Confederate President Jefferson Davis refused to acknowledge that the cause was lost, despite the recent surrender of the largest Confederate army. He and his cabinet-in-transit (Secretary of State Judah P. Benjamin, Navy Secretary Stephen R. Mallory, and Postmaster General John T. Reagan) met with Generals Joseph E. Johnston and P.G.T. Beauregard at the home of Colonel J. Taylor Wood in Greensboro, North Carolina, on April 12. Johnston, with Beauregard second-in-command, led the largest Confederate army still in the field. According to Johnston:
“We had supposed that we were to be questioned concerning the military resources of our department, in connection with the question of continuing or terminating the war. But the President’s object seemed to be to give, not to obtain information; for, addressing the party, he said that in two or three weeks he would have a large army in the field by bringing back into the ranks those who had abandoned them in less desperate circumstances, and by calling out the enrolled men whom the conscript bureau with its forces had been unable to bring into the army.”
Johnston stated, “Neither opinions nor information was asked, and the conference terminated.” Secretary of War John C. Breckinridge arrived at Greensboro later that day and confirmed that Confederate General-in-Chief Robert E. Lee had surrendered the entire Army of Northern Virginia. “General Beauregard and myself,” Johnston wrote, “conversing together after the intelligence of the great disaster, reviewed the condition of our affairs, and carefully compared the resources of the belligerents, and agreed in the opinion that the Southern Confederacy was overthrown.”
After this second meeting ended, Johnston spoke with Breckinridge and reiterated that the cause was lost. Johnston “said that the only power of government left in the President’s hands was that of terminating the war, and that this power should be exercised without more delay. I also expressed my readiness to suggest to the President the absolute necessity of such action, should an opportunity to do so be given me. General Breckenridge promised to make me this opportunity.”
Davis reassembled his cabinet on the morning of the 13th, and it was soon apparent that only he and Benjamin supported continuing the fight. Johnston and Beauregard arrived at 10 a.m., and Davis repeated his announcement from yesterday. The men compared their military resources to the Federals, and Johnston later wrote:
“I represented that under such circumstances it would be the greatest of human crimes for us to attempt to continue the war; for, having neither money nor credit, nor arms but those in the hands of our soldiers, nor ammunition but that in their cartridge-boxes, nor shops for repairing arms or fixing ammunition, the effect of our keeping the field would be, not to harm the enemy, but to complete the devastation of our country and ruin of its people. I therefore urged that the President should exercise at once the only function of government still in his possession, and open negotiations for peace.”
Davis said, “Our late disasters are terrible, but I do not think we should regard them as fatal. I think we can whip the enemy yet, if our people turn out.” The men sat silent until Davis asked for their views. Johnston spoke first: “My views are, sir, that our people are tired of war, feel themselves whipped, and will not fight.” The Confederacy was “without money, or credit, or arms, or ammunition, or means of procuring them.” Johnston continued:
“My men are, daily, deserting in large numbers, and are taking my artillery teams to aid their escape to their homes. Since Lee’s defeat, they regard the war as at an end. If I march out of North Carolina her people will all leave my ranks. It will be the same as I proceed south through South Carolina and Georgia, and I shall expect to retain no man beyond the by-road or cow-path that leads to his house. My small force is melting away like snow before the sun, and I am hopeless of recruiting it. We may, perhaps, obtain terms which we ought to accept.”
Davis turned to Beauregard, who declared, “I concur in all General Johnston has said.”
Johnston recalled Davis “replied to our suggestion as if somewhat annoyed by it. He said that it was idle to suggest that he should attempt to negotiate, when it was certain, from the attempt previously made, that his authority to treat would not be recognized, nor any terms that he might offer considered by the Government of the United States.” Johnston said that it was not unusual for military commanders to negotiate a peace, and perhaps he could do so with Major-General William T. Sherman.
Only Benjamin disagreed with Johnston’s suggestion. Davis was reluctant to approve it, but he finally said, “Well, sir, you can adopt this course, though I am not sanguine as to ultimate results.” At Johnston’s insistence, Davis dictated a letter to Mallory for Johnston’s signature:
“The results of the recent campaign in Virginia have changed the relative military condition of the belligerents. I am, therefore induced to address you, in this form, the inquiry whether, in order to stop the further effusion of blood and devastation of property, you are willing to make a temporary suspension of active operations, and to communicate to Lieutenant-General Grant, commanding the armies of the United States, the request that he will take like action in regard to other armies–the object being, to permit the civil authorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate the existing war.”
Johnston suggested confronting Sherman’s Federals at Charlotte, and if they proved too powerful, the Confederates would then retreat southwest, “with Texas as a final goal.” Davis approved this plan, believing that Johnston would adopt it regardless of whether the Federals were willing to talk peace. But Johnston intended to adopt it only if Sherman refused to negotiate. Davis arranged for Commissary General I.M. St. John to have supplies ready for the Confederates on their line of retreat.
Davis and the cabinet spent the 14th planning their route out of Greensboro to the south. Outwardly, the president was still confident that the Confederacy could win its independence. But privately his confidence wavered, as he wrote to his wife Varina at Charlotte: “I will come to you if I can. Everything is dark. You should prepare for the worst by dividing your baggage so as to move in wagons… I have lingered on the road to little purpose…”
Bibliography
- Angle, Paul M., A Pictorial History of the Civil War Years. New York: Doubleday, 1967.
- Davis, Jefferson, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government: All Volumes. Heraklion Press, Kindle Edition 2013, 1889.
- Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative: Red River to Appomattox. New York: Vintage Civil War Library, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group (Kindle Edition), 2011.
- Johnston, Joseph E., Narrative of Military Operations During the Civil War. Sharpe Books, Kindle Edition, 2014.
- Korn, Jerry, Pursuit to Appomattox: The Last Battles. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983.
- Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day. New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971.
- Longacre, Edward G. (Patricia L. Faust ed.), Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War. New York: Harper & Row, 1986.