Federal siege operations resumed in front of Petersburg, Virginia, after the disastrous defeat at the Crater in late July. General-in-Chief Ulysses S. Grant, the overall Federal commander, wrote to Major-General George G. Meade, commanding the Army of the Potomac, on August 1: “Have you any estimate of our losses in the miserable failure of Saturday? I think there will have to be an investigation. So fair an opportunity will probably never occur again for carrying fortifications.”
Meade blamed Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside, who commanded the operation that produced the Crater, for the debacle. As the two generals exchanged heated messages regarding the affair, both sides called a truce long enough to tend the wounded and bury the dead. Brigadier-General James Ledlie, who had been drunk in a bombproof during the battle, relinquished his division command on the 5th. He was later censured for his role in the defeat, and he resigned his commission five months later.
At the insistence of Grant and Meade, a court of inquiry convened on the 6th to investigate the Crater fiasco. The officers of the court were Meade allies and mostly hostile toward Burnside and his Ninth Corps. Meade wanted him court-martialed, but before the court even adjourned, Burnside went on a 30-day leave. Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Lyman of Meade’s staff wrote that Burnside’s leave “will extend itself, I fancy, so far as this army goes.”
Lyman was right. Burnside’s later request to return to the Potomac army was rejected, as Meade said, “I don’t care where he goes, so as he is not in my army.” Placed on “extended leave,” Burnside never returned to active duty. His chief of staff, Major-General John G. Parke, took over the Ninth Corps. In later testimony to the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, Grant said of the Crater:
“I think if I had been a corps commander, and had had that in charge, I would have been down there and would have seen that it was done right; or, if I had been the commander of the division that had to take the lead, I think I would have gone in with my division … I think the cause of the disaster was simply the leaving the passage of orders from one to another down to an inefficient man. I blame his seniors also for not seeing that he did his duty, all the way up to myself.”
Grant did not wait long before once more seeking new ways to get around the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia in front of Petersburg and Richmond. He had been slowly extending the Federal siege line to the south and southwest of Petersburg, but after the Crater defeat, Grant would take extra care in avoiding any direct confrontations. President Jefferson Davis told General Robert E. Lee, commanding the Confederate defenders, “It is thought idle to attack your entrenchments but feasible to starve you out.”
Major-General Benjamin F. Butler, commanding the Federal Army of the James pinned down at Bermuda Hundred, devised a plan to break his men out by building a canal across Dutch Gap, a 174-yard-wide neck of land in a bend in the James River. This would allow ships to bypass five miles of Confederate batteries and water impediments at Trent’s Reach and Drewry’s Bluff, thereby giving the Federals a clear shot at Richmond.
Federal troops, including many black soldiers, began digging under enemy artillery and sniper fire. Grant had little faith that the canal would work, but he let Butler go on with it because he was a troublesome political general, and this would keep him busy. The brutal project lasted until the end of the year, and the canal was not officially completed until the war ended. After the war, the Dutch Gap Canal became a useful shipping channel on the James.
As Butler’s men worked, Grant received word that Lee had weakened his army by sending reinforcements to Lieutenant-General Jubal Early’s army in the Shenandoah Valley. Grant was told “that it was understood that three divisions of infantry went to Early in the first part of the week. Great secrecy was observed in the movement, and the troops were taken through the city mostly in the night.”
Learning that the troops were from Lieutenant-General Richard H. Anderson’s corps stationed north of the James, Grant reported, “The enemy has sent north two if not three divisions of infantry, twenty-three pieces of artillery, and one division of cavalry.” Grant thought that Lee had sent Anderson’s entire corps, which would mean that no more than 8,500 Confederates remained in front of Richmond. But Lee had really sent just one infantry and one cavalry division, leaving the Richmond defenses more heavily guarded than Grant thought.
Grant assigned three units to confront the Confederates north of the James, all under the command of Major-General Winfield Scott Hancock:
- Hancock’s Second Corps from the Army of the Potomac, now under Brigadier-General Francis Barlow
- Major-General James B. Birney’s Tenth Corps from the Army of the James
- Brigadier-General David M. Gregg’s Second Division of the Cavalry Corps/Army of the Potomac
This attack force was to probe the Confederate defenses around Richmond in search of a possible weak point that would allow for a breakthrough. The cavalry, like in the first raid against Richmond in July, was to ride around the capital and target the Virginia Central Railroad, which supplied the city and its defenders from the fertile Shenandoah Valley.
Meanwhile, the Federals remaining below the James were to also probe for weaknesses. If no breakthrough could be made, the left flank of the Federal siege line (consisting of Major-General Gouverneur Warren’s Fifth Corps) was to attempt to cut the Weldon Railroad, which supplied Petersburg and its defenders from the port of Wilmington, North Carolina.
The commands of Birney and Gregg crossed the James at Bermuda Hundred on the night of the 13th. Barlow’s men were loaded on transports to deceive the Confederates into thinking they were going to Washington. They would then be brought back to reinforce Birney and Gregg. Their target was Deep Bottom Run, 10 miles southeast of Richmond. Grant explained to Meade, “If the enemy are reduced as much in numbers as we have reason to believe they are, Hancock’s movements tomorrow may lead to almost the entire abandonment of Petersburg. Have this watched as closely as you can, and if you find this view realized, take such advantage of it as you deem best.”
Bibliography
- Bearss, Edwin C. with Suderow, Bryce, The Petersburg Campaign: The Eastern Front Battles, June-August 1864, Volume I. El Dorado Hills, Calif.: Savas Beattie LLC; Casemate Publishers, Kindle Edition, 2012.
- Catton, Bruce, Grant Takes Command. Open Road Media, Kindle Edition, 2015.
- Davis, William C., Death in the Trenches: Grant at Petersburg. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983.
- Freeman, Douglas Southall, Lee. Scribner, (Kindle Edition), 2008.
- Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day. New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971.
- Sears, Stephen W., Lincoln’s Lieutenants: The High Command of the Army of the Potomac. Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Books, (Kindle Edition), 2017.
- Stanchak, John E. (Patricia L. Faust ed.), Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War. New York: Harper & Row, 1986.