Category Archives: Politics

Birth of the C.S.S. Florida

March 22, 1862 – The steamship Oreto left England, destined to become the menacing Confederate commerce raider C.S.S. Florida.

The C.S.S. Florida | Image Credit: Wikipedia.org

The C.S.S. Florida | Image Credit: Wikipedia.org

The Oreto, a twin-bladed screw steamer, had been under construction at Liverpool. U.S. officials expressed suspicions that the ship was being built for the Confederate navy. Those suspicions were supplemented by the fact that Liverpool was largely a pro-Confederate city that a U.S. diplomat claimed had been “made by the slave trade, and the sons of those who acquired fortunes in the traffic, now instinctively side with the rebelling slave-drivers.”

Building or arming warships for belligerent powers such as the Confederacy violated Great Britain’s Foreign Enlistment Act. The U.S. consul at Liverpool, Thomas H. Dudley, had discovered the ship’s true purpose as a commerce raider before she left port, but Confederate naval agent James D. Bulloch produced forged papers claiming that a Palermo merchant, not the Confederate government, owned the Oreto. The U.S. minister to Britain, Charles Francis Adams, presented Dudley’s evidence that the ship violated British law to the Foreign Office, but it was not acted upon before the Oreto was taken out of port, ostensibly just for a trial run.

Bulloch hosted a group of guests aboard the steamer on March 22. The new ship was commanded by a British captain, bore the British flag, and carried no armaments. After a short cruise in the harbor, all the guests but one were removed to smaller boats and the vessel left Liverpool. The lone remaining guest was John Low of the Confederate navy, and the ship headed for Nassau in the Bahamas to be fitted with four seven-inch guns.

She was later rechristened the C.S.S. Florida, a powerful Confederate commerce raider under Commander John N. Maffitt.

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References

Catton, Bruce, The American Heritage Picture History of the Civil War (New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., 1960), p. 260; Delaney, Norman C., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 520-21; Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 145; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 126; Jones, Virgil Carrington (Pat), Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 264; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 187; McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States Book 6, Oxford University Press, Kindle Edition, 1988), p. 546; McPherson, James M., War on the Waters: The Union and Confederate Navies, 1861-1865 (Littlefield History of the Civil War Era, The University of North Carolina Press, Kindle Edition, 2012), p. 112; Time-Life Editors, The Blockade: Runners and Raiders (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983), p. 121

The President’s Special War Order Number 3

March 11, 1862 – President Abraham Lincoln issued an executive order removing George B. McClellan as general-in-chief of all Federal armies and creating new military departments that would report directly to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton.

Abraham Lincoln and George B. McClellan | Image Credit: Wikipedia.org

Abraham Lincoln and George B. McClellan | Image Credit: Wikipedia.org

Lincoln had long been concerned that McClellan could not command all the Federal armies while staying in the field with the Army of the Potomac at the same time. This concern intensified when Stanton reported “great ignorance, negligence and lack of order and subordination–and reckless extravagance” within the Army of the Potomac. Now that McClellan had finally taken the field by leading that army into northern Virginia, the time was right for a military reorganization.

In addition to limiting McClellan’s authority to the Department of the Potomac, Lincoln assigned Major General Henry W. Halleck to command the new Department of the Mississippi. This consolidated the Departments of Kansas, Missouri, the Tennessee, and the Ohio, totaling 128,810 men ranging from Knoxville to Kansas.

Halleck had lobbied for this change since the fall of Fort Donelson; he had taken most of the credit for Major General Ulysses S. Grant’s capture of that fort as well as Fort Henry. Major General Don Carlos Buell, who had been reluctant to cooperate with Halleck as an equal, became Halleck’s subordinate, commanding the Army of the Ohio within Halleck’s new department. Major General David Hunter, commanding the Department of Kansas, was transferred east.

In a surprise move, Lincoln brought back controversial Major General John C. Fremont to command the new Mountain Department. This absorbed Brigadier General William S. Rosecrans’s Department of Western Virginia, and included southwestern Virginia and eastern Kentucky. Rosecrans would command the new department until Fremont arrived. He was expected to invade eastern Tennessee in support of the Unionists in that region.

