General Braxton Bragg’s Confederate Army of Tennessee retained its tenuous grip on the Federal army within Chattanooga. But Major-General Ulysses S. Grant, commanding the Federals, planned to launch his long-awaited attack on Bragg’s Confederates on November 21. Grant’s plan called for the 17,000 men of Major-General William T. Sherman’s Army of the Tennessee (mainly the Fifteenth Corps) to march northeast from Bridgeport, Alabama, over Lookout Mountain, and north through Chattanooga to extend the left of Grant’s line to meet Bragg’s right flank on Missionary Ridge.
Meanwhile, Major-General George H. Thomas’s 36,000-man Army of the Cumberland would hold the Federal center in Chattanooga, and Major-General Joseph Hooker’s 11,000 men from the Army of the Potomac’s Eleventh and Twelfth corps held the Federal left, in Lookout Valley west of Chattanooga.
The Federal high command seemed satisfied with Grant’s plan. Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton informed President Abraham Lincoln that “a battle or falling back of the enemy by Saturday (the 21st), at furthest, is inevitable.” But Thomas was not so confident. He wrote to Major-General William S. Rosecrans, whom he had succeeded as Cumberland army commander, about the situation:
“I was in hopes, after opening the road to Bridgeport on this side of the river that we would have some little relief, but I do not see that our labors have been diminished, for we have been compelled to build and corduroy the entire road from here to Kelley’s Ferry. However, we have quite a good road now and have accumulated something like 15 days rations ahead. We also have in position 12 heavy guns, with sufficient ammunition to fight two battles. Our horses however are entirely exhausted and the RR has entirely given out. If, however, we can hold out for a month longer, our position will be entirely secure.”
By the 20th, Sherman’s four divisions were stretched nearly 30 miles between Brown’s Ferry at the head and Bridgeport at the rear. This slow advance meant that it would be impossible for Grant to attack on the 21st as scheduled. He set the attack for the 22nd instead. As Sherman’s westerners slogged along, they encountered Hooker’s easterners for the first time. Sherman later recalled:
“It was on this occasion that the Fifteenth Corps gained its peculiar badge: as the men were trudging along the deeply-cut, muddy road, of a cold, drizzly day, one of our Western Soldiers left his ranks and joined a party of the Twelfth Corps at their camp-fire. They got into a conversation, the Twelfth Corps men asking what troops we were, etc., etc. In turn, our fellow (who had never seen a corps-badge, and noticed that everything was marked with a star) asked if they were all brigadier-generals. Of course they were not, but the star was their corps badge, and every wagon, tent, hat, etc., had its star. Then the Twelfth Corps men inquired what corps he belonged to, and he answered, ‘The Fifteenth Corps.’ ‘What is your badge?’ ‘Why,’ said he (and he was an Irishman), suiting the action to the word, ‘40 rounds in the cartridge box and 20 in the pocket!’”
A New York soldier described Sherman’s men as they passed:
“This army looked quite unlike our own. They all wore large hats instead of caps; were carelessly dressed, both officers and men, and marched in a very irregular way, seemingly not caring to keep closed up and in regular order. They were a large fine type of men, all westerners; it was easy to see that at any serious time they would close up and be there. As they passed by we viewed their line and a good deal of friendly chaffing was done. They expressed their opinion that we were tin soldiers. ‘Oh look at their little caps. Where are your paper collars? Oh how clean you look, do you have soap?’”
As Sherman’s march continued, Grant received a puzzling message from Bragg under a flag of truce: “As there may still be some noncombatants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal.” This seemed to indicate that Bragg would soon attack, even though Grant saw no evidence that he would actually do so. Grant later wrote, “Of course I understood that this was a device intended to deceive; but I did not know what the intended deception was.”
Grant guessed that Bragg might truly be preparing to withdraw, but Bragg was not. Bragg was also unaware that Grant planned to attack his right. He wrote President Jefferson Davis, “Sherman’s force has arrived, and a movement on our left is indicated.” As such, he asked Davis to get General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding Confederate forces in Mississippi, to send him reinforcements. Bragg wrote, “Our fate may be decided here, and the enemy is at least double our strength.”
