The Battle of the North Anna

On the morning of May 23, General Robert E. Lee reunited his Confederate Army of Northern Virginia when Lieutenant-General A.P. Hill’s Third Corps arrived. Lee arranged the forces to defend both the Confederate capital of Richmond and the vital railroad intersection at Hanover Junction:

  • Hill’s corps held the army’s left flank, extending northwest
  • Lieutenant-General Richard Ewell’s Second Corps held the right flank, extending east
  • Major-General Richard H. Anderson’s First Corps held the center, which curled along the North Anna
  • Confederates from both Ewell’s and Anderson’s corps guarded Hanover Junction
  • Confederates under Major-Generals John C. Breckinridge and George Pickett were in reserve

Meanwhile, Major-General George G. Meade’s Federal Army of the Potomac began gathering near Mount Carmel Church, about a mile north of the North Anna on the Telegraph Road. Federal General-in-Chief Ulysses S. Grant issued orders:

  • Major-General Gouverneur Warren’s Fifth Corps would move west and cross the North Anna at Jericho Mills
  • Major-General Winfield Scott Hancock’s Second Corps would move south down the Telegraph Road and cross the North Anna using the Chesterfield Bridge
  • Major-General Horatio G. Wright’s Sixth Corps would follow Warren
  • Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside’s Ninth Corps would follow Hancock

The two armies were almost completely disengaged from each other for the first time in almost three weeks. Meade proposed staying disengaged by moving the Federals farther to the southeast and crossing the Pamunkey River at Hanover Town. Grant argued against this because the primary objective of this campaign was to destroy Lee’s army, and the longer they stayed disengaged the more time Lee would have to back into Richmond’s strong defenses.

While at Mount Carmel Church, the intense rivalry between Meade’s Potomac army in the east and Major-General William T. Sherman’s armies in the west came to the surface. Charles A. Dana, observing the campaign on behalf of the War Department, read a message from Sherman to Meade and his staff: “The army of the West having fought, could now afford to manoeuvre, and that, if his (Grant’s) inspiration could make the Army of the Potomac do its share, success would crown our efforts.”

Colonel Theodore Lyman wrote that Meade “got awfully mad,” and his “grey eyes grew like a rattlesnake’s” as he said, “in a voice like cutting an iron bar with a handsaw: ‘Sir! I consider that despatch an insult to the army I command and to me personally. The Army of the Potomac does not require General Grant’s inspiration or anybody else’s inspiration to make it fight!’”

Meanwhile, Lee continued arranging his defenses. He did not expect a confrontation; he guessed that any activity in his front would be just a diversion for another effort by Grant to move southeast around the Confederate right flank. Lee wrote his wife that Grant had “become tired of forcing his passage through us.” As such, only a small Confederate force guarded Chesterfield Bridge, and all other crossings on the line were undefended. Moreover, Lee was suffering from exhaustion and acute diarrhea, making him unable to ride his horse. This gave Grant a great opportunity to smash through Lee’s army if he brought his full force to bear.

Confederate Gen R.E. Lee | Image Credit: Wikispaces.com

Lee wrote to President Jefferson Davis regarding General P.G.T. Beauregard’s idea to unite his Confederates below Richmond with Lee’s. Lee wrote, “I am in a position to move against him (Grant), and shall endeavor to engage him while in motion… I should be very glad to have the aid of General Beauregard in such a blow, and if it is possible to combine, I think it will succeed.”

The Confederates rested during the day, but due to dwindling supplies, the men received just a pint of cornmeal and a quarter-pound of bacon. They were unaware that the Federals were approaching. On the Confederate left, Warren’s men finally found the undefended Jericho Mills after getting lost in the woods, and the three divisions were across the North Anna by around 4:30 p.m.

Based on the ease in which he crossed, Warren reported to headquarters, “I do not believe the enemy intends holding the North Anna.” Meade ordered Warren to establish a beachhead on the southern bank and build defenses. Learning that the Confederates were guarding the Virginia Central Railroad ahead, Warren deployed his men in line of battle and advanced.

Lee received word that Federals had crossed on his left flank, but he still believed that this was either just a scouting expedition or a ruse. He directed A.P. Hill to dispatch just one division, under Major-General Cadmus M. Wilcox, with artillery support to meet the threat. The Confederates were outnumbered five-to-two (i.e., 15,000 to 6,000).

Wilcox’s Confederates attacked the surprised Federals around 6 p.m. and nearly broke their line. However, the Federals regrouped, and their artillery atop a bluff overlooking the North Anna held the Confederates at bay. Warren’s overwhelming forces began flanking Wilcox, who ordered a withdrawal when no reinforcements were forthcoming.

Warren sustained 377 casualties while Wilcox lost 730. Warren’s men built defenses on their beachhead at Jericho Mills. Lee admonished Hill for failing to bring up the rest of his corps to support Wilcox: “General Hill, why did you let those people cross here? Why didn’t you throw your whole force on them and drive them back as (‘Stonewall’) Jackson would have done?”

Action near the North Anna on 23 May | Image Credit: American Battlefield Trust

To the southeast, Hancock’s corps approached Chesterfield Bridge. Hancock dispatched a probing force, and then reported upon their return, “No crossing of the river can be forced here at present, as all accounts agree that the enemy are in force, and there is a creek between us and the river, with obstacles.” Hancock deployed his artillery, and a two-hour cannon duel ensued. Lee was nearly killed by a cannonball that lodged in the door of the house where he was observing the action.

When the duel ended, Hancock ordered an attack. Quickly overwhelmed, the Confederates fled across the bridge to the south bank. Grant later wrote, “The bridge was carried quickly, the enemy retreating over it so hastily that many were shoved into the river, and some of them were drowned.” Federal sharpshooters prevented the Confederates from burning the bridge after crossing, and Confederate artillery fire prevented Hancock’s men from crossing the bridge. The Federals dug entrenchments on the northern bank instead.

That night, Wright’s Sixth Corps arrived on the opposite bank in support of Warren. Burnside’s Ninth Corps came up on Wright’s left near Ox Ford, and Hancock remained entrenched in front of Chesterfield Bridge to Burnside’s left.

Lee finally realized that a major engagement was developing, and he would not give up Hanover Junction without a fight. He worked with his engineers through the night to establish an inverted V-shaped line. The apex was at Ox Ford, with the left extending southwest and the right extending southeast to Hanover Junction.

As the Confederates formed this new line, it appeared to the Federals as if they were retreating and leaving just a token force at Ox Ford. But if Grant tried to attack that point, the two sides of the inverted V could split his army. A.P. Hill’s corps would hold Warren and Wright at Jericho Mills, while Anderson and Ewell faced Burnside and Hancock at Ox Ford and Chesterfield Bridge. Breckinridge and Pickett remained in reserve. Lee said of Grant, “If I can get one more pull at him, I will defeat him.”


Bibliography

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  • Davis, Jefferson, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government: All Volumes. Heraklion Press, Kindle Edition 2013, 1889.
  • Jaynes, Gregory, The Killing Ground: Wilderness to Cold Harbor. Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 1983.
  • Jensen, Les D. (Patricia L. Faust ed.), Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War. New York: Harper & Row, 1986.
  • Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day. New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971.
  • Sears, Stephen W., Lincoln’s Lieutenants: The High Command of the Army of the Potomac. Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Books, (Kindle Edition), 2017.
  • Wert, Jeffry D. (Patricia L. Faust ed.), Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War. New York: Harper & Row, 1986.

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