Major-General Joseph Hooker had his Federal Army of the Potomac in strong pursuit of General Robert E. Lee’s Confederate Army of Northern Virginia as the Confederates moved north into Pennsylvania. Hooker wanted every available man put under his command during this emergency, including the Federal garrison holding Maryland Heights and Harpers Ferry in Virginia’s Shenandoah Valley. But General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck insisted that the troops were needed to entice Lee to divide his army.
There had been bad blood between Hooker and Halleck since before the war, and this disagreement revived the tension. Hooker inspected the Harpers Ferry defenses on June 27 and ordered Major-General William French, commanding the garrison, to evacuate. Since Hooker was not French’s superior, French sent the orders to Halleck for review. Halleck shot back, “Pay no attention to General Hooker’s orders.” This enraged Hooker, who confided in a fellow officer asking if a battle was coming soon: “Yes, but I shall not fight the battle. Halleck’s dispatch severs my connection with the Army of the Potomac.”
Hooker telegraphed Halleck at 1 p.m. on June 27:
“My original instructions require me to cover Harper’s Ferry and Washington. I have now imposed upon me, in addition, an enemy in my front of more than my number. I beg to be understood, respectfully, but firmly, that I am unable to comply with this condition with the means at my disposal, and earnestly request that I may at once be relieved from the position I occupy.”
Halleck replied at 8 p.m., “As you were appointed to this command by the President, I have no power to relieve you. Your dispatch has been duly referred for Executive action.” By that time, President Abraham Lincoln had already decided to grant Hooker’s request.
Lincoln and the high command had always been unimpressed with Hooker due to his overconfidence. This was made even worse by his embarrassing defeat at Chancellorsville, and now his apparent inability to stop Lee’s invasion. Lincoln, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, and Halleck had agreed after Chancellorsville that while it may be politically damaging to fire Hooker, they would quickly accept his resignation if he ever offered it.
In choosing a suitable replacement for Hooker, Lincoln ignored pleas to reinstate the still-popular George B. McClellan. New Jersey Governor Joel Parker was one of the louder voices in favor of McClellan, prompting Lincoln to explain to him that he had no idea of “the difficulties and involvements of replacing General McClellan in command.” Lincoln also ignored urgings from Radical Republicans to bring back their favorite, Major-General John C. Fremont. Two of Hooker’s corps commanders, John F. Reynolds and George G. Meade, were the top candidates, and when Reynolds strongly refused the job, Meade was chosen.
Meade commanded the Fifth Corps, and he was a well-respected professional officer who had been part of all the army’s campaigns since the first Battle of Bull Run. He was not very well known by troops outside his corps, but past defeats had taught many of the men to be indifferent toward whoever commanded them. Stanton noted that Meade had no real enemies, “and as a Pennsylvanian, he has patriotism enough to draw out all the latent energies of his nature.” Lincoln added, “And will fight well on his own dunghill.” Changing army commanders while a major confrontation loomed was an extraordinary gamble.
Colonel James A. Hardie of the adjutant general’s office was assigned to deliver Special Orders Number 194 to Hooker and Meade. He left Washington at 7:30 p.m., a half-hour before Halleck deflected Hooker’s request to resign. Hardie arrived at Meade’s headquarters outside Frederick at 3 a.m. and woke the commander. When Hardie said, “I’m afraid I’ve come to make trouble for you,” Meade thought he was being arrested. Hardie handed him the order instead.
“You will receive with this the order of the President placing you in command of the Army of the Potomac,” Halleck wrote. “Your army is free to act as you may deem proper under the circumstances as they arise… Harpers Ferry and its garrison are under your direct orders.” Having command of Harpers Ferry was something the administration had denied Hooker. Halleck added, “Considering the circumstances, no one ever received a more important command.” Meade was given the authority to dismiss any officer he saw fit, regardless of seniority.
When Meade considered turning it down, Hardie said that this was an order, not a request, to take command. Meade said, “Well, I’ve been tried and condemned without a hearing, and I suppose I shall have to go to execution.” Major-General George Sykes took over Meade’s Fifth Corps.
