On the morning of May 25, General Robert E. Lee had his Confederate Army of Northern Virginia in strong defensive positions south of the North Anna River. The line formed an inverted “V,” with the apex at the river crossing at Ox Ford:
- The left side of the V ran southwest from Ox Ford, and was held by Lieutenant-General A.P. Hill’s Third Corps.
- The right side of the V ran southeast from Ox Ford, and was held by Major-General Richard H. Anderson’s First Corps.
- The right flank jutted eastward from the V and then southward to protect the vital railroad intersection at Hanover Junction; this was held by Lieutenant-General Richard Ewell’s Second Corps.
Major-General George G. Meade’s Federal Army of the Potomac, with General-in-Chief Ulysses S. Grant in overall command, was mostly across the North Anna on a line running roughly west-northwest to east-southeast:
- Major-General Horatio G. Wright’s Sixth Corps held the right (west) flank, opposite Hill’s Confederates.
- Major-General Gouverneur Warren’s Fifth Corps held the right-center to Wright’s left, also opposite Hill.
- Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside’s Ninth Corps held the left center to Warren’s left, opposite the apex at Ox Ford and Anderson’s Confederates.
- Major-General Winfield Scott Hancock’s Second Corps held the left (east) flank, opposite Ewell’s Confederates.
The day started with Warren probing Hill’s defenses and reporting that they were too strong to attack. Wright tried to move around Hill’s left but found that it was protected by Major-General Wade Hampton’s cavalry. Burnside and Hancock held their lines but did not try advancing any further. Skirmishing broke out at various points as Federal troops wrecked about five miles of the Virginia Central Railroad, which the Confederates used to get supplies from the Shenandoah Valley.
The Federals found no weaknesses in Lee’s line. As Brigadier-General Evander Law explained:
“Grant found himself in what may be called a military dilemma. He had cut his army in two by running it upon the point of a wedge. He could not break the point, which rested upon the river, and the attempt to force it out of place by striking on its sides must of necessity be made without much concert of action between the two wings of his army, neither of which could reinforce the other without crossing the river twice.”
That night, Grant called the first meeting of his top commanders since the campaign began. There he explained that the Federals could move against either Lee’s left (southwest) or right (south) flank. Meade argued for another movement around Lee’s right. Grant, however, called for a movement around Lee’s left. This would cut the Confederate army off from being supplied by the Shenandoah Valley, and it could also confuse Lee in such a way that he might put his army in a vulnerable position.
Grant issued orders the next day, but before the army even began mobilizing, he received word that Lee was strengthening his left flank in anticipation of just such a move. Lee wrote of Grant, “From present indication, he seems to contemplate a movement on our left flank.” Grant then changed his mind and went with Meade’s plan. Even if Lee had not suspected a move to his left, the Federals would have to cross three rivers and break away (if only temporarily) from their supply base at Port Royal to do it.
As the Federals prepared to move once more, the armies remained stationary on the 26th. Major-General Philip Sheridan’s Cavalry Corps, recently returned from its raid on Richmond, demonstrated on the Confederate left to mask the movement to the right. Lee, still bedridden from acute diarrhea, tried to discern whether the activity on his left indicated a general advance or a feint. Conflicting reports stated that Grant intended to attack both.
The Confederates were not aware that Grant intended to move east of the Pamunkey River to Hanovertown. Reaching this abandoned port would place the Federals just 15 miles northeast of Richmond. Grant sent the Federal train on pontoon bridges to Fort Monroe “in readiness to proceed up the James River.” This was the first indication that Grant might take the Potomac army south of Richmond, where the Federal Army of the James was stationed near Petersburg.
The Federals began pulling out of their entrenchments that night. The corps of Hancock and Burnside stayed in place while the corps of Warren and Wright swung around them. Sheridan’s cavalry troopers led the way to Hanovertown, about 34 miles southeast.
Major operations on the North Anna River came to an end. In the four days of fighting from the 23rd through the 26th, the Federals sustained 2,623 casualties, while the Confederates lost between 1,500 and 2,000. Lee did not consider this a Confederate success because he could not draw Grant into an open battle, but his army remained between the Federals and Richmond, and Lee retained his supply line.
Grant’s forward progress had been stopped a third time by Lee, and while Grant had skirted around Lee’s right the first two times, he was now deep in enemy territory and running out of room to continue that maneuver. Grant explained the purpose of his movement to Chief of Staff Henry W. Halleck on the night of the 26th:
“To make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter of our men that even success would not justify. To turn the enemy by his right, between the two Annas, is impossible on account of the swamp on which his right rests. To turn him by his left leaves Little River, New Found River and South Anna River, all of them streams presenting considerable obstacles to the movement of an army, to be crossed. I have determined, therefore, to turn the enemy’s right by crossing at or near Hanover Town. This crosses all these streams at once, and leaves us where we can still draw supplies.”
Confident that he was wearing the Confederates down, Grant added perhaps too optimistically:
“Lee’s army is really whipped. The prisoners we now take show it, and the actions of his army show it unmistakably. A battle with them outside of intrenchments cannot be had. Our men feel that they have gained the morale over the enemy, and attack him with confidence. I may be mistaken but I feel that our success over Lee’s army is already assured. The promptness and rapidity with which you have forwarded reinforcements has contributed largely to the feeling of confidence inspired in our men, and to break down that of the enemy.”
Assistant Secretary of War Charles A. Dana, observing the Army of the Potomac on behalf of the War Department, echoed Grant’s sentiments in his report: “Rely upon it, the end is near as well as sure.” But the Federals would soon learn that the Confederates still had much fight left in them.
Bibliography
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- Davis, Jefferson, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government: All Volumes. Heraklion Press, Kindle Edition 2013, 1889.
- Freeman, Douglas Southall, Lee. Scribner, (Kindle Edition), 2008.
- Grant, Ulysses S., Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. New York: Da Capo Press, 1982 (original 1885, republication of 1952 edition).
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- Jensen, Les D. (Patricia L. Faust ed.), Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War. New York: Harper & Row, 1986.
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