Before dawn, General-in-Chief Ulysses S. Grant, the overall Federal commander of Major-General George G. Meade’s Army of the Potomac, concentrated three Federal corps on a north-south line in front of New Cold Harbor:
- Major-General William F. “Baldy” Smith’s Eighteenth Corps from the Army of the James held the right (north)
- Major-General Horatio G. Wright’s Sixth Corps held the center
- Major-General Winfield Scott Hancock’s Second Corps held the left (south)
- Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside’s Ninth Corps held the extreme Federal right a few miles north at Bethesda Church
- Major-General Gouverneur Warren’s Fifth Corps was on Burnside’s left, moving south to join Smith’s right
General Robert E. Lee had hurriedly assembled the bulk of his Confederate Army of Northern Virginia behind virtually impregnable defenses in front (east) of New Cold Harbor:
- Lieutenant-General Richard H. Anderson’s First Corps held the left (north), which included Major-General Robert F. Hoke’s recently transferred Confederates
- Major-General John C. Breckinridge’s Confederates from the Shenandoah Valley held the center
- Lieutenant-General A.P. Hill’s Third Corps held the right (south)
- Lieutenant-General Jubal Early’s Second Corps opposed Burnside’s Federals to the north
Grant had been moving southeast against Lee’s right flank for nearly a month, but with the Chickahominy River now to his left, Grant was out of room. He therefore directed Meade to launch an all-out assault intended to overwhelm Lee’s defenders and open the road to the Confederate capital of Richmond. Grant left the specifics of the attack to Meade, who in turn left it to his corps commanders.
But the Federal attack that was supposed to have taken place on the morning of June 2 was delayed 24 hours. This gave Lee more than enough time to build some of strongest defensive works of the war. A correspondent described them as “intricate, zig-zagged lines within lines, lines protecting flanks of lines, lines built to enfilade opposing lines… works within works and works without works.” Grant ordered the Federals to reconnoiter the enemy lines before the attack, but this was not done thoroughly enough to identify such strong defenses.
Federal bugles sounded at 4:30 a.m., and the assault began when about 60,000 men began advancing in double-lines over open ground toward the waiting Confederates. As the Federals marched to within 50 yards, they became easy targets. The Confederates opened a murderous volley so loud that it could be heard in Richmond.
On the Federal left, a division of Hancock’s corps managed to capture an advanced position, but the Confederates quickly drove them off in savage hand-to-hand fighting. A Federal gunner wrote that the enemy fire “had the fury of the Wilderness musketry with the thunders of the Gettysburg artillery super-added. It was simply terrific.”
Hancock wrote Meade at 6 a.m., “I shall await your orders, but express the opinion that if the first dash in an assault fails, other attempts are not apt to succeed better.” Meade ordered him to renew the assault, but Hancock reported that “division commanders do not speak encouragingly of the prospect of success since the original attacks failed. Unless success has been gained in other points, I do not advise persistence here.”
In the center, Wright’s line became jumbled in heavy underbrush and thickets. One of Wright’s divisions “carries their first line but is in a very exposed position,” while another “cannot succeed on his front.” A soldier wrote, “And all the time, there was poured from the rebel lines, which we could not see, those volleys of hurtling death.”
On the Federal right, Smith’s Federals may have gotten the worst of the fire as they emerged from a ravine and were quickly cut down by the waiting Confederates. It was reported, “The 18th Corps also got the first line but were at last obliged to come back.” An officer of the 12th New Hampshire recalled, “To give a description of this terrible charge is simply impossible, and few who were in the ranks of the 12th will ever feel like attempting it. To those exposed to the full force and fury of that dreadful storm of lead and iron that met the charging column, it seemed more like a volcanic blast than a battle, and was just about as destructive.”
A Federal officer wrote, “The men bent down as they pushed forward, as if trying, as they were, to breast a tempest, and the files of men went down like rows of blocks or bricks pushed over by striking against one another.” A soldier added, “We felt it was murder, not war, or at best a very serious mistake had been made.” The fight in the Cold Harbor sector of the line was over within 30 minutes.
Farther north, Warren stopped his movement to Smith’s right; this enabled Confederate artillerists to turn all their guns on Smith’s men. Burnside’s Federals advanced and drove enemy skirmishers off, but Burnside thought he had penetrated the first Confederate defense line and ordered a halt to regroup. He planned to renew the assault that afternoon.