Meade and Hardie next went to Hooker’s headquarters, where Hooker was already aware of Hardie’s presence and waited for him in full dress uniform. Hooker took the news well, and he called in his chief of staff, Major-General Daniel Butterfield, to show Meade the current situation between the two opposing armies.
Hooker and Butterfield explained that since Lee had no pontoons, he would probably not try to cross the Susquehanna River. It therefore seemed evident that he was planning to move along the riverbank in a semicircle to the northeast, east, and then southeast to threaten Baltimore and Washington. The Federals were inside Lee’s potential arc, poised to defend both cities or attack Lee’s flank if it appeared vulnerable.
Back at Washington, Lincoln held a cabinet meeting where he announced that Hooker had asked to be relieved from command. According to Navy Secretary Gideon Welles, Lincoln said that he had been seeing the same flaws in Hooker that he had seen in George McClellan: “a want of alacrity to obey, and a greedy call for more troops which could not, and ought not to be taken from other points.” Hooker had also “taken umbrage at the refusal” of Halleck to give him the Harpers Ferry garrison.
The cabinet members then discussed who should succeed Hooker, with Lincoln mentioning a few names. Welles noted, “I soon saw this review of names was merely a feeler to get an expression of opinion–a committal–or to make it appear that all were consulted. It shortly became obvious, however, that the matter had already been settled, and the President finally remarked he supposed General Halleck had issued the orders… We were consulted after the fact.”
Word quickly spread throughout the Federal army that Meade had replaced Hooker. Most of the men outside the Fifth Corps knew little of Meade and were uncertain about what the change would bring. Correspondent T.C. Grey of the New York Tribune wrote, “The relieving of Hooker is received with a kind of apathetic indifference by the army, although many are loud in denouncing the act at this particular time.”
Most who had dealt more directly with Hooker were happy to see him go. Provost Marshal Marsena Patrick wrote, “Of course this has caused great commotion, but as yet I have heard no regret.” Major-General John Gibbon stated, “I was delighted, on the road, to hear that Gen. Meade was in command of the army.” An officer in the Second Corps wrote, “We breathed a full breath of joy and of hope. The Providence of God had been with us General Meade commanded the Army of the Potomac. The Army brightened and moved on with a more elastic step.”
Headquarters officers lined up to wish Hooker farewell at 6 p.m. According to the Boston Journal, Hooker “shook hands with each officer, laboring in vain to stifle his emotion. The tears rolled down his cheeks. The officers were deeply affected… He spoke in high terms of General Meade.”
Hooker issued a farewell order in which he called Meade “a brave and accomplished officer, who has nobly earned the confidence and esteem of this army on many a well-fought field.” A colonel wrote, “His farewell order is excellent, the most modest of all his productions.” Hooker had done well to revive the demoralized Army of the Potomac, but he ultimately proved incapable of achieving victory.
The army, now Meade’s army, consisted of over 100,000 men spread out on both sides of the Potomac, with most men on the Maryland side around Frederick. The Bureau of Military Information, which had served Hooker so well with its accurate estimates of enemy strength, continued to do so by informing Meade that Lee’s army numbered at most 80,000 men with 275 guns. In fact, Lee had almost exactly that many men, not counting his cavalry, and 283 guns. The B.M.I. also reported that the Confederates were spread out between Chambersburg and Carlisle in Pennsylvania.
Meade quickly developed a plan of action and sent it to Washington at 4:45 p.m.: “I propose to move this army tomorrow in the direction of York. I must move toward the Susquehanna, keeping Washington and Baltimore well covered, and if the enemy is checked in his attempt to cross the Susquehanna, or if he turns toward Baltimore, give him battle.” This plan canceled Hooker’s strategy of threatening Lee’s supply lines to the west.
Meade called on the corps commanders to explain to their men the vital importance of stopping Lee’s invasion. Meade wrote that “the army has fought well heretofore,” and it would now fight “more desperately and bravely than ever if it is addressed in fitting terms.” He issued orders on the night of the 28th to “be ready to march at daylight tomorrow.”
Bibliography
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