Fremont had been removed as commander of the Department of the West the previous November and later censured by the House of Representatives (103 to 28) for mismanaging that department. However, Fremont had backing from Radical Republicans, abolitionists, and the influential Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, so Lincoln bowed to their pressure and reinstated him.

U.S. Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton | Image Credit: Flickr.com

U.S. Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton | Image Credit: Flickr.com

McClellan, Halleck, and Fremont, now commanding the three major theaters of operation, were to “report severally and directly to the Secretary of War.” This put Stanton in charge of military administration and efficiency.

Before issuing this order, Lincoln had shared it with Stanton, Secretary of State William H. Seward, and Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase. All three cabinet members endorsed it, with Seward suggesting that Stanton issue the order through the War Department. Stanton demurred to avoid causing further animosity between himself and his once-close friend McClellan. So Lincoln officially signed the order and issued it under his authority.

Hoping to notify McClellan of the order before it became public, Lincoln dispatched one of his supporters, Ohio Governor William Dennison, to McClellan’s headquarters. Dennison bore a message from the president explaining that the move was not a demotion; rather, “having personally taken the field,” Lincoln wanted McClellan to fully concentrate on the Army of the Potomac. Lincoln also stated that McClellan would take on this lesser role “until otherwise ordered,” implying that he might reinstate him as general-in-chief in the future.

Dennison was too late. On the morning of the 12th, the National Intelligencer released details of the order, and McClellan’s allies in Washington telegraphed his headquarters at Fairfax Court House. Dennison arrived with Lincoln’s explanation after the fact, and McClellan wrote a reply: “I shall work just as cheerfully as before, and that no consideration of self will in any manner interfere with the discharge of my public duties.”

Most Washington insiders, especially Stanton and the Radical Republicans, pushed for this reorganization to elevate Halleck and Fremont while stripping McClellan of some of his authority. Many hoped that McClellan’s removal as general-in-chief would be permanent. Speculation soon abounded that, despite Lincoln’s assertions, the order indicated his doubts about McClellan’s abilities.

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References

Bailey, Ronald H., Forward to Richmond: McClellan’s Peninsular Campaign (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983), p. 87-89, 92; CivilWarDailyGazette.com (multiple dates); Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 139; Donald, David Herbert, Lincoln (Simon & Schuster, Kindle Edition, 2011), Loc 7186-97; Faust, Patricia L., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 407-08, 502; Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative: Fort Sumter to Perryville (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), p. 266, 318; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 121; Goodwin, Doris Kearns, Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), p. 428-31; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 183; McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States Book 6, Oxford University Press, Kindle Edition, 1988), p. 424; Stanchak, John E., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 500, 542-43; Wert, Jeffry D., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 515, 815; White, Howard Ray, Bloodstains, An Epic History of the Politics that Produced and Sustained the American Civil War and the Political Reconstruction that Followed (Southernbooks, Kindle Edition, 2012), Q162

Lincoln Issues Two General War Orders

March 8, 1862 – President Abraham Lincoln demonstrated his flagging confidence in General-in-Chief George B. McClellan by creating a corps command structure within the Army of the Potomac.

Abraham Lincoln and George B. McClellan | Image Credit: Wikipedia.org

Abraham Lincoln and George B. McClellan | Image Credit: Wikipedia.org

Lincoln and McClellan met at the White House on the morning of the 8th to discuss McClellan’s plan to load the army on transports and move down Chesapeake Bay, landing at Urbanna on Virginia’s coast. During the discussion, Lincoln said that a “very ugly matter” had come up concerning rumors that the plan “was conceived with the traitorous intent of removing its defenders from Washington, and thus giving over to the enemy the capital and the government, thus left defenseless.”

McClellan quickly snapped that no man would call him a traitor, and, according to McClellan, Lincoln relented and “said that he merely repeated what others had said, and that he did not believe a word of it.” To prove his loyalty, McClellan announced that he would share the Urbanna plan with his division commanders, most of whom knew nothing about it yet, and ask them to vote on whether it was sound.

McClellan summoned the 12 division commanders to his headquarters, where he explained the plan and took the vote. He then returned to the White House that same day to report to Lincoln that the commanders had voted in favor of the plan, 8 to 4. This seemed to satisfy Lincoln enough to allow McClellan to proceed with his Urbanna strategy.

