By the morning of May 10, General Robert E. Lee’s Confederate Army of Northern Virginia was strongly entrenched around Spotsylvania Court House, with the line shaped like an upside-down L:
- Lieutenant-General Richard H. Anderson’s First Corps held the left flank, which ran west to east
- Lieutenant-General Richard Ewell’s Second Corps held the center, which ran eastward from Anderson’s right until the line jutted northeastward in a salient known as the “Mule Shoe”
- Lieutenant-General A.P. Hill’s Third Corps (led by Major-General Jubal Early because Hill was out sick) started at the eastern face of the Mule Shoe and ran southward from there
The Federal Army of the Potomac, commanded by Major-General George G. Meade (with General-in-Chief Ulysses S. Grant in overall command), had raced to get to the vital crossroads at Spotsylvania but lost the race to Lee’s Confederates. Grant reported to Chief of Staff Henry W. Halleck at Washington, “Enemy hold our front in very strong force and evince strong determination to interpose between us and Richmond to the last. I shall take no backward step…”
The Federal line was situated as thus:
- Major-General Winfield Scott Hancock’s Second Corps held the right flank, which opposed Anderson’s corps
- Major-General Gouverneur Warren’s Fifth Corps held the center, which opposed part of Anderson’s and part of Ewell’s corps
- Brigadier-General Horatio G. Wright’s Sixth Corps held the left flank, which opposed Ewell’s corps and the Mule Shoe sector
- Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside’s Ninth Corps was supposed to be coming up to oppose Early’s corps
Grant had directed Hancock to attack in the western sector on the belief that a single Confederate division–that of Brigadier-General William Mahone–held the line there. But Lee had shifted Major-General Henry Heth’s division to join Mahone early on the 10th. Hancock successfully sent a brigade around the Confederates’ flank and into their rear, but he could not capitalize because Grant, upon learning that Mahone and Heth were now on the left, believed that Lee’s center was weak and decided to send troops to that sector instead.
Grant directed Hancock to leave a division to oppose the Confederates on the Federal right and move his remaining corps alongside Warren for a coordinated attack on Anderson’s main defenses at 5 p.m. As Hancock shifted, Heth’s Confederates attacked his lone division, pushing the Federals north of the Po River before disengaging. Meanwhile, Warren asked Meade to consent to an immediate attack without waiting for Hancock or the 5 p.m. scheduled time; Warren wanted to prove his aggressiveness after Meade accused him of losing his nerve two days ago. Meade consented.
Warren’s Federals advanced through unforgiving forest and brush before meeting fire from Anderson’s Confederates. Warren was forced to order a withdrawal, and Meade rescheduled the Warren-Hancock attack for 6 p.m. This attack was also repulsed, with the two failed assaults costing the Federals about 3,000 casualties.
During this time, Wright reconnoitered the Mule Shoe farther east and determined it to be vulnerable to attack. He assigned Colonel Emory Upton, a young brigade commander who had developed a theory that entrenched defenders could be defeated by tightly compacted attackers, to lead 12 regiments (about 5,000 men) in an attack on the salient. Upton’s plan was to charge the Confederate works with bayonets, and once they were taken, Federal reinforcements would pour in and spread along the line. He was to be supported by a division in his rear, and Burnside’s Ninth Corps attacking the Confederate right.
Upton compacted three regiments into four lines and had them fix bayonets. The Federals charged across 200 yards of open field, holding their fire so they could move at maximum speed. They penetrated the line just as Upton expected. He later wrote, “Like a resistless wave, the column poured over the works, putting hors de combat those who resisted, and sending to the rear those who surrendered.”
Upton expected Brigadier-General Gersham Mott’s division to support him once his troops broke through. But Mott was driven off by Confederate artillery, leaving Upton’s men isolated in the enemy trenches. Lee personally shifted troops from his right to counterattack; when the men shouted for him to return to safety, Lee said he would only if they drove the Federals out. The Confederates did, closing the gap and securing the line once more.
