In the North, President Abraham Lincoln and General-in-Chief Ulysses S. Grant were under mounting criticism for sustaining such horrific casualties while Confederates under Lieutenant-General Jubal Early continued roaming throughout the Shenandoah Valle. Early raided as far north as southern Pennsylvania, and even threatened Washington. As Grant later wrote:
“It seemed to be the policy of General (Henry W.) Halleck and Secretary (of War Edwin M.) Stanton to keep any force sent there, in pursuit of the invading army, moving right and left so as to keep between the enemy and our capital; and, generally speaking, they pursued this policy until all knowledge of the whereabouts of the enemy was lost. They were left, therefore, free to supply themselves with horses, beef cattle, and such provisions as they could carry away from Western Maryland and Pennsylvania. I determined to put a stop to this.”
Major-General David Hunter commanded the Federal Department of West Virginia, but he had not been effective in stopping Early. In June, Grant had suggested putting Major-General Philip Sheridan (currently commanding the Cavalry Corps in the Army of the Potomac) in charge of such an operation, but Stanton rejected it on account of Sheridan’s young age, and Halleck opposed it because it might cause Hunter to resign. But now, having gotten Lincoln’s approval, Grant insisted that Sheridan be given the job. He notified Halleck on August 1:
“I am sending General Sheridan for temporary duty whilst the enemy is being expelled from the border. Unless General Hunter is in the field in person, I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes let our troops go also. Once started up the Valley they ought to be followed until we get possession of the Virginia Central railroad.”
Grant also recommended that the four departments surrounding Washington and the Valley be merged into one central command, with Sheridan commanding in the field and Hunter handling the administrative duties. The new 37,000-man army would consist of Hunter’s Army of West Virginia, three divisions of the Sixth Corps (from the Army of the Potomac), two divisions of the Nineteenth Corps (from the Army of the Gulf), two divisions from Sheridan’s Cavalry Corps, and 12 artillery batteries.
Grant sent Sheridan to take command without waiting for approval from Halleck or Stanton. Grant had considered giving the command to Major-General George G. Meade (commanding the Army of the Potomac), but Grant explained to him that Lincoln feared transferring him because it would look like he was giving Meade a smaller command as punishment for not yet capturing Petersburg or Richmond. Grant added that he wanted a commander who was aggressive enough not only to destroy Early’s army but to also lay waste to the Valley so it was no longer useful to the Confederate war effort, and he was not sure that Meade was the man for such an assignment.
Meanwhile, Hunter’s Federals remained camped on the Monocacy River in Maryland, unable to chase down Early’s Confederates. Hunter reported on the 1st, “It appears impossible for the officers of the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps to keep their men up. So many are suffering from sunstroke, and all from the intense heat and constant marching, that I fear, unless they have some rest, they will be rendered very inefficient for any service.”
Halleck informed Grant, “If Sheridan is placed in general command, I presume Hunter will again ask to be relieved. Whatever you decide upon I shall endeavor to have done.” Halleck wrote again at 2:30 p.m. on the 3rd:
“Sheridan had just arrived. He agrees with me about his command, and prefers the cavalry alone to that and the Sixth Corps… He thinks that for operations in the open country of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Northern Virginia cavalry is much better than infantry, and that cavalry arm can be much more effective there than about Richmond or south. He, therefore, suggests that another cavalry division be sent here, so that he can press the enemy clear down to the James River.”
Grant replied, “Make such disposition of Sheridan as you think best.” Lincoln wrote Grant that same day:
“I have seen your despatch in which you say ‘I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself South of the enemy, and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also.’ This, I think, is exactly right, as to how our forces should move. But please look over the despatches you may have received from here, even since you made that order, and discover, if you can, that there is any idea in the head of any one here, of ‘putting our army South of the enemy’ or of following him to the death in any direction. I repeat to you it will neither be done nor attempted unless you watch it every day, and hour, and force it.”
This was the first advice that Lincoln offered Grant since he became general-in-chief, and it was meant to warn him about how Washington bureaucrats tended to disrupt military planning. Grant responded on the 4th, “I will start in two hours for Washington & will spend a day with the Army under Genl Hunter.” Grant would not stop at Washington to consult with anybody; he would go directly to Hunter’s headquarters on the Monocacy.
Grant placed Major-General Benjamin F. Butler, commanding the Army of the James, in temporary command of the Petersburg siege. He wrote, “In my absence remain on the defensive, notifying General Meade that if attacked he is authorized to call on such of your troops as are south of the Appomattox. Only expecting to be gone three days I will not relinquish command. But being senior you necessarily would command in any emergency.”
Confederate General Robert E. Lee was informed of the new Federal army being formed and notified President Jefferson Davis, “I fear that this force is intended to operate against General Early, and when added to that already opposed to him, may be more than he can manage. Their object may be to drive him out of the Valley and complete the devastation they commenced when they were ejected from it.”
Lee and Davis agreed that they must reinforce Early’s Confederates to protect the Shenandoah Valley harvests and the Virginia Central Railroad needed to sustain the Army of Northern Virginia under siege at Petersburg.
Bibliography
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