While the Confederate Army of Tennessee was retreating into Georgia, a detachment under Lieutenant-General James Longstreet was laying siege to Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside’s Federal Army of the Ohio at Knoxville, about 100 miles northeast. Longstreet had planned to capture Fort Sanders, formerly Fort Loudon, outside Knoxville. However, he had canceled two night assaults, and he postponed another until reinforcements under Major-General Bushrod R. Johnson arrived.
General Braxton Bragg, commanding the Army of Tennessee, had sent his chief engineer, Brigadier-General Danville Leadbetter, to inspect Longstreet’s positions. Leadbetter urged Longstreet to attack the opposite end of Knoxville, but Longstreet directed a reconnaissance that deemed the suggestion impractical. So after further delay, Longstreet again resumed his targeting of Fort Sanders.
The fort stood on high ground that made it impossible for attackers to approach without detection. The Federals strung telegraph wire among the stumps and stakes in front of the fort, marking one of the first uses of wire entanglements in warfare. The fort was also fronted by a line of entrenchments and rifle pits. Surrounding the fort was a ditch 12 feet wide and anywhere from four to 10 feet deep. The base of the fort’s parapet had been cut away, making it very difficult for an attacker to climb if he somehow overcame all the other obstacles.
After more preparation, Longstreet scheduled the attack for noon on November 28, with an artillery barrage preceding an infantry charge. However, rain delayed the action for another day, and rumors began spreading among the Confederates that Bragg had been defeated at Chattanooga. One of Longstreet’s division commanders, Major-General Lafayette McLaws, wrote him, “If we have been defeated at Chattanooga, our communications must be made with Virginia. We cannot combine again with General Bragg, even if we should be successful in our assault on Knoxville… I think we had better delay the assault until we hear the result of the battle of Chattanooga.”
Longstreet responded:
“I am entirely convinced that our only safety is in making the assault upon the enemy’s position to-morrow at daylight, and it is the more important that I should have the entire support and co-operation of the officers in this connection… It is a great mistake to suppose that there is any safety for us in going to Virginia if General Bragg has been defeated, for we leave him at the mercy of his victors, and with his army destroyed our own had better be, for we will be not only destroyed, but disgraced. There is neither safety nor honor in any other course than the one I have chosen and ordered. P.S.–The assault must be made at the time appointed, and must be made with a determination which will insure success.”
The attack would begin at dawn on the 29th, but for some reason Longstreet canceled the artillery barrage. He also ruined the element of surprise by deploying skirmishers the night before to clear the area for his sharpshooters. The Federals, sensing an attack was imminent, took positions in the trenches and waited for the Confederates to approach.
In bitter cold, three Confederate infantry brigades advanced at 6 a.m. on the 29th. Confederate sharpshooters helped neutralize the Federals in the trenches, and the wires did little to delay the approach. However, the Confederates stopped at the ditch, where they were met by terrible rifle and canister fire from the fort. Some men jumped into the ditch for cover, but since they had no ladders, they had to try hoisting each other on their shoulders to reach the parapet.
After about 20 minutes, the Confederates withdrew to regroup. Longstreet did not launch a second attack. He later wrote, “After the repulse, General Burnside was so considerate as to offer a ‘flag of truce’ for time to remove our killed and wounded about his lines.” The Confederates sustained 813 casualties (129 killed, 458 wounded, and 226 captured), while the Federals lost just 13 (eight killed and five wounded) of their 440 defenders. Since the siege’s beginning, Longstreet had lost 1,142 men while Burnside lost 693.
As his men collected the casualties, Longstreet received “a telegram from the President informing me that General Bragg had been forced back by superior numbers, and ordering me to proceed to co-operate with his army.” Longstreet then received a message from Bragg through Major-General Joseph Wheeler to reunite with Bragg’s Confederates at Dalton. Longstreet wrote:
“As General Wheeler’s note indicated doubt of the feasibility of the move towards General Bragg, it occurred to me that our better course was to hold our lines about Knoxville, and in that way cause General Grant to send to its relief, and thus so reduce his force as to stop, for a time, pursuit of General Bragg… We were cut off from communication with the army at Dalton, except by an impracticable mountain route, and the railway to the north was broken up by the removal of bridges and rails for a distance of a hundred miles and more.”
Meanwhile, Major-General Ulysses S. Grant, the overall Federal commander in the region, was in the process of reinforcing Burnside at Knoxville. He had initially dispatched Major-General Gordon Granger’s Fourth Corps, which was currently at Chattanooga. Grant then ordered Major-General William T. Sherman’s Federals to join Granger’s move up to the Hiwassee River. Granger would continue moving along the Tennessee River, preventing a junction between Longstreet and Bragg along the way.
Two days passed, and Granger had not yet begun moving out. When Grant questioned him, Granger argued that moving on Knoxville would not be prudent. Grant was already unhappy with Granger because he had halted the pursuit of Bragg’s army on the night of the 25th, when the Confederates were in full panic and might have been destroyed if pressed. Assistant Secretary of War Charles A. Dana, observing operations on behalf of the War Department, reported, “Grant is very angry with Granger for misconduct in the Chattanooga battle.” Grant therefore placed Sherman in charge of relieving Knoxville.
Grant informed General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck that “knowing Sherman’s promptness and ability,” he had been put in charge of the operation. According to Grant:
“Finding that Granger had not only not started but was very reluctant to go, he having decided for himself that it was a very bad move to make, I sent word to General Sherman of the situation and directed him to march to the relief of Knoxville… I was very loath to send Sherman, because his men needed rest after their long march from Memphis and hard fighting at Chattanooga. But I had become satisfied that Burnside would not be rescued if his relief depended upon General Granger’s movements.”
The combined forces of Sherman and Granger moved out on the 29th, not yet aware that Sherman had been put in command over Granger. The forces consisted of Granger’s Fourth Corps, along with elements of the Fifteenth and Eleventh corps. They reached Cleveland on the 29th, foraging in the countryside along the way. The next day, they marched to Charleston, where the Chattanooga & Knoxville Railroad crossed the Hiawassee River. Sherman received notice of the command change on the 30th:
“News are received from Knoxville to the morning of the 27th. At that time the place was still invested, but the attack on it was not vigorous. Longstreet evidently determined to starve the garrison out. Granger is on the way to Burnside’s relief, but I have lost all faith in his energy or capacity to manage an expedition of the importance of this one. I am inclined to think, therefore, I shall have to send you. Push as rapidly as you can to the Hiawassee, and determine for yourself what force to take with you from that point. Granger has his corps with him, from which you will select in conjunction with the force now with you. In plain words, you will assume command of all the forces now moving up the Tennessee, including the garrison at Kingston, and from that force, organize what you deem proper to relieve Burnside. The balance send back to Chattanooga. Granger has a boat loaded with provisions, which you can issue, and return the boat. I will have another loaded, to follow you. Use, of course, as sparingly as possible from the rations taken with you, and subsist off the country all you can.”
As the month ended, Sherman was preparing to link with Burnside and drive Longstreet out of Tennessee.
Bibliography
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- Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative: Fredericksburg to Meridian. New York: Vintage Civil War Library, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group (Kindle Edition), 2011.
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- Korn, Jerry, The Fight for Chattanooga: Chickamauga to Missionary Ridge. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983.
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- Woodworth, Steven E., Nothing but Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865. New York: Vintage Civil War Library, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. Kindle Edition, 2005.
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