The Battle of New Hope Church

By the morning of May 25, two corps of General Joseph E. Johnston’s Confederate Army of Tennessee–those of Lieutenant-Generals Leonidas Polk and William Hardee–held a line centered on New Hope Church, a Methodist meetinghouse near a crossroads about four miles northeast of Dallas. Polk’s troops were on the road leading east to Marietta, and Hardee’s men lined up on Polk’s left. Johnston’s third corps under Lieutenant-General John Bell Hood came up on Polk’s right.

Major-General William T. Sherman, commanding the three Federal armies marching toward Dallas, expected Johnston to fall back to Marietta, on the Western & Atlantic Railroad. He did not expect Johnston to block him at New Hope Church. Sherman was told that Confederates were east of Dallas, but he thought they were just part of a small force there to stall his advance.

The Federals approached Dallas from the north after marching through dense forest for two days. Brigadier-General John W. Geary’s division of Major-General Joseph Hooker’s Twentieth Corps led the advance, five miles ahead of the rest of the armies. Geary’s men began exchanging fire with Hood’s troops around 10 a.m., and Geary soon learned that the entire Confederate army was in the area.

According to Sherman: “I came up in person soon after, and as my map showed that we were near an important cross-road… I ordered General Hooker to secure it if possible that night.” Hooker summoned his other two divisions under Major-Generals Alpheus Williams and Daniel Butterfield in Geary’s support. Geary established defenses while awaiting reinforcements. At the same time, Hood gathered reinforcements as well.

Battlefield around New Hope Church | Image Credit: Wikipedia.org

The two forces faced each other until late afternoon, when Sherman finally directed Major-General George H. Thomas, commanding the Army of the Cumberland over Hooker, “Let Williams go in anywhere as soon as he gets up. I don’t see what they are waiting for in front now. There haven’t been 20 rebels there today.” Hooker arranged his three divisions in line of battle and sent them forward after 4 p.m. Sherman wrote:

“The woods were so dense, and the resistance so spirited, that Hooker could not carry the position, though the battle was noisy, and prolonged far into the night. This point, ‘New Hope,’ was the accidental intersection of the road leading from Allatoona to Dallas with that from Van Wert to Marietta, was four miles northeast of Dallas, and from the bloody fighting there for the next week was called by the soldiers ‘Hell-Hole.’”

Visibility was extremely poor as the Federals advanced through heavy brush against the strong enemy fortifications, which the Confederates used to their advantage as they fired into the attackers. Hooker’s men began running out of ammunition, and a heavy thunderstorm erupted around 7 p.m. that rendered much of the gunpowder useless. Hooker ordered a withdrawal around sundown, having sustained 1,665 casualties. Hood lost about half that total, with Major-General Alexander P. Stewart’s division having done most of the fighting.

As the rest of the Federals came up during the night, Sherman still did not believe that Johnston’s whole army was at New Hope Church. He admonished Hooker for waiting so long to attack, believing that Geary alone could have broken through the Confederate line. But Hood had been there all day, and considering he had repulsed Hooker’s entire corps, he might have destroyed Geary’s lone division.

Sherman wrote Major-General James B. McPherson, commanding the Army of the Tennessee, “I don’t believe there is anything more than Hood’s corps (at New Hope), but still Johnston may have his whole army, and we should act on that hypothesis.” The Federals therefore came up and formed a line parallel to Johnston’s and began building defenses of their own. This campaign, which had been dominated thus far by maneuvering, would now focus more upon fortifications.

As the sun rose on the 26th, the Federals and Confederates were entrenched on a muddy six-mile front. Sherman ordered a series of probes to gauge Johnston’s strength. After sporadic skirmishing all along the line, Sherman decided to try turning the Confederate right.


Bibliography

  • Bailey, Ronald H., The Battles for Atlanta: Sherman Moves East. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983.
  • Castel, Albert (Patricia L. Faust ed.), Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War. New York: Harper & Row, 1986.
  • Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative: Red River to Appomattox. New York: Vintage Civil War Library, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group (Kindle Edition), 2011.
  • Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day. New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971.
  • McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. Oxford History of the United States Book 6, Oxford University Press (Kindle Edition), 1988.
  • Sherman, William T., Memoirs of General William T. Sherman, Vol. I. New York: D. Appleton and Co. (Kindle Edition), 1889.

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