However, Lincoln was not completely satisfied until he issued two peremptory orders to McClellan later that day. The first, titled “President’s General War Order No. 2,” dismantled McClellan’s division-command structure by grouping the 12 divisions within the Army of the Potomac into four corps, to be led by Generals Irvin McDowell, Edwin V. Sumner, Samuel P. Heintzelman, and Erasmus D. Keyes. A fifth corps was also created and assigned to operate in the Shenandoah Valley under Major General Nathaniel P. Banks.

McClellan had considered creating a corps system, but he wanted to select his corps commanders himself once they were tested in battle. Lincoln had not only made the selections, but he had consulted with the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, not McClellan, beforehand. None of those promoted were McClellan’s favorites, and worse, three of the four (McDowell, Sumner, and Heintzelman) had voted against McClellan’s Urbanna plan.

Lincoln’s second directive, titled “President’s General War Order No. 3,” officially approved the Urbanna plan on several conditions:

  • McClellan had to leave enough troops behind so that Washington remained “entirely secure;”
  • He had to reach a consensus among his top officers as to how many men to leave behind;
  • He could not move the bulk of his army until the Confederate blockade of the lower Potomac River was broken;
  • He had to begin operations within 10 days.

Thus, McClellan got the approval he sought for his plan, but he feared that the conditions placed upon the approval might compromise his overall strategy. This would play a significant role in the way he conducted operations in the future.

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References

Bailey, Ronald H., Forward to Richmond: McClellan’s Peninsular Campaign (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983), p. 84-85; Donald, David Herbert, Lincoln (Simon & Schuster, Kindle Edition, 2011), Loc 7164-75; Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative: Fort Sumter to Perryville (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), p. 252-53; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 119; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 180-81; McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States Book 6, Oxford University Press, Kindle Edition, 1988), p. 424; Sommers, Richard J., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 172-75, 598; Wert, Jeffry D., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 773-74

Lincoln’s Compensated Emancipation Plan

March 6, 1862 – President Abraham Lincoln submitted a message asking Congress to consider a plan of gradual, compensated slave emancipation.

President Abraham Lincoln | Image Credit: Wikimedia.org

President Abraham Lincoln | Image Credit: Wikimedia.org

In his message, Lincoln called for a joint resolution declaring “that the United States ought to co-operate with any state which may adopt gradual abolishment of slavery, giving to such state pecuniary aid, to be used by such state in it’s (sic) discretion, to compensate for the inconveniences public and private, produced by such a change of system.” No U.S. president had ever submitted such an extraordinary legislative proposal to Congress before.

Lincoln asserted that the plan would help keep border slave states (i.e., Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri) from seceding. He wrote that “the leaders of the existing rebellion entertain the hope that this Government will ultimately be forced to acknowledge the independence of some part of the disaffected region, and that all the slave States north of such part will then say, ‘The Union for which we have struggled being already gone, we now choose to go with the Southern section.’ To deprive them of this hope substantially ends the rebellion, and the initiation of emancipation deprives them of it and of all the States initiating it.”

If the border states would “surrender on fair terms their own interest in Slavery rather than see the Union dissolved,” Lincoln believed it would hasten the war’s end. In this way, Lincoln argued for ending slavery not for moral reasons, but to preserve the Union and destroy the “proposed confederacy.”

To those concerned that such a plan would be too expensive, Lincoln argued that “less than one half-day’s cost of this war would pay for all the slaves in Delaware at four hundred dollars per head,” and 87 days’ worth of expenses would compensate for all the remaining slaves in Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri.

Lincoln maintained that such a plan was constitutional because it served the “general welfare,” with each state being able to decide for itself whether or not to take part. Opponents quickly countered that individual states could not enter into special relationships with the Federal government, such as one that would give the slave states a financial benefit that free states could not enjoy, even though they would be helping to fund said benefit.

The president urged the border state congressmen to support this measure because it was “impossible to foresee all the incidents, which may attend and all the ruin which may follow it.” This was an implied warning that if they rejected the plan, involuntary emancipation without compensation might someday be imposed.

In a meeting with Lincoln four days later, the border state congressmen questioned the constitutionality of the plan, inferred that Federal coercion toward emancipation would be resisted, and expressed fears that freeing slaves would harm race relations.

