was weak. Forrest did not intend to capture Memphis, but rather he sought to capture the Federal commanders there, free imprisoned Confederates, and relieve Federal pressure in northern Mississippi.

Brig Gen N.B. Forrest | Image Credit: CivilWarDailyGazette.com

Forrest did not tell his men that they were going to Memphis, but as they crossed the Tallahatchie on the 19th, rumors quickly spread that Memphis was their objective. They stopped the next evening at Hernando, just 25 miles from the city. Forrest resumed the advance around midnight, relying on the element of surprise. He stopped at 3 a.m. to deliver final instructions, and the Confederates used the dense fog to gallop into Memphis just before dawn.

The raiders failed to free the prisoners at Irving Block Prison. They also did not capture any of the Federal commanders. Major General Stephen A. Hurlbut, the former Memphis commander, was not there; Brigadier General R.P. Buckland held Fort Pickering; and Washburn escaped in his night clothes to join Buckland. Forrest did take Washburn’s uniform, but he later returned it.

Forrest ordered a withdrawal at 9 a.m., and the Confederates fell back along the same route they had taken north. They cut telegraph wires while seizing 500 prisoners and a large amount of horses and supplies. Hurlbut, who had been criticized for failing to stop Forrest, later said, “There it goes again! They superseded me with Washburn because I could not keep Forrest out of West Tennessee, and Washburn cannot keep him out of his own bedroom!”

The Confederates did not achieve their first two objectives, but they did achieve the third: Smith ordered his Federals to withdraw from northern Mississippi when he learned of Forrest’s raid. The troops vindictively destroyed Oxford before leaving; a reporter noted, “Where once stood a handsome little country town now only remain the blackened skeletons of houses, and smouldering ruins.”

Rumors that Forrest would return to Memphis caused a citywide panic. Washburn responded by strengthening the garrison at Fort Pickering and arranging for the navy to send him gunboats. Although the rumors proved false, Washburn’s inspector general later said, “The whole town was stampeded” in “the most disgraceful affair I have ever seen.”

Sherman tried putting a positive spin on this Federal embarrassment, telegraphing Washburn, “If you get the chance, send word to Forrest that I admire his dash but not his judgment. The oftener he runs his head against Memphis the better.” However, Forrest remained at large, where he could disrupt Sherman’s supply lines into Georgia and keep Federal forces in Tennessee and Mississippi on high alert.

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References

Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 449; Foote, Shelby, The Civil War: A Narrative: Volume 3: Red River to Appomattox (Vintage Civil War Library, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, Kindle Edition, 2011), Loc 10745-55, 10766-870; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 480, 485, 489; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 558-59