By this month, Brigadier General Nathaniel Lyon’s Federal Army of the West had subjugated the Missouri government and pushed secessionist state militia to Missouri’s southwestern corner. However, Lyon expected a strong counterattack, and sure enough Brigadier General Ben McCulloch had combined his force of Louisianans, Texans, and Arkansans with Major General Sterling “Pap” Price’s Missouri State Guard. This 12,000-man force advanced to Crane Creek, about 30 miles below Springfield, with McCulloch as the ranking commander. McCulloch took advantage of the topography around Crane Creek by placing his men in strong defenses atop the high hills and ridges where Lyon’s Federals were expected to pass.
Lyon’s army totaled less than 6,000 men. He had asked for reinforcements but received no response from his superior, Major General John C. Fremont, at St. Louis. Fremont was more concerned about the Confederate threat in north and eastern Missouri, and he sent the bulk of his forces to those sectors. Because Lyon “had saved Missouri from secession,” Fremont essentially allowed him to command independently. This gave Lyon freedom of movement, but it cut him off from Fremont’s help. As the secessionists advanced, Lyon was outnumbered, ill-equipped, and far from his base of supply.
Lyon’s Federals moved 10 miles along the Wire road to Wilson’s Creek, south of Springfield. Lyon knew that a larger force was closing in on him, but he did not know where from. Varying reports indicated that the Confederates could be at Cassville, Carthage, or Sarcoxie.
On August 2, McCulloch sent “a thousand more or less” Confederates under Brigadier General James Rains seven miles forward to Curran Post Office and Dug Spring. Rains’s men were about eight miles from the Federals. Lyon moved his troops up to Dug Spring to meet the threat, and after dispersing a small cavalry force, both sides traded cannon fire through the woods. Rains then deployed infantry which pushed back the Federal left, but the remaining Federals held firm and sent Rains’s troops fleeing back to McCulloch at Crane Creek. McCulloch did not advance with his full force because he did not know how large Lyon’s army was. Lyon, believing he was facing 15,000 men, fell back toward Springfield.
The next day, Lyon’s men dispersed a small Confederate camp near the watering hole at Curran Post Office and made off with most of the equipment left behind. However, Lyon still could not pinpoint the location of the main enemy force, and many of his 90-day enlistments were about to expire. This would leave him with just 3,500 men. Nevertheless, Lyon opted to keep his force near the watering hole until the 4th.
At Crane Creek, General Price wanted to attack. He offered to subordinate himself and his Missouri State Guard to McCulloch if he would attack Lyon. If McCulloch would not, Price would detach his Guard and attack Lyon himself, “for it is better that they and I should perish than Missouri be abandoned without a struggle.” Price said he would launch his assault on the 5th, and he told McCulloch, “You must either fight beside us or look on at a safe distance and see us fight all alone the army you dare not attack even with our aid.”
McCulloch was reluctant to advance any further because he was already 150 miles away from his supply base in Arkansas. And the men’s green corn diet was making them sick. But then a message came from General Leonidas Polk, Confederate commander of the Western Theater, notifying McCulloch that another 12,000-man Confederate force under General Gideon Pillow was advancing on New Madrid in southeastern Missouri. Seeing the potential of trapping Lyon between Pillow and himself, McCulloch relented and ordered an advance at midnight on the 5th to surprise Lyon the following dawn.
The Confederates did not know that Lyon had conducted a grueling day-long withdrawal toward Springfield. Lyon now reported that 20,000 Confederates were confronting him, and added, “I am under the painful necessity of retreating, and can at most only hope to make my retreat good. I am in too great haste to explain more fully… Prudence seems now to indicate the necessity of withdrawing, if possible, from the country, and falling upon either Saint Louis or Kansas.” Lyon stopped on the night of the 4th near Terrell Creek, a tributary of Wilson’s Creek. Fremont finally ordered that “Montgomery’s force (the 3rd Kansas at Fort Leavenworth) join General Lyon’s command at Springfield, Missouri, immediately.”
On the morning of the 5th, McCulloch discovered that Lyon was farther away than expected. Nevertheless, he left his supplies at Crane Creek and directed a pursuit. Supply wagons slowed the Federal retreat on the Wire road. Intermittent skirmishing occurred with Lyon’s rear guard throughout the hot, humid day until McCulloch finally ordered a halt at Moody Springs, a few miles south of Wilson’s Creek. Lyon’s Federals continued on to Springfield.
McCulloch continued forward the next day and established his camp where the Telegraph road crossed Wilson’s Creek. Price continued urging an attack, and McCulloch finally decided to move up the Telegraph road and attack Lyon at Springfield, 10 miles to the northeast. He spent the 6th and 7th scouting the Federal positions and formulating his plan.
Bibliography
- Catton, Bruce and Long, E.B. (ed.), Terrible Swift Sword: Centennial History of the Civil War Book 2. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. (Kindle Edition), 1963.
- Cutrer, Thomas W., Theater of a Separate War: The Civil War West of the Mississippi River. The University of North Carolina Press, (Kindle Edition), 2017.
- Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative: Fort Sumter to Perryville. New York: Vintage Books, 1958.
- Kennedy, Frances H. (ed.), The Civil War Battlefield Guide. James M. McPherson, The Conservation Fund, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990.
- Long, E.B. with Long, Barbara, The Civil War Day by Day. New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971.