Lincoln countered that the plan “would not be half as onerous, as would be an equal sum, raised now, for the indefinite prossecution (sic) of the war.” In a letter to New York Tribune editor Horace Greeley, Lincoln stated that “we should urge it persuasively, and not menacingly, upon the South.” Nevertheless, congressmen from the border slave states maintained strong opposition to any Federal interference with slavery.

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References

Davis, Jefferson, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government: All Volumes (Heraklion Press, Kindle Edition 2013, 1889), Loc 14906-32; Donald, David Herbert, Lincoln (Simon & Schuster, Kindle Edition, 2011), Loc 7306-17; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 117; Goodwin, Doris Kearns, Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), p. 459-60; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 179, 184-85; McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States Book 6, Oxford University Press, Kindle Edition, 1988), p. 498-99; Pollard, Edward A., Southern History of the War (New York: The Fairfax Press, 1990), p. 270; White, Howard Ray, Bloodstains, An Epic History of the Politics that Produced and Sustained the American Civil War and the Political Reconstruction that Followed (Southernbooks, Kindle Edition, 2012), Q162

The Legal Tender Act

February 25, 1862 – President Abraham Lincoln signed a bill into law establishing the first Federal paper currency in U.S. history–the “U.S. Note.”

Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase | Image Credit: Wikimedia.org

Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase | Image Credit: Wikimedia.org

By this time, the northern banking community was nearing collapse. Doubts about the Federals’ ability to win the war and a possible European recognition of Confederate independence had prompted panic buying of precious metals, resulting in a gold shortage. This shortage hindered Federal efforts to obtain loans or repay debts. In a message to Congress, Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase finally conceded: “I came with reluctance to the conclusion that the legal tender clause is a necessity. Immediate action is of great importance. The Treasury is nearly empty.”

The “legal tender clause” was a measure that would enable the U.S. Treasury to print paper money that was not backed by specie (i.e., precious metals such as gold or silver). Prior to this, all American currency had value based on its ability to be converted to specie. The printing of this new paper money would be financed by bond sales.

Chase called the issuance of paper money “indispensably necessary” as a means to increase the money supply and help pay for the war. Printing money out of thin air sparked intense debate in Congress, with most Democrats opposing and most Republicans favoring the move. Republican William P. Fessenden of Maine, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, acknowledged that it was “of doubtful constitutionality… It is bad faith… It shocks all my notions of political, moral, and national honor…” however, “to leave the government without resources in such a crisis is not to be thought of.”

Republican Congressman Elbridge C. Spaulding of New York, a member of the House Ways and Means Committee and chairman of a sub-committee working on wartime emergency measures, proposed printing $150 million in paper money. This would pay for all debts except import tariffs and interest on the national debt. Spaulding declared:

“The bill before us is a war measure, a necessary means of carrying into execution the power granted in the Constitution ‘to raise and support armies’… These are extraordinary times, and extraordinary measures must be resorted to in order to save our Government and preserve our nationality.”

Democratic Congressman George Pendleton of Ohio countered:

“The wit of man has never discovered a means by which paper currency can be kept at par value, except by its speedy, cheap, certain convertibility into gold and silver… prices will be inflated… incomes will depreciate; the savings of the poor will vanish; the hoardings of the widow will melt away; bonds, mortgages, and notes–everything of fixed value–will lose their value.”

A banker argued that “gold and silver are the only true measure of value. These metals were prepared by the Almighty for this very purpose.” Constitutionalists asserted that Congress only had the power to “coin” money, which meant create coin, not money based on worthless paper. Moreover, allowing for the payment of debts with this paper violated the Constitution’s contracts clause.

Republican Congressman Samuel Hooper of Massachusetts contended, “Every intelligent man knows that coined money is not the currency of the country,” because state banknotes were the prime medium of exchange, and they often depreciated in value. Hooper stated that the real question was whether national paper money would have “as much virtue… as the notes of banks which have suspended specie payments.”

Lawmakers added a provision authorizing payment of bond interest in specie, up to six percent. It was hoped that this would encourage more bond sales, which would finance the new currency. Tariffs would also continue to be paid in specie to finance interest payments on the bonds.

