When Confederate Lieutenant-General James Longstreet abandoned his siege of Knoxville, Tennessee, in early December, he decided not to reunite his small army with the Confederate Army of Tennessee at Dalton, Georgia. Instead, Longstreet would stay in northeastern Tennessee in hopes of persuading local residents, most of whom were Unionist, to switch allegiance to the Confederacy. Longstreet’s force headed northeast of Knoxville.
Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside, commanding the Federal Army of the Ohio at Knoxville, learned that Longstreet had lifted the siege and dispatched 4,000 cavalry troopers under Brigadier-General James M. Shackelford to pursue him on December 5. Two days later, Burnside followed up by sending Major-General John G. Parke’s Ninth Corps to join the pursuit.
As the pursuit got under way, Burnside’s request to be relieved as army commander was finally granted. He had long grown tired of the Lincoln administration’s intense scrutiny of his conduct, first as commander of the Army of the Potomac and then as commander of the Knoxville campaign. Burnside was replaced by Major-General John G. Foster.
Longstreet continued his withdrawal from Knoxville under Federal pursuit, reaching Rogersville in northeastern Tennessee on the 9th. His Confederates stopped there to rest and gather supplies. Meanwhile, the combined Federal force of Shackelford and Parke continued its pursuit. Shackelford’s troopers periodically clashed with Confederate cavalry along the Holston River over the next few days, particularly around Bean’s Station, just southwest of Rogersville. Parke’s infantry halted at Rutledge, farther southwest, due to a lack of provisions.
On the 12th, Longstreet received word that Major-General William T. Sherman’s Federals, who had come to rescue Burnside from the Knoxville siege, were heading back to Chattanooga. With Burnside’s (now Foster’s) army weakened, Longstreet decided to turn back and go on the offensive. He had hoped to last the winter by living off the forage along the Holston River. To do so, he needed to drive the pursuing Federals away, “or force him to come out and fight us.” But the Federals seemed content to remain at Bean’s Station. Longstreet therefore resolved to reverse his withdrawal by moving southwest on the road from Rogersville to Rutledge.
Longstreet’s initial plan was to “cut off the advance force at Bean’s Station by… marching the main column down the valley to capture this advance part of the command.” He informed President Jefferson Davis, “I presume that the enemy’s force now in East Tennessee will amount to about 27,000. Mine should reach 20,000.” He originally had just 15,000, but Major-General Robert Ransom’s Confederates in West Virginia were moving south to join him. Longstreet continued:
“We are in some distress for want of shoes and other clothing, and are in want of horseshoes, and are a little short on ammunition; yet I dislike to move farther east unless my troops are really necessary at some other point. The season is so far advanced that I can scarcely hope to get shoes in time to accomplish much, and I dislike to venture out at so late a period without shoes.”
Shackelford had been observing Confederate movements and expected an attack, but he only expected a cavalry skirmish intended to block his pursuit, not an all-out attack intended to destroy him. The Confederates cooked three days’ rations on the night of the 13th, and before dawn the next morning they embarked on a 16-mile forced march, trudging along on roads turned to mud by pouring rain.
Shackelford reported to Parke at Rutledge, “The patrols on the roads to the river saw nor heard nothing of the enemy.” But when the Confederates approached around 2 p.m. on the 14th, skirmishing began and Shackelford wrote, “I am thoroughly satisfied that Longstreet’s command is in our front, and I think his cavalry is moving down the river.” Shackelford was right.
Longstreet sent two cavalry divisions under Major-General William T. Martin down the Holston to get behind the Federal right and rear west of Bean’s Station, while the infantry and artillery kept the front occupied. Two cavalry brigades under Brigadier-General William “Grumble” Jones would move to cut the Federal line of retreat to Rutledge.
Shackelford had just 5,000 men to face Longstreet’s 12,000, but many Federal units had Spencer repeating rifles that helped even the odds. Shackelford positioned his men on a defensive line between Clinch Mountain to the north and Big Ridge to the south. Both sides began trading artillery fire as two Confederate infantry brigades advanced.
The Confederates were stopped by the deadly artillery fire at least twice, but they resumed their advance after each stoppage. When Longstreet saw the Federal line waver, he sent in Brigadier-General Bushrod R. Johnson’s division. The Federals fell back but then held firm once more. Longstreet then committed Major-General Lafayette McLaws’s division. This finally broke the Federal line and sent the enemy in retreat.
Casualties were remarkably low for such a violent engagement, with both sides losing less than 200 men. Longstreet committed only about 4,200 of his 12,000 effectives. He claimed victory, but he soon learned that it was not the complete victory he hoped for. Martin’s cavalry was blocked from the Federal rear by enemy troopers, and Jones’s cavalry was held up capturing a wagon train. Consequently, the Federal line of escape to Rutledge remained open.
When Parke learned of the engagement, he sent his forces at Rutledge forward to support Shackelford. He reported to Foster at Knoxville, “The fight will probably be renewed tomorrow. If this division of infantry cannot hold them in check, I will fall back on the road to Knoxville.”
On the 15th, the Federals set up defenses between Bean’s Station and Rutledge as Parke sent the rest of the Ninth Corps forward to support them. Foster reported, “General Longstreet, however, did not attack, in consequence, probably, of the very inclement weather, which then set in with such severity as to paralyze for a time the efforts of both armies.”
Actually, Longstreet did not attack because his troops did not come up in time. Two brigades under Brigadier-Generals Evander M. Law and Jerome B. Robertson did not arrive in vicinity of the Federal defenses until around 2:30 p.m., too late in Longstreet’s estimation to be effective. Also, McLaws’s division stayed back at Bean’s Station because McLaws stated that his men needed to eat. There would be consequences for these delays.
Bibliography
- Freeman, Douglas S., Lee’s Lieutenants: A Study in Command, Vol. 3. Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1944.
- Hess, Earl J. The Knoxville Campaign: Burnside and Longstreet in East Tennessee. Knoxville, Tenn: University of Tennessee Press, 2013.
- Longstreet, James, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co. (Kindle Edition), 1895.
- Stanchak, John E. (Patricia L. Faust ed.), Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War. New York: Harper & Row, 1986.