The Second Battle of Petersburg

Federal cavalry and infantry from Major-General Benjamin F. Butler’s Army of the James prepared to move on Petersburg, the key railroad city 22 miles south of the Confederate capital of Richmond. The attacking force numbered about 10,000 men and consisted of:

  • Two divisions from Major-General William F. “Baldy” Smith’s Eighteenth Corps
  • Brigadier-General Edward W. Hinks’s division of U.S. Colored Troops
  • Brigadier-General August V. Kautz’s cavalry division

Smith was to command this attack force. He was to follow the same line of advance on Petersburg that was used in the failed assault of June 9. Smith’s force was to be supported by Major-General Winfield Scott Hancock’s Second Corps from the Army of the Potomac, having recently crossed to the south side of the James River.

Just 2,200 Confederates defended Petersburg under Brigadier-General Henry A. Wise. They held works known as the Dimmock Line, which ran east of the city and consisted of breastworks and trenches 20 feet thick, with 55 artillery redans. Sixteen batteries ran from Battery 1 on the Appomattox River in the north to Battery 16 three miles to the south. Since Wise did not have enough men to hold the entire line, he concentrated his force in the northeastern sector. Wise’s department commander, General P.G.T. Beauregard, scrambled to transfer troops from Bermuda Hundred and collect reinforcements from General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia.

This was the greatest opportunity the Federals would ever have to destroy the Confederate army in Virginia. The bulk of Lee’s force was still north of the James, unaware that the entire Army of the Potomac was crossing to target Petersburg. If they moved quickly, the Federals could easily overwhelm the token force guarding Petersburg and capture the town, which would force the remaining Confederates around Richmond to either starve or surrender. A decisive strike had an excellent chance to end the war.

Kautz’s troopers rode out as planned on the morning of the 15th, but they were delayed in trying to cross the Appomattox on a pontoon bridge. Once across, they met unexpected Confederate resistance northeast of Petersburg. The Federals were held up for two hours, during which Kautz decided that “our line was really weaker than the enemy’s in men.” Kautz withdrew just as he had done on the 9th, leaving the infantry to make the main assault on Petersburg without cavalry support.

Hinks’s division of untested U.S. Colored Troops was the first to arrive. The men made two assaults and captured a cannon. Captain Charles F. Adams, Jr. recalled that several men in the division had vowed to avenge Fort Pillow, where Confederates had allegedly murdered black soldiers. Adams wrote, “The darkies fought ferociously. If they murder prisoners, as I hear they did… they can hardly be blamed.”

Smith’s other two infantry divisions joined Hinks and they advanced on the Dimmock Line northeast of Petersburg around noon. Smith quickly assessed that these defenses were much stronger than those he had reconnoitered at Chattanooga. They were even stronger than Cold Harbor, where Smith saw many of his men shot down 12 days ago. He therefore ordered a reconnaissance before attacking, unaware that even though the defenses were formidable, he outnumbered the defenders nearly five-to-one.

Smith was exhausted from the night march to Petersburg and afflicted with “the effects of bad water, and malaria brought from Cold Harbor.” He also had no adequate engineer officer to coordinate the reconnaissance, so the operation was not completed until after 3 p.m.

Meanwhile, Beauregard warned Chief of Staff Braxton Bragg that if he was not reinforced, he could lose his line on Bermuda Hundred, Battery Dantzler (which was under construction), or Petersburg itself. Beauregard ordered Major-General Robert F. Hoke to take his division from Drewry’s Bluff to Petersburg. When Beauregard learned that the Federals had reached the Dimmock Line, he told Bragg at 11:45 a.m., “We must now elect between lines of Bermuda Neck and Petersburg. We cannot hold both.”

Bragg left the decision as to which to defend to Beauregard, who opted to defend Petersburg. He ordered Major-General Bushrod R. Johnson, whose division held the Bermuda Hundred line, to leave a picket line and take the rest of his troops west to Petersburg. Beauregard wrote at 1:45 p.m., “I did not ask advice with regard to the movement of troops, but wished to know the preference of the War Department between Petersburg and lines across Bermuda Hundred neck, for my guidance, as I fear my present force may prove unequal to hold both.”

