As May began in northern Virginia, Major-General Joseph Hooker’s Federal Army of the Potomac was divided into three major sections:
- The flanking column of about 75,000 men was in the Wilderness between the tiny hamlet of Chancellorsville to the west and Fredericksburg to the east.
- The diverting column of about 40,000 men was in front of Fredericksburg trying to draw the attention of General Robert E. Lee’s Confederate Army of Northern Virginia away from the flanking column.
- The Cavalry Corps under Major-General George Stoneman was moving to cut the Confederates’ lines of communication and supply in hopes of drawing them out of their Fredericksburg trenches and into an open fight.
Hooker’s plan on this fifth day of his offensive was to have the diverting column, led by Major-General John Sedgwick, to begin its drive on Fredericksburg while Federals seized the heights beyond Banks’s Ford on the Rappahannock River. This would set the stage for the main movement, which was for the flanking column to hit Lee’s left flank.
May 1 opened with a light, chilly rain, and fog in the fields between the armies. Hooker was hampered by malfunctioning telegraph machines that delayed messages by as much as five hours. The Federals, already virtually blind in the dense Wilderness, were rendered even more so by these communication difficulties.
Meanwhile, Lee had correctly guessed that the Federals in front of Fredericksburg were just a diversion to Hooker’s main attack to the west. Lee responded by preparing to divide his already outnumbered force:
- A skeleton force of about 12,500 men would hold the heights behind Fredericksburg; this force consisted of Major-General Jubal Early’s division and a detached brigade led by Brigadier-General William Barksdale.
- Lee’s main body, consisting of Lieutenant-General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s corps and two detached divisions under Major-Generals Robert Anderson and Lafayette McLaws (about 36,300 men in all) would move west to confront Hooker’s flanking wing. Anderson and McLaws were temporarily assigned to Jackson’s command.
As Lee supervised artillery emplacements at Fredericksburg, Jackson began assembling the divisions of Anderson and McLaws. By 11 a.m., their men were moving west on the Orange Turnpike and Plank Road to face Hooker’s Federals heading east from Chancellorsville.
Artillery opened around 11:20 a.m., and heavy skirmishing began between Chancellorsville and the Tabernacle Church. The Federals surged forward into a clearing outside the Wilderness and seized high ground, from which they could launch a strong counterattack. Hooker directed Sedgwick to begin his diversion in front of Fredericksburg at 1 p.m. He was to “threaten an attack with full force… as severe as can be.” But this communication did not reach Sedgwick until nearly 5 p.m.
Professor Thaddeus S.C. Lowe, the Federal army aeronautics chief, reported from an observation balloon that Lee’s entire army was coming from Fredericksburg to stop the Federal advance. Up to this time, Hooker’s offensive had gone almost exactly the way he wanted. But Lowe’s news threw him off, as he did not expect to fight a major battle before reaching his true objective. So Hooker, who had proclaimed that Lee must “ingloriously fly” to escape destruction, ordered his men to immediately disengage and fall back to their previous positions around the Chancellorsville crossroads.
Hooker’s decision was partly made because the weakest point of his line, the center, was in danger of being cut off, with no reinforcements close to coming to his rescue. Major-General George Sykes, commanding the center, reported, “I was completely isolated from the rest of the army.” In addition, Confederate cavalry commanded all the roads leading out of Chancellorsville, thereby preventing Hooker from getting an accurate idea of where Lee’s army truly was. Hooker could also see that Sedgwick’s diversion was doing nothing to stop Lee from bringing what he believed to be the entire Confederate army out to face him (Hooker was unaware that Sedgwick still had not gotten his message).
But Hooker’s subordinates saw a golden opportunity squandered. Brigadier-General Gouverneur K. Warren, the Federal army chief engineer, believed that the Federals had gained a major advantage and pleaded with Hooker to reconsider. Major-General Darius N. Couch, commanding the Second Corps, also sent a messenger to headquarters saying, “In no event should we give up our ground.”