The Republican-dominated Congress, influenced by increasing pressure from the Treasury, business leaders, and bankers, ultimately cast the votes needed to approve the bill. Three-fourths of congressional Democrats opposed the measure, but their minority status could not overcome the three-fourths of Republicans in favor. Lincoln, admittedly no expert in finance, signed the measure into law.

The Legal Tender Act created the first national monetary system based on paper, or fiat, currency. The new currency, which featured the image of Treasury Secretary Chase, was called “greenbacks” due to the green ink used to print the notes. Issuing paper money in place of specie was intended as a wartime emergency measure only. Attorney General Edward Bates wrote a legal opinion arguing the law’s validity because it fell under the Constitution’s “necessary and proper” clause. Ironically, Chase himself would later rule this measure unconstitutional as Supreme Court chief justice after the war.

The first $150 million in notes were to begin issuance in April; ultimately $400 million was circulated. The paper money helped restore enough investor confidence to sell the $500 million in six-percent bonds issued at the same time. It also provided access to the funds that had been hoarded since the financial crisis of December. Paper money circulation ended when specie currency was finally restored in 1879.

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References

Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 134; Donald, David Herbert, Lincoln (Simon & Schuster, Kindle Edition, 2011), Loc 7452; Faust, Patricia L., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 323; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 114; Jackson, Donald Dale, Twenty Million Yankees: The Northern Home Front (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983), p. 58-59; Linedecker, Clifford L. (ed.), The Civil War A to Z (Ballantine Books, 2002), p. 164; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 175; Longacre, Edward G., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986, Patricia L. Faust ed.), p. 432-33; McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States Book 6, Oxford University Press, Kindle Edition, 1988), p. 444-46

The Official Inauguration of Jefferson Davis

February 22, 1862 – Jefferson Davis took the oath of office to become the first official president of the Confederacy.

Confederate President Jefferson Davis | Image Credit: Wikipedia.org

Confederate President Jefferson Davis | Image Credit: Wikipedia.org

Davis and Vice President Alexander H. Stephens had been elected to their posts by delegates of the Montgomery convention the previous February on a provisional basis only, pending a general election. That general election had officially elected Davis and Stephens as Confederate president and vice president in November. Under the Confederate Constitution, they were to serve one six-year term and were ineligible for reelection.

Confederate officials selected February 22, George Washington’s Birthday, as the presidential inauguration day at the Confederate capital of Richmond, Virginia. Thousands of people attended the ceremonies, which began in the Virginia Hall of Delegates and then moved outside to a canopied platform beside the statue of Washington in the Capitol Square. Davis was escorted to the platform by his black footmen; they all wore black because, as one of them said, “This… is the way we always does in Richmond at funerals and sichlike.”

On the platform, Davis took the chief executive’s oath, kissed the Bible, and delivered his inaugural address. He declared: “Whatever of hope some may have entertained that a returning sense of justice would remove the danger with which our rights were threatened, and render it possible to preserve the Union of the Constitution, must have been dispelled by the malignity and barbarity of the Northern States in the prosecution of the existing war.” He cited as evidence:

“Bastilles filled with prisoners, arrested without civil process or indictment duly found; the writ of habeas corpus suspended by Executive mandate; a State Legislature controlled by the imprisonment of members whose avowed principles suggested to the Federal Executive that there might be another added to the list of seceded States; elections held under threats of a military power; civil officers, peaceful citizens, and gentle-women incarcerated for opinion’s sake–proclaimed the incapacity of our late associates to administer a Government as free, liberal, and humane as that established for our common use.”

Davis contrasted these Federal actions to those of his administration, stating that “through all the necessities of an unequal struggle there has been no act on our part to impair personal liberty or the freedom of speech, of thought, or of the press.”

Noting the financial troubles in the North, Davis predicted a Federal economic collapse: “The period is near at hand when our foes must sink under the immense load of debt which they have incurred, a debt which in their effort to subjugate us has already attained such fearful dimensions as will subject them to burdens which must continue to oppress them for generations to come.”

Davis expressed his view that the war was a test of what the southern people were willing to endure to defend their freedom: “It was, perhaps, in the ordination of Providence that we were to be taught the value of our liberties by the price which we pay for them.”