Smith wrote Hancock, whose Second Corps was supposed to have come up and join him in the attack, at 4 p.m.: “If the Second Corps can come up in time to make an assault tonight after dark in vicinity of Norfolk and Petersburg railroad (i.e., the Federal left), I think we may be successful.” Smith noted that Hancock needed to hurry because Lee’s Confederates were rushing to reinforce Petersburg.

Hancock, unaware that reinforcing Smith required urgency, did not get his Federals moving until around 10:30 a.m. And when he did get moving, he reported that he “spent the best hours of the day on the 15th in marching by an incorrect map in search of a designated position which, as described, was not in existence or could not be found.” Hancock received orders directly from General-in-Chief Ulysses S. Grant to hurry and join Smith’s assault at Petersburg; this finally told Hancock exactly where to go and why. He hurried his troops along.

Smith decided to bombard the Petersburg works before launching an infantry assault. But the artillery horses were being watered and the guns were in the rear; it took two hours to bring them all forward. During this time, Beauregard was hurrying to reinforce the Dimmock Line. 

The Federal assault began at 7 p.m. Smith only sent forward skirmishers, which the Confederates would not fire on because they were expecting a large attack force to follow. According to Brigadier-General E. Porter Alexander, the chief Confederate artillerist, “Smith’s device was eminently successful. Our artillery would not fire at the skirmishers at all. They reserved their fire for the storming columns which they expected to follow. The skirmishers over ran and captured two redans at a salient where the line crossed the railroad to City Point, capturing about 250 prisoners and four guns.”

Fighting outside Petersburg on 15 June | Image Credit: American Battlefield Trust

The Federals seized about a mile of fortifications and 16 guns; the black troops took Batteries 6 through 11 alone. This was enough to knock the Confederates out of the Dimmock line; they fell back to weaker defenses closer to Petersburg along Harrison’s Creek. According to Beauregard, “Petersburg at that hour was clearly at the mercy of the Federal commander, who had all but captured it.”

Hinks requested permission to lead his division into Petersburg; night had fallen but there was a full moon and clear skies. Butler assured Smith that Lee’s Confederates had not “passed down the railroad to harm you yet.” Others urged Smith to use the bright moonlight to renew the assault, but he declined, believing that reinforcements “were already pouring into the town.” Smith telegraphed Butler, “Unless I misapprehend the topography, I hold the key to Petersburg.”

Hancock arrived on the scene around 9 p.m. and told Smith that two divisions of the Second Corps were at his disposal, depending on “his judgment and knowledge of the field.” Although he outranked Smith, Hancock was unsure of his orders and unaware of how vulnerable Petersburg was. He therefore deferred to Smith’s judgment and agreed to wait until tomorrow to attack. One of Hancock’s soldiers recalled, “The rage of the intelligent enlisted men was devilish. The most blood-curdling blasphemy I ever listened to I heard that night, uttered by the men who knew they were to be sacrificed on the morrow. The whole corps was furiously excited.”

Beauregard planned to send Hoke’s Confederates in a night attack to regain the sectors of the Dimmock Line that had been lost, but he relented when he saw how exhausted Hoke’s men were by their march from Drewry’s Bluff. After midnight, Beauregard transferred the rest of Johnson’s division from Bermuda Hundred to Petersburg. Beauregard resolved to wait until Johnson’s men arrived before launching a counterattack. Johnson’s withdrawal from Bermuda Hundred left Butler free to move the rest of his army between Richmond and Petersburg, but he did not.

The Confederates from Bermuda Hundred and those from Lee north of the James arrived during the night to increase the Petersburg defense force to about 14,000 men. One of the Federals’ greatest opportunities to starve Richmond into submission and possibly end the war was lost. Grant told Illinois Congressman Elihu Washburne, “Unless my next move brings on a battle, the balance of the campaign will settle down to a siege.”


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