President Abraham Lincoln arranged for a steamer to take him to the headquarters of Major-General Joseph Hooker’s Federal Army of the Potomac after learning the extent of the defeat at Chancellorsville. Lincoln, accompanied by General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck, debarked on the morning of May 7 and took a special train to Falmouth, where they met with Hooker to discuss current and future operations.
Lincoln expressed relief to find that the “troops are none the worse for the campaign,” as evidenced by generally high morale and few desertions. He also said that he was “agreeably surprised with the situation.” Lincoln did not assign blame for the defeat, but knowing the indignation the defeat would cause throughout the North, he urged Hooker to launch a new offensive as soon as possible.
Halleck met with Hooker’s corps commanders to get their opinion on the state of the army. By this time, Hooker was unhappy with several of his generals. He argued with Major-General John Sedgwick about Sedgwick’s performance during the battle, and he argued with Major-General George G. Meade over whether Meade voted to fight or retreat at the early morning council of war on the 5th. Ultimately, Brigadier-General Gouverneur K. Warren, the army’s chief engineer, lamented that “our great weakness, in my opinion, is the incompetency of many of our corps commanders.”
Another generals’ uprising was forming, much like the one that undermined and eventually displaced Ambrose Burnside after the “mud march.” Major-General Darius N. Couch, Hooker’s second-in-command, told Halleck that there was “much dissatisfaction among the higher officers at Hooker’s incomprehensible bad management.” Couch was so disgusted by Hooker’s performance at Chancellorsville that he demanded to be transferred out of the army. Couch’s request was granted, and he was replaced as head of the Second Corps by Major-General Winfield Scott Hancock.
Major-General Henry W. Slocum, commanding the Twelfth Corps, pushed for Meade to replace Hooker as army commander. Slocum, Couch, and Sedgwick told Meade that they would gladly serve under him even though they outranked him. But Meade firmly opposed this and the matter was dropped. Meade did pledge to give his opinion if asked, however. And many politicians who came down to check on the army’s condition noticed the attention that Meade was getting.
Another officer getting attention was Major-General John F. Reynolds, commanding the First Corps. Reynolds was visiting Washington shortly after the battle where he learned that there was talk of the administration giving him army command. Reynolds immediately went to the White House and told Lincoln that he did not want the job and would not accept it if offered. At the same time, Reynolds suggested that Hooker should be replaced. Lincoln replied, “I am not disposed to throw away a gun because it missed fire once.”
Reynolds also suggested that Meade replace Hooker. When Meade learned this, he told Lincoln he had no ambition to command the army, but he joined with Sedgwick in quietly expressing dissatisfaction with Hooker’s leadership. Only three of Hooker’s corps commanders–Major-Generals Oliver O. Howard, George Stoneman, and Daniel Sickles–supported Hooker, but Hooker alienated Stoneman and Howard by asserting that they were the most responsible for the defeat.
Lincoln warned Hooker that “some of your corps and Division Commanders are not giving you their entire confidence.” This brought back memories of Hooker blatantly undermining Burnside five months ago when Burnside commanded the army. Rather than fire back, Hooker left it up to Lincoln to decide what to do about it.
Lincoln and Halleck returned to Washington the same day. As he left, Lincoln handed Hooker a letter that showed the president was already looking ahead to a new offensive:
“If possible I would be very glad of another movement early enough to give us some benefit from the fact of the enemies communications being broken, but neither for this reason or any other, do I wish anything done in desperation or rashness. If you have (a plan), prosecute it without interference from me. If you have not, please inform me, so that I, incompetent as I may be, can try and assist in the formation of some plan for the army.”
Lincoln told newspaper reporters at Falmouth that he was returning to Washington with “his confidence in Gen. Hooker and his army unshaken.” When someone asked him if he would remove Hooker from command, Lincoln said that because he had stuck with George B. McClellan “a number of times, he saw no reason why he should not try General Hooker twice.”
Hooker responded the same day, writing:
“If in the first effort we failed, it was not for want of strength or conduct of the small number of troops actually engaged, but from a cause which could not be foreseen (i.e., the Confederate flank attack on May 2), and could not be provided against. As to the best time for renewing our advance upon the enemy, I can only decide after an opportunity has been afforded to learn the feeling of the troops. I have decided in my own mind the plan to be adopted in our next effort, if it should be your wish to have one made. It will be one in which the operations of all the corps… will be within my personal supervision.”
As the Federals returned to their old camps at Falmouth and resumed the daily routines of army life, news of the Chancellorsville defeat slowly reached the northern public. This news did not cause the mass outcry that Fredericksburg did, partly because War Department restrictions on the press meant that the news trickled out rather than coming in one shocking bulletin.
According to Navy Secretary Gideon Welles, “Our people, though shocked and very much disappointed, are in better tone and temper than I feared they would be. The press had wrought the public mind to high expectation by predicting certain success, which all wished to believe. I have not been confident, though I had hopes.” Senator Zachariah Chandler, who had led the Radical Republicans in condemning the commanders for the Fredericksburg debacle, spoke for many in his party when he said, “I have full confidence in Joe Hooker.”
Even so, Lincoln took note of Hooker’s attitude. This bothered the president because it reflected a “cool, clear, and satisfied” air that refused to acknowledge responsibility for failure or willingness to learn from mistakes. Lincoln guessed that this attitude led to many of Hooker’s subordinates no longer wanting to serve under him.
Lincoln then met with Halleck and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton to discuss Hooker’s fate. They agreed that the atmosphere was too politically charged to remove Hooker at this time, but if Hooker submitted his resignation some time in the future, they would accept.
Bibliography
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