Hooker revised his order to, “Hold on until 5 o’clock.” But by the time the message reached Couch, he told the courier, “Tell General Hooker he is too late. The enemy are already on my right and rear. I am in full retreat.” According to Major-General George G. Meade, whose Fifth Corps was part of the withdrawing force:
“Just as we reached the enemy we were recalled. Had Hooker rested on his first order for an advance and left it to be carried out by his corps and division commanders, a sharp battle would have ensued, of which the result would of course have been dubious; but the army would not have been demoralized by having to retreat so soon after they had taken the offensive, and Hooker would not have lost the confidence of his officers by the vacillation exhibited in his actual orders of that day.”
Some officers thought that Hooker might have been drunk, but others later testified before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War that he had not been drinking that day. In fact, some even thought that alcohol might have improved Hooker’s performance. Hooker later wrote, “I soon discovered that I was hazarding too much to continue the movement.” But then he summed it up more succinctly: “For once, I lost confidence in Hooker.”
Nevertheless, Hooker’s confidence seemed restored by day’s end. When Couch fumed at “the general’s vacillation,” Hooker assured him, “It’s all right, Couch, I’ve got Lee just where I want him; he must fight me on my own ground.” Hooker then issued a bold announcement: “The Rebel army is now the legitimate property of the Army of the Potomac… The enemy is in my power, and God Almighty cannot deprive me of them.” He informed his corps commanders, “The major general commanding trusts that a suspension in the attack today will embolden the enemy to attack him.”
But his troops were back where they started that morning, in the woods and not the clearing where the Confederates had stopped them. The heavy brush of the Wilderness offset Hooker’s advantage in both numbers and artillery. And the initiative had now shifted from Hooker to Lee. From that point forward, Couch believed that “my commanding general was a whipped man.”
Meanwhile, the third prong of Hooker’s offensive was getting nowhere. Stoneman’s cavalry was assigned to shut down the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad by burning the bridges spanning the North Anna River, in Lee’s rear. But Stoneman was over 30 miles to the west, preparing to move farther south rather than east to the North Anna. This ensured that Lee’s supply line would remain intact.
Lee came up from Fredericksburg and met with Jackson southeast of Chancellorsville just after nightfall. They sat on hardtack boxes in front of a fire and discussed upcoming strategy. Jackson reported that the Federals had stopped withdrawing and were now stationed behind defenses.
Major-General J.E.B. “Jeb” Stuart, commanding the Confederate cavalry, reported that his troopers had scouted the Orange Turnpike and found that the Federal right flank was “in the air.” The Federal troops on the right consisted of Major-General Oliver O. Howard’s Eleventh Corps, which was largely disliked by the rest of the army because the men were predominantly German immigrants who spoke little English. Having not yet proved themselves in battle, they were placed on the right, and though they were vulnerable, it was believed that putting them farthest away from the enemy would ensure that they would not see any action.
With Lee’s army already divided between Fredericksburg and the Wilderness outside Chancellorsville, Jackson proposed splitting it a third time by sending his corps on a 14-mile march around to attack the Federal right flank. A local resident showed one of Jackson’s aides a path that could be used, off the main road, to get where they needed to be without detection.
Lee told Jackson, “General Stuart will cover your movement with his cavalry.” Jackson said, “My troops will move at 4 o’clock.” While Jackson led his corps around Hooker’s right, Lee would demonstrate against Hooker’s front with the divisions of Anderson and McLaws, and Early would continue to demonstrate against the Federals in front of Fredericksburg.
This defied all military logic and was the greatest gamble ever yet attempted by Lee. Facing an army of nearly 130,000 men, Lee would send 28,000 to assail the right while holding the front with 18,000 and Fredericksburg with just 12,000. But Lee, who had been able to size up his opposing commanders very well so far, believed that Hooker had lost his nerve by withdrawing. He therefore told Jackson, “Well, go on.”
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