Major-General George G. Meade, commanding the Federal Army of the Potomac, had hoped to launch a surprise attack on General Robert E. Lee’s Confederate Army of Northern Virginia. But Meade lost both the elements of surprise and stealth, and now Lee’s troops were behind strong defenses on a rough north-south line along the western bank of Mine Run.
Many Federals, including Provost-Marshal Marsena Patrick, blamed Major-General William French (commanding the Third Corps) for the failure. Patrick wrote in his diary, “The 3’ Corps, after fooling away Thursday on the North Side of the River, finally crossed at Jacob’s Ferry & again got lost in trying to reach Robertson’s Tavern.”
But Meade was not yet ready to end his campaign. He set up headquarters at Robertson’s Tavern and moved Major-General John Sedgwick’s Sixth Corps ahead of French in a “very laborious” maneuver amidst “mud and soft cross-roads.” Meade’s line now consisted of:
- Major-General Gouverneur Warren’s Second Corps on the left (south)
- Major-General John Newton’s First Corps in the center
- Sedgwick’s corps on the right (north)
- French’s corps and Major-General George Sykes’s Sixth Corps were in reserve
The Federals advanced two miles west on the morning of the 28th, marching through rain along the Orange Turnpike and other parallel roads until they discovered the new seven-mile Confederate line on the high ground along Mine Run. One of Meade’s staffers called it “a very strong position, resembling Fredericksburg.” According to Meade:
“The western bank of Mine Run, with an elevation of over 100 feet, had a gentle and smooth slope to the creek, averaging over 1,000 yards of cleared ground. The summit, on which was the enemy’s line of battle, was already crowned with infantry parapets, abatis, and epaulements for batteries. The creek itself was a considerable obstacle, in many places swampy and impassable. A careful examination, made personally and by engineer officers, convinced me there was no probability of success in an attack in our immediate front, in the vicinity of the turnpike.”
Major-General Jubal Early’s Confederate Second Corps held the left (north) of the line, while Lieutenant-General A.P. Hill’s Third Corps held the right (south). A Confederate officer recalled, “The enemy being immediately in our front, their sharpshooters advancing, my sharpshooters were soon engaged, the enemy also using artillery. A dense fog and heavy rain here put a stop to the firing and everything became quiet. This opportunity was improved by us in throwing up breastworks.”
Warren personally inspected the Confederate defenses and found them impregnable. However, he requested permission to “make a demonstration in the enemy’s right, to threaten it, and endeavor to discover a more favorable position to assault, and finally, if this could not be done, to move on around as if to get in his rear, with the intention of making him abandon his present front.”
Meade approved, and he issued orders for the other corps commanders to reconnoiter the defenses in their fronts to determine the practicality of a frontal assault. Warren planned to conduct his flanking maneuver the next morning, but the weather turned bitterly cold overnight. Pickets were rotated in and out of duty every 30 minutes to keep from freezing.
The Confederates continued improving their defenses into the 29th, building elaborate fieldworks to prepare for the full-scale frontal assault that Lee expected to come. But the Federals also put up fortifications, and both sides observed each other from the safety of their defenses.
That morning, Warren pulled his Second Corps out of the Federal line and began moving to find a way around the Confederate right. French’s Third Corps moved up to replace Warren on the line, and Newton’s First Corps kept the Confederates occupied with skirmishing and artillery fire.
Newton’s men began building bridges to cross Mine Run, but Newton finally acknowledged that the effort was futile: “Success at the best was only probable, and must have been attended with heavy sacrifice of life.” French informed Warren, “I have looked at the ground occupied by the enemy, and cannot see a practicable point or line upon which my command, supported or unsupported, could do anything but carry in such an exhausted state, while they will be in full force to take advantage of it.”
French guessed that “a bold movement on the left in conjunction” with a successful attack by Warren on the Confederate right “would change the result, but even then there would be no decisive result to compensate.” Warren inspected the Confederate defenses and concluded that they could not be taken except by an all-out attack. Warren tried massing his men for the assault, but nightfall stopped his progress.
That night, Meade called a council of war, where he explained that scouts had discovered two vulnerable points in the Confederate defenses–one on their extreme left, and one in French’s front (though French disagreed). Meade announced that artillery would open at 8 a.m. on the 30th, after which Warren would take nearly half the army in an assault on the extreme Confederate right. This would be followed an hour later by Sedgwick attacking the enemy left, along with Newton and French demonstrating against the center.
The attack was predicated on Warren finding a vulnerable spot on the Confederate right. Meade ordered no reconnaissance of his own, instead relying on Warren to reconnoiter enemy positions himself. As orders went out among the Federals for a general assault, many soldiers wrote their names and regiments on paper for identification; some even wrote, “killed in action, November 30, 1863.”
The night again turned bitterly cold, but Lee’s Confederates continued extending their lines and strengthening their defenses in anticipation of an attack. Major-General Jeb Stuart informed Lee that the Federals were massing south of the Catharpin road, along Mine Run.
Warren spent the entire night getting his men into position, and as he reported, “I was thus prepared for strong and repeated assaults… no part escaped our observation.” But by dawn on the 30th, he saw that Hill’s Confederates had strengthened their already mighty defenses, with “the breastworks, epaulements, and abatis perfected” and the right flank extended. Warren stated, “I at once decided not to attack, and informed General Meade.”
The Federal artillery bombardment opened as scheduled, but no infantry advance was made. Warren’s message finally reached Meade at 8:50 a.m. Warren asserted that the enemy positions “seem so formidable in my present front that I advise against making the attack here. The full light of the sun shows me that I cannot succeed… I would sooner sacrifice my commission than my men.”
As Warren recalled, “I advised against any further attempt to outflank the enemy in his immediate front. Any further attempt to outflank the enemy in his immediate presence, with the force I then had… exposed my command to the chances of an overwhelming attack from him, and was not justifiable on any principle, nor was it proposed to me.” Meade showed Warren’s message to his chief of staff and said, “My God! General Warren has half my army.”
Meade was enraged, but he reluctantly agreed to suspend the attack. Orders were quickly sent to cancel Sedgwick’s attack against the Confederate left. A staffer noted that Sedgwick, confident that he would have succeeded, “is so savage about it that no one dares to go near him.” Meade was annoyed that Warren had decided on his own not to attack, but he ultimately concluded that Warren made the right decision. Warren suggested that the Confederate right might be turned if the entire Federal army attacked it, but since this would require Meade to move his supply base, he declined.
The two armies remained within striking distance of each other, with Lee refusing to withdraw in the face of superior numbers. He wrote, “Believing that the enemy would not abandon an enterprise undertaken with so great a display of force without giving battle, I was unwilling to lose the advantage of our position…” This tentative campaign continued into December.
Bibliography
- Catton, Bruce, The Army of the Potomac: A Stillness at Appomattox. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1953.
- Freeman, Douglas Southall, Lee. Scribner, (Kindle Edition), 2008.
- Hubbell, John T. (Patricia L. Faust ed.), Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War. New York: Harper & Row, 1986.
- Jaynes, Gregory, The Killing Ground: Wilderness to Cold Harbor. Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 1983.
- Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day. New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971.
- Sears, Stephen W., Lincoln’s Lieutenants: The High Command of the Army of the Potomac. Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Books, (Kindle Edition), 2017.