Confederate General-in-Chief Robert E. Lee conceded that his army’s defeat at Fort Stedman meant that Petersburg and Richmond had to be abandoned. The defeat also ended any hopes Lee might have had to keep Federal General-in-Chief Ulysses S. Grant and Major-General William T. Sherman from joining forces. Now Lee’s only chance was to lead his Army of Northern Virginia southwest to link with General Joseph E. Johnston’s Confederates in North Carolina. And even then victory would be nearly impossible; the best that Lee could hope for was to fend off the Federals long enough for northerners to lose patience with the war and demand its end.
The day after the battle, Lee explained to President Jefferson Davis why he authorized the assault on Fort Stedman and the subsequent withdrawal. He stated that as a result, “I fear now it will be impossible to prevent a junction between Grant and Sherman, nor do I deem it prudent that this army should maintain its position until the latter shall approach too near.” Lee’s army had dwindled to a startlingly low number:
- There were just 12,550 effectives north of the James River, where it would take them as many as two days to reach the right flank southwest of Petersburg.
- Major-General William Mahone’s division of about 4,000 held the vital Howlett line, which stretched between the James and Appomattox rivers and held both of Lee’s flanks together.
- Major-General John B. Gordon’s corps held a four-mile line east of Petersburg and contained just about 5,500 men.
- Lieutenant-General A.P. Hill’s corps held an eight-mile line to Gordon’s right with about 9,200 troops.
- Lieutenant-General Richard H. Anderson’s 4,800-man corps held the extreme right flank.
- Major-General George Pickett’s 5,000-man force was Lee’s only reserve, but low morale among the troops gave the force the highest desertion rate in the army.
Lee relayed a report stating that Johnston had just 13,500 effectives in his army, or about 8,000 less than previously reported. Lee wrote, “This could hardly have resulted from the casualties of battle, and I fear must be the effect of desertion.” In his own Army of Northern Virginia, Lee counted 1,061 desertions in just a nine-day span between March 9 and 18, not including cavalry or artillery. Lee wrote, “The number is very large and gives rise to painful apprehensions as to the future… I do not know what can be done to put a stop to it.”
General Anderson, asserted, “The depressed and destitute condition of the soldiers’ families was one of the prime causes of desertion, but the chief and prevailing reason was a conviction among them that our cause was hopeless and that further sacrifices were useless.” General Gordon wrote, “Everything was exhausted except devotion and valor.”
Estimating enemy manpower, Lee guessed that Sherman had about 60,000 men and Grant had about 80,000. This was far greater than the combined total of 63,000 for Lee and Johnston. But reality was even worse: Sherman actually had about 90,000 men and Grant had nearly 131,000. Lee concluded:
“If General Grant wishes to unite Sherman with him without a battle, the latter, after crossing the Roanoke, has only to take an easterly direction towards Sussex, while the former, moving two days march towards Weldon, provided I moved out to intercept Sherman, would render it impossible for me to strike him without fighting both armies. I have thought it proper to make the above statement to Your Excellency of the condition of affairs, knowing that you will do whatever may be in your power to give relief.”
Richmond officials began planning to leave town. President Davis would stay behind, but he arranged for his wife Varina and their children to leave. Davis told Varina, “My headquarters for the future may be in the field, and your presence would embarrass and grieve me instead of giving comfort.” When Mrs. Davis asked what she could do to help, Davis said, “You can do this in but one way: by going yourself and taking the children to a place of safety. If I live, you can come to me when the struggle is ended,” but he did not “expect to survive the destruction of constitutional liberty.” Davis also asked her not to take any food because “the people need it.”
On the Federal side, Grant arranged for Rear-Admiral David D. Porter to send gunboats up the Appomattox River to protect the supply base at City Point against a potential Confederate attack. Also, Major-General Philip Sheridan’s Federal cavalry troopers returned to the Petersburg front after wiping Confederates out of the Shenandoah Valley.
Sheridan had spent the last four weeks laying waste to the Valley, which included destroying the Virginia Central Railroad and the James River Canal. After determining that Lynchburg was too strong to attack, Sheridan headed back east. When Sheridan reported to headquarters on the 26th, Grant gave him written orders to lead his troopers south to join forces with Sherman in North Carolina. Grant later recalled:
“I saw that after Sheridan had read his instructions he seemed somewhat disappointed at the idea… I said to him: ‘General, this portion of your instructions I have put in merely as a blind;’… I told him that, as a matter of fact, I intended to close the war right here, with this movement… His face at once brightened up, and slapping his hand on his leg he said: ‘I am glad to hear it, and we can do it.’”
Sheridan was elated to be leading the final push against the Confederates in Virginia. He wrote, “Feeling that the war was nearing its end, I desired my cavalry to be in at the death.”
The marching orders that Grant had issued on the 24th went into effect as planned, as if the fight at Fort Stedman never even happened. Grant’s goal was to draw Lee out into an open fight. If he could not do that, he would cut the Boydton Plank Road and the South Side Railroad, Lee’s last two supply lines. According to Grant’s plan:
- Sheridan would lead three cavalry divisions west across Hatcher’s Run, past Lee’s right flank, and seize Dinwiddie Court House.
- The Second and Fifth corps under Major-Generals Andrew A. Humphreys and Gouverneur Warren would come out of their trenches south and west of Petersburg to support Sheridan.
- Three divisions from Major-General E.O.C. Ord’s Army of the James would move out of their trenches in front of Richmond and Bermuda Hundred and move south and west to take up positions in the trenches formerly held by Humphreys and Warren.
- Ord’s remaining three divisions under Major-General Godfrey Weitzel would remain in the Richmond-Bermuda Hundred trenches as a holding force north of the James River.
- The Sixth and Ninth corps under Major-Generals Horatio G. Wright and John G. Parke would continue holding the eastern sector of the Petersburg line, looking for any exploitable weakness in the Confederate defenses.
Meanwhile, Lee planned to withdraw his army along the South Side Railroad to its junction with the Richmond & Danville Railroad. From there the Confederates would follow the Danville line southwest into North Carolina. But the move had to be delayed because troops were still recovering from the Fort Stedman fight, the roads were still too muddy for wagons, and President Davis still hoped to hold Petersburg and Richmond. But whether they were ready or not, the spring campaign was about to begin.
Bibliography
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