Burnside, unaware he faced just a single division, stopped and dug trenches after coming under fire (Grant later blamed himself for not knowing Burnside’s situation and ordering him to advance). Upton lost a quarter of his men, but he took about 1,000 prisoners. Grant noted, “Upton had gained an important advantage, but a lack in others of the spirit and dash possessed by him lost it to us.” Grant used the authority given him to promote officers in the field by making Upton a brigadier-general.
Grant discussed the Mule Shoe attack with Meade and remarked, “A brigade today–we’ll try a corps tomorrow.” Meade was encouraged by Upton’s performance, but many in the army criticized that of Mott. Colonel Theodore Lyman of Meade’s staff wrote, “Mott’s men on the left behaved shamefully,” without acknowledging that part of the reason why Mott’s men may have been hesitant to attack was because their division had been nearly shattered in the Wilderness. Wright told Meade, “General, I don’t want Mott’s men on my left. They are not a support; I would rather have no troops there.” Meade downsized Mott’s division to a brigade and transferred it to another sector.
Lee feared that the Federal attack on the Mule Shoe was a sign of things to come. He wrote Ewell that night, “It will be necessary for you to reestablish your whole line tonight. Set the officers to work to collect and refresh their men and have everything ready for the renewal of the conflict tomorrow.”
Lee reported that night, “Thanks to a merciful Providence, our casualties have been small.” President Jefferson Davis had been anxiously awaiting news from both this front and the one to the south, where Major-General Benjamin F. Butler’s Federal Army of the James was threatening both the capital and Petersburg. Major-General Philip Sheridan’s Federal Cavalry Corps had also been detached to threaten Richmond. Davis pledged to try sending reinforcements to Lee, but “we have been sorely pressed by enemy on south side. Are now threatened by the cavalry…”
Combat was suspended the next day due to rain. As Lee and his subordinates assessed their situation, Lee took exception to an aide accusing Grant of butchery: “I think General Grant has managed his affairs remarkably well up to the present time.” Receiving intelligence that Federal wagons were moving to the rear, Lee guessed that Grant was pulling back toward Fredericksburg. As such, he pulled 22 guns out of the Mule Shoe salient, unaware that this was the exact point that Grant planned to attack the next day.
Lee then issued orders: “I wish you to have everything in readiness to pull out at a moment’s notice… We must attack those people if they retreat.” When A.P. Hill suggested staying put and letting the Federals continue their futile attacks on the Confederate defenses, Lee replied, “The army cannot stand a siege, we must end this business on the battlefield, not in a fortified place.”
On the morning of the 11th, Meade wrote his wife, “We have been fighting continuously for Six days, and have gotten I think decidedly the better of the enemy… I am quite well & in good spirits.” Meade issued orders for troops whose three-year enlistments were about to expire to be put to work escorting wagon trains of wounded men to Fredericksburg.
Grant had breakfast with his political benefactor, Congressman Elihu Washburne of Illinois. Before returning to Washington, Washburne told Grant that President Abraham Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton “would be deeply gratified if I could carry a message from you giving what encouragement you can as to the situation.” Grant wrote:
“We have now ended our sixth day of very hard fighting. The result up to this time is much in our favor. But our losses have been heavy, as well as those of the enemy. We have lost to this time 11 general officers, killed, wounded, and missing, and probably 20,000 men. I think the loss of the enemy must be greater, we having taken over 4,000 prisoners in battle, while he has taken but few, except stragglers. I am satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only kept up to the mark by the greatest exertions on the part of their officers and by keeping them intrenched in every position they take. I am now sending back to Belle Plain all my wagons for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer.”
This message, particularly the last line, caused a sensation both in Washington and throughout the North. When Lincoln read this and other dispatches, he told his secretary John Hay, “How near we have been to this thing before and failed. I believe if any other General had been at the Head of that army it would have now been on this side of the Rapidan. It is the dogged pertinacity of Grant that wins.”
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