The next day, Grant began finalizing his plan of attack. Thomas suggested reverting to the original plan of attacking on Lookout Mountain, but Grant wanted an all-out assault on all Confederate positions. This was intended to not only drive Bragg away from Chattanooga, but to push him away from Lieutenant-General James Longstreet’s Confederates, which were about 100 miles to the northeast laying siege to Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside’s Federal army at Knoxville.
Sherman’s march, slowed by his long supply train, was slowed even more by incessant rain on the 21st. Grant finally issued orders through his chief of staff for Sherman to move without his train: “I am directed by the general commanding to say that, in order to avoid delay, you will have your troops pass your transportation and move at once, leaving only a sufficient force to guard your trains.” Grant then postponed the attack a second time.
When Federal General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck informed Grant that Burnside was surrounded at Knoxville, Grant replied, “Our attack on the enemy’s right has not yet commenced. Troops have been moving night and day ever since Sherman appeared at Bridgeport, but narrow and bad roads have made an earlier attack impossible. Owing to heavy rain last night, it will be impossible to attack Bragg before Monday (the 23rd).”
The nonstop rain destroyed the pontoon bridge at Brown’s Ferry and left one of Sherman’s divisions under Brigadier-General Peter J. Osterhaus isolated on the wrong side of the Tennessee River. Grant reassigned that division to Hooker’s force in the Lookout Valley instead. Brigadier-General Jefferson C. Davis’s division of Thomas’s army was transferred to Sherman’s command.
Thomas, worried by Sherman’s delays, continued arguing in favor of a concentrated attack on Lookout Mountain, reasoning that if Bragg strengthened his right to meet Sherman at Missionary Ridge, then he would have to weaken his left at Lookout. But Bragg still had no idea that Sherman planned to attack; he believed that Sherman was on his way to reinforce Burnside at Knoxville. Because of this, Bragg urged Longstreet to hurry and destroy Burnside, then come back to rejoin him at Chattanooga.
Longstreet directed Major-General Lafayette McLaws’s division to attack the Federal works outside Knoxville, stating that casualties “will not be great compared with the importance of the move.” McLaws was to attack on the night of the 22nd, but he told Longstreet that such a move would be futile. Longstreet informed Bragg that his force was not strong enough to “warrant my taking his works by assault. Can’t you spare me another division? It will shorten the work here very much.”
When Bragg warned Longstreet that Sherman was coming to oppose him, Longstreet wrote, “There can be no force to move against my rear, unless it comes from your front, and it cannot come from there without your being advised in time to send more troops to me.”
Bragg then dispatched an officer to personally inform Longstreet that he would be sending 11,000 troops to Knoxville under Major-Generals Bushrod R. Johnson and Patrick R. Cleburne, with Cleburne in overall command. These troops currently held Missionary Ridge. Johnson’s command left by rail immediately, while Cleburne waited for the train to return for his men.
This left Bragg with less than 35,000 men to face Grant’s revitalized army of over 60,000. Based on Thomas’s persistence (along with the possibility that Bragg might be retreating), Grant slightly modified his plan by changing Thomas’s attack in the center to a mere demonstration instead. Sherman would assault the Confederate right, and Hooker would act based on the progress made by Sherman and Thomas on the morning of the 23rd.
Bibliography
- Catton, Bruce, Grant Takes Command. Open Road Media, Kindle Edition, 2015.
- Cozzens, Peter, The Shipwreck of Their Hopes: The Battles for Chattanooga. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press (Kindle Edition), 1994.
- Grant, Ulysses S., Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. New York: Da Capo Press, 1982 (original 1885, republication of 1952 edition).
- Korn, Jerry, The Fight for Chattanooga: Chickamauga to Missionary Ridge. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983.
- Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day. New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971.
- Sherman, William T., Memoirs of General William T. Sherman, Vol. I. New York: D. Appleton and Co. (Kindle Edition), 1889.
- Woodworth, Steven E., Nothing but Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865. New York: Vintage Civil War Library, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. Kindle Edition, 2005.