Near May’s end, Major-General William T. Sherman had led his three Federal armies away from the Western & Atlantic Railroad in an effort to move around the left (southern) flank of General Joseph E. Johnston’s Confederate Army of Tennessee. But after inconclusive fighting at New Hope Church, Pickett’s Mill, and Dallas, Sherman opted to swing back to the northeast and reconnect with the railroad, which supplied his armies from Chattanooga.
Federal cavalry under Major-General George Stoneman seized Allatoona Pass on the railroad as the Armies of the Ohio and the Cumberland shifted northeast. Major-General James B. McPherson’s Army of the Tennessee finally disengaged from the Confederates in front of Dallas and began following the other two armies.
Johnston recognized the movement and reported, “Today the enemy is moving his forces from his right to his left. We are making a corresponding movement to our right.” Johnston believed that his army was slowly wearing down Sherman’s, despite the many retreats: “In partial engagements it has had great advantages, and the sum of all the combats amounts to a battle.” He was confident that he could eventually defeat Sherman by just continuing to inflict casualties while pulling him farther away from his supply base at Chattanooga.
It began raining on June 2 and continued off and on for the next few weeks. The Federals were particularly affected by the weather since they were traveling without tents. For the next two days, Johnston tried to stop the Army of the Ohio’s eastern shift. The Confederates attacked from behind rocks and forests, prompting Sherman to worry that he was being drawn into “a big Indian war.” The Federals used large amounts of ammunition while inflicting few casualties, but they finally pushed through and reached the railroad. The other two armies soon followed.
Advance Federal units reached Acworth, a railroad town south of Allatoona Pass, on the 3rd. Sherman told Major-General George H. Thomas, commanding the Army of the Cumberland, “Joe Johnston is shrewd enough to see that we have begun such a movement, and will prepare the way.”
That night, Johnston issued orders for his army to fall back from its New Hope Church-Dallas line to previously prepared entrenchments that bisected the railroad about eight miles below Acworth. Facing north, Johnston’s men held a line that connected several mountains:
- Lieutenant-General William Hardee’s corps held the left (west) on Lost Mountain and at Gilgal Church.
- Lieutenant-General Leonidas Polk’s corps held the center from Pine Mountain to the railroad.
- Lieutenant-General John Bell Hood’s corps held the right (east) across the railroad, along the base of Brush Mountain.
Behind the Confederate center was Kennesaw Mountain, through which the railroad ran. Past Kennesaw was Marietta, and then Atlanta. Sherman reported, “Kennesaw is the key to the whole country.” He arranged his three armies on a line to match Johnston’s, with Major-General John Schofield’s Army of the Ohio on the right (west), Thomas in the center, and McPherson on the left (east).
The Federals reached the railroad and began shifting around Raccoon Creek on the 4th. Sherman directed McPherson to hold Acworth by marching behind the other two Federal armies and making up the new Federal left flank. Federals held the railroad all the way down to Big Shanty, about halfway between Allatoona and Marietta. Skirmishing broke out around Pine Mountain as the Federals probed the Confederate defenses.
McPherson’s Federals advanced on the 5th to probe for enemy positions and found that the Confederates were gone. Johnston had by this time withdrawn to the new defense line along the Lost-Pine-Brush mountain chain. Sherman secured Allatoona as a new supply base as McPherson sent troops out of Acworth on the road to Marietta.
By the 8th, all of Sherman’s Federals had reached Acworth and were assembling to confront Johnston’s army in full force. Two divisions of Major-General Francis P. Blair, Jr.’s Seventeenth Corps, previously on furlough, finally arrived as reinforcement, but Sherman was forced to send some troops back to deal with Major-General Nathan Bedford Forrest’s Confederate cavalry wreaking havoc on the Federal supply line. This caused delays in Sherman’s preparations against Johnston.
On the Confederate side, it was hoped that troops from General Edmund Kirby Smith’s Trans-Mississippi Department could be rushed east to reinforce Johnston, but this was becoming increasingly unlikely. President Jefferson Davis wrote on the 9th:
“I do not think General Smith could re-enforce General Johnston in time for the battle which must be fought for Georgia. Unless General Johnston strikes before the enemy have brought up all the re-enforcements reported to be moving, his chances will be greatly diminished for the success which seemed attainable before he retreated, and still seems to be practicable.”
The Federals continued probing forward the next few days until all three armies were at Big Shanty. Railroad crews opened the line to ensure that Sherman’s 100,000 men, most of whom had been well rested over the past week, would also be well supplied. However, there were still many obstacles to overcome, as Sherman later wrote, “The rains continued to pour, and made our developments slow and dilatory, for there were no roads, and these had to be improvised by each division for its own supply-train from the depot in Big Shanty to the camps.” From here, Sherman could see Johnston’s defenses on the mountain chain:
“On each of these hills the enemy had signal-stations and fresh lines of parapets. Heavy masses of infantry could be distinctly seen with the naked eye, and it was manifest that Johnston had chosen his ground well, and with deliberation had prepared for battle; but his line was at least 10 miles in extent–too long, in my judgment, to be held successfully by his force, then estimated at 60,000. As his position, however, gave him a perfect view over our field, we had to proceed with due caution. McPherson had the left, following the railroad, which curved around the north base of Kennesaw; Thomas the centre, obliqued to the right, deploying below Kennesaw and facing Pine Hill; and Schofield, somewhat refused, was on the general right, looking south, toward Lost Mountain.”
Sherman reported to Chief of Staff Henry W. Halleck on the night of the 13th:
“We have had hard and cold rains for about 10 days. A gleam of sunshine this evening give hope of a change. The roads are insufficient here, and the fields and new ground are simply impassable to wheels. As soon as possible I will study Johnston’s position on the Kennesaw and Lost Mountains, and adopt some plan to dislodge him or draw him out of his position.”
But Sherman added, “We cannot risk the heavy loss of an assault at this distance from our base.”
Meanwhile, Johnston met with his corps commanders to discuss how they could shorten their lines because the Confederates were spread too thin. As they talked, two of Thomas’s corps moved around the base of Pine Mountain, where the Confederates were most vulnerable. Hardee, concerned that this could isolate one of his divisions on the mountain, asked Johnston to reconnoiter the movements with him. That fateful reconnaissance would take place on the 14th.
Bibliography
- Bailey, Ronald H., The Battles for Atlanta: Sherman Moves East. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983.
- Davis, Jefferson, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government: All Volumes. Heraklion Press, Kindle Edition 2013, 1889.
- Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative: Red River to Appomattox. New York: Vintage Civil War Library, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group (Kindle Edition), 2011.
- Johnston, Joseph E., Narrative of Military Operations During the Civil War. Sharpe Books, Kindle Edition, 2014.
- Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day. New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971.
- Pollard, Edward A., Southern History of the War (facsimile of the 1866 edition). New York: Fairfax Press, 1990.
- Sherman, William T., Memoirs of General William T. Sherman, Vol. I. New York: D. Appleton and Co. (Kindle Edition), 1889.
- Woodworth, Steven E., Nothing but Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865. New York: Vintage Civil War Library, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. Kindle Edition, 2005.