Meade wrote Grant, “I should be glad to have your views as to the continuance of these attacks, if unsuccessful.” Grant replied, “The moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed, suspend the offensive, but when one does succeed push it vigorously, and if necessary pile in troops at the successful point wherever they can be taken…”
But the Federals all along the line were stopped by 7 a.m. Grant ordered a renewal wherever the enemy seemed most vulnerable, and Meade ordered the three corps on the left to attack again. Both Hancock and Smith resisted, with Smith calling a renewal a “wanton waste of life.” Wright’s men remained pinned down in the center. A New Hampshire captain spoke for many officers by saying, “I will not take my regiment in another such charge if Jesus Christ himself should order it!”
Grant rode up to assess the situation with the corps commanders around noon and realized that no success could be gained. He wrote Meade at 12:30 p.m.:
“The opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case an assault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of farther advance for the present. Hold our most advanced positions and strengthen them… Wright and Hancock should be ready to assault in case the enemy should break through General Smith’s lines, and all should be ready to resist an assault.”
Grant understated the repulse in an update to Chief of Staff Henry W. Halleck: “We assaulted at 4:30 o’clock this morning, driving the enemy within his entrenchments at all points but without gaining any decisive advantage. Our troops now occupy a position close to the enemy, some places within 50 yards, and are entrenching. Our loss was not severe, nor do I suppose the enemy have lost heavily.”
This was the most lopsided Federal defeat since the ill-fated assault on Marye’s Heights at Fredericksburg. The Federals sustained 7,000 casualties, while the Confederates lost less than 1,500. Lee telegraphed Richmond, “So far every attack has been repulsed.”
President Jefferson Davis and other officials rode out from the capital to the battlefield. Postmaster General John Reagan asked Lee, “General, if the enemy breaks your line, what reserve have you?” Lee responded, “Not a regiment, and that has been my condition ever since the fighting commenced on the Rappahannock. If I shorten my lines to provide a reserve, he will turn me; if I weaken my lines to provide a reserve, he will break them.”
After Davis returned from the battlefield, he received a dispatch that Lee sent to Secretary of War James A. Seddon: “Our loss today has been small, and our success, under the blessing of God, all that we could expect.” While Cold Harbor was a resounding Confederate victory, continuous fighting over the past month had depleted the Army of Northern Virginia, and Richmond remained in grave danger.
That night, Grant told his staff, “I regret this assault more than any one I ever ordered.” He later wrote, “I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made… no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed, the advantages other than those of relative losses, were on the Confederate side.”
Ordering the Federal assault had been a mistake, but Grant based his decision partly on the fact that he had ordered a similar attack at Missionary Ridge during the Battle of Chattanooga which had succeeded. Also, Grant was hoping for a quick breakthrough to Richmond in answer to northern rumblings about the growing cost of the war, which was bound to influence on the upcoming presidential election.
Ultimately Grant was not discouraged. He wrote his wife Julia, “This is likely to prove a very tedious job I have on hand, but I feel very confident of ultimate success.” Meade told his wife, “Be not over-elated by reported successes, nor over-depressed by exaggerated rumors of failures. Up to this time our success has consisted only in compelling the enemy to draw in towards Richmond; our failure has been that we have not been able to overcome, destroy or bag his army.”
Since arriving at Cold Harbor on June 1, the Army of the Potomac had lost about 12,000 men. Since opening the spring offensive last month, Federal losses exceeded 50,000 killed, wounded, or missing. Charles Francis Adams, Jr. declared that the Federal army “has literally marched in blood and agony from the Rapidan to the James.” The Federals still alive in front of the Confederate works dug makeshift trenches to make themselves harder targets for sharpshooters. A soldier wrote his parents, “If there is ever again any rejoicing in the world it will be when this war is over. One who has never been under fire has no idea of war.”
People in the North began to openly question Grant’s leadership, with some even denouncing him as a “butcher.” But this did not deter Grant from planning his next move. He told Meade to stop work on the York River Railroad, which was being used to supply the troops from their base at White House. This was because Grant was looking to develop a new strategy that even Lee did not anticipate.
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