Trying to turn a negative into a positive, Davis cited unexpected benefits from European powers adhering to the Federal blockade:

“If the acquiescence of foreign nations in a pretended blockade has deprived us of our commerce with them, it is fast making us a self-supporting and an independent people. The blockade, if effectual and permanent, could only serve to divert our industry from the production of articles for export and employ it in supplying the commodities for domestic use.”

However, he also acknowledged the recent defeats in the Western Theater and North Carolina:

“After a series of successes and victories, which covered our arms with glory, we have recently met with serious disasters. But in the heart of a people resolved to be free these disasters tend but to stimulate to increased resistance. To show ourselves worthy of the inheritance bequeathed to us by the patriots of the Revolution, we must emulate that heroic devotion which made reverse to them but the crucible in which their patriotism was refined.”

Davis concluded:

“With humble gratitude and adoration, acknowledging the Providence which has so visibly protected the Confederacy during its brief but eventful career, to thee, O God, I trustingly commit myself, and prayerfully invoke thy blessing on my country and its cause.”

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References

Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative: Fort Sumter to Perryville (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), p. 217-18; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 113; Linedecker, Clifford L. (ed.), The Civil War A to Z (Ballantine Books, 2002), p. 84-85; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 174; McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States Book 6, Oxford University Press, Kindle Edition, 1988), p. 402-03, 433; Pollard, Edward A., Southern History of the War (New York: The Fairfax Press, 1990), p. 265-67; White, Howard Ray, Bloodstains, An Epic History of the Politics that Produced and Sustained the American Civil War and the Political Reconstruction that Followed (Southernbooks, Kindle Edition, 2012), Q162

The Death of Willie Lincoln

February 20, 1862 – President and Mrs. Lincoln’s 12-year-old son died of what doctors called “bilious,” or typhoid, fever.

Willie Lincoln | Image Credit: Wikipedia.org

Willie Lincoln | Image Credit: Wikipedia.org

William Wallace “Willie” Lincoln had been critically ill for most of this month, with First Lady Mary Lincoln becoming increasingly hysterical as his condition worsened. Doctors tending to him speculated that the unsanitary conditions in the White House may have caused his illness. Willie finally succumbed at 5 p.m. on the 20th. This was the second of four sons the Lincolns lost; Edward Baker Lincoln had died of “consumption” at age three in 1850.

Mary Lincoln was inconsolable, prompting some to wonder if she had gone insane. For President Lincoln, this tragedy offset the recent military victories in the Western Theater. He visited his secretary, John Nicolay, after Willie’s death and said, “Well, Nicolay, my boy is gone–he is actually gone!” Sobbing, Lincoln went to tend to his eight-year-old son Tad, who was also suffering from Willie’s illness. Tad eventually recovered.

The president conducted no official business for four days, during which time he received a letter of condolence from General-in-Chief George B. McClellan:

“You have been a kind true friend to me in the midst of the great cares and difficulties by which we have been surrounded during the past few months. Your confidence has upheld me when I should otherwise have felt weak. I am pushing to prompt completion the measures of which we have spoken, and I beg that you will not allow military affairs to give you a moment’s trouble.”

Funeral services for Willie took place in the White House at 2 p.m. on the 24th. Congress adjourned for that day so members could attend the services in the midst of one of the worst wind and rainstorms in Washington history. Willie was temporarily interred in Oak Hill Cemetery at Georgetown before he could be permanently buried in Springfield. The president quickly returned to work while he continued grieving.

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References

Bailey, Ronald H., Forward to Richmond: McClellan’s Peninsular Campaign (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983), p. 74; Denney, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle (New York: Gramercy Books, 1992 [1998 edition]), p. 122, 131, 133; Donald, David Herbert, Lincoln (Simon & Schuster, Kindle Edition, 2011), Loc 7076-87; Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative: Fort Sumter to Perryville (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), p. 251; Fredriksen, John C., Civil War Almanac (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 112; Goodwin, Doris Kearns, Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), p. 418-19; Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971), p. 167-68, 173-75; White, Howard Ray, Bloodstains, An Epic History of the Politics that Produced and Sustained the American Civil War and the Political Reconstruction that Followed (Southernbooks, Kindle Edition